Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Paul Seabury
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Richard C. Kraus

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1982



WORKERS IN THE USSR

A "Working Class"?
Alex Pravda

Labor Unrest
Betsy Gidwitz

Moscow and Europe's Peace Movements
J. A. Emerson Vermaat

Problems of Peace and Socialism
Wallace Spaulding

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Problems of Communism

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NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1982 VOL XXXI

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Cover: Soviet workers constructing the Baykal-Amur Railway shown near the new railroad town of Niya in September 1980. Photo by TASS from Sovfoto.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Is There a Soviet Working Class?
Alex Pravda

An examination of the realities beneath the political myth of a Soviet working class reveals a cleavage among Soviet manual workers between a low-skilled "working-class group" and a high-skilled "working-middle-class group." The first is politically conservative and relatively cohesive; the second overlaps in many regards with professionals, tends to be less content with the political status quo, but is also less cohesive.

Labor Unrest in the Soviet Union
Betsy Gidwitz

Rising labor unrest in the USSR appears to be precipitated by poor working conditions and persistent food and housing shortages. In the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union, the unrest links up with anti-Soviet resentments. Yet, the Soviet government has managed to contain worker strikes effectively by combining immediate material concessions with repression.

Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement
J. A. Emerson Vermaat

The Soviet Union has waged a "peace" campaign in recent years aimed at preventing the modernization of the West European defense system. Moscow has activated the Soviet front organizations and utilized the organizational structure of several West European Communist parties in order to interact with indigenous peace groups and, thereby, influence public opinion in the West.

New Head, Old "Problems of Peace and Socialism"
Wallace Spaulding

The appointment of Yuriy Sklyarov as Editor-in-Chief of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* highlights the firm control that the Soviet Union has maintained over this important symbol of world Communist unity since its founding in 1958. This control, it should be noted, has been challenged by Albanian and Chinese Communists (who left the Editorial Council) and by other, non-ruling Communist parties in Europe and the Far East.

Essay-reviews

Cold War Complexities
Paul Seabury

The cold war had its origins in a setting of far greater political and military complexity than either traditional or revisionist historians would suggest. Battlefield exigencies prevented the early opening of the "Second Front" demanded by Stalin and promised by the Western members of the Alliance out of fear of a separate Soviet-German peace. The course of combat left Soviet troops in control of large swaths of European territory, but different Allied strategies could conceivably have provided Moscow an even larger European empire.

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Chernenko's Platform
Marc D. Zlotnik

Konstantin Chernenko has been campaigning actively for a top leadership position in the USSR. His writings and actions—betokening a man who is pragmatic and willing to try new policy initiatives—suggest that he has been making his appeal to reform-minded elements within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Gulag Literature
John Garrard

Although the number of those incarcerated in Soviet prison camps has decreased since Stalin's days, the Gulag system remains firmly in place. Some of those who experienced it and survived have described camp life. Yet, as was true 200 years ago under the tsars, today's authorities in the USSR are still able to prevent this literature from reaching its intended audience—the general public.

Intellectuals and the State in China
Richard C. Kraus

The state and the intellectuals in China have historically shared a mutual dependence—in exchange for serving the state, the intellectuals were assured a social position. In modern times, however, the intellectuals have been caught in the dilemma of both wanting to serve the state and to be its critics. The adjustment of the intellectuals to these ambiguities in the People's Republic of China makes an absorbing story.

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Workers in the USSR

EDITORS' NOTE—The nature of the Soviet working class and its political orientation are questions of obvious concern for the new leadership in Moscow and for decision-makers in the West who must assess prospects for stability or instability in the USSR. In the first article below, Mr. Pravda explores the mythical concept of the "working class" that figures importantly in Soviet ideology, and delineates the differing attitudes of two distinctive class-like groupings discernible among Soviet manual workers. In the second, Ms. Gidwitz looks at specific problems of worker life in the USSR and presents evidence of a rising incidence of worker unrest.

Is There a Soviet Working Class?

by Alex Pravda

Of all the political myths sustaining the Soviet system that of the "working class" is the most powerful and the most overloaded. It is in the name of the working class that the Communist party rules and in its interests that party policies are launched. Indeed, working-class interests have long been held to be synonymous with those of nation and state. Not only is the working class seen as legitimizing current party and state power; it also projects regime legitimacy into the future by standing as the symbolic vanguard of Soviet progress toward "classless" communism. Working-class values are exemplified in the "new Soviet man," and working-class energies supposedly fuel economic development.

At the same time, the "working class" also poses certain conceptual problems. How can the working class continue to play a leading political role within an "all-people's state"? Where does the working class as economic vanguard fit in with the notion of the "scientific-technological revolution"—and thus of scientists and technologists—as the cutting edge of development? By what metamorphosis can the working class transform itself and lead society to socialist classlessness? Such questions, it may be argued, belong to the realm of political theology and can always be "resolved" by *ex cathedra* pronouncements.[1] To make such resolutions and explanations even barely plausible, however, the working class as myth must be kept separate from the working class as social reality.

Mr. Pravda is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Reading, England. Author of Reform and Change in the Czechoslovak Political System, January-August 1968 *(1975), he has contributed articles on workers in Eastern Europe to* Canadian Slavonic Papers *and* Soviet Studies *as well as to several compendia.* *The author expresses his gratitude to the National Council for Soviet and East European Research for financial support of his current comparative study of workers and politics in Communist states from which the present article is drawn and to the Nuffield Foundation for travel funds that made possible the collection of additional material.*

[1] For instance, one recent commentary by the Editor-in-Chief of *Kommunist* (Moscow) insisted that the advent of Communist society should be conceived in terms of "Communist transformation" rather than the disappearance of the working and other classes. See R. Kosolapov, "The Attacking Class," *Pravda* (Moscow), July 31, 1981, p. 2.

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Keeping the two apart presented few problems as long as Soviet social-scientific research was strictly subordinated to ideological dogma. Since the early 1960's, however, Soviet academic studies of the working class have largely abandoned traditional sloganistic discussions in favor of empirically-based analyses. The best of these studies highlight the heterogeneity of the Soviet working class and depict it as comprising various strata grounded in the division of labor. This empirical approach yields a picture of Soviet society in which stratifications by skills, education, income, and cultural attributes within and across class divisions assume greater salience than class distinctions themselves. Understandably, such Soviet analyses stop short of any full-fledged model of permanent stratification, but they do provide components from which one can be constructed. Indeed, Soviet traditionalists object to these "empirical" concepts of the working class both because they smack of bourgeois stratification and because they attempt to shift the vanguard role in society from the working class to the intelligentsia and technocrats.[2]

Expressed in academic debate, these different views reflect and foster considerable political flexibility on the subject of the working class and social differentiation in general. Provided that the power and political aspects of working-class unity and loyalty remain unquestioned, Soviet authorities seem to be favorably disposed to the empirical approach, which makes it possible to come to grips with social realities quite beyond the scope and capacity of traditional class theory. Also, the framework of stratification provides a politically acceptable account of existing social inequalities. Since differences and inequalities between strata are explained in terms of the division of labor, their disappearance becomes a function of development rather than of social or political change. Finally, fragmenting of the working class and other groups into composites of finely differentiated, noncumulative strata produces a complex social picture which can be used to camouflage embarrassing underlying patterns and thus perpetuate the political myth of the "working class."

Implicit in all the Soviet debates about the working class is the crucial question of whether workers (1) form a variety of different strata depending on the social attribute examined or (2) cluster in class-like groups with similar stratification across a number of attributes. The first image fits into a larger social picture of "nonegalitarian classlessness"; the second, with its connotations

The symbol of the working man figures strongly in Soviet official ideology, as seen in this giant poster from the 1979 May Day parade in Moscow.

—Sipa Press from Black Star.

of differing class interests, is far more difficult to reconcile with the "working class" as political myth.

Even Western scholars, free from the restraints that hamper their Soviet colleagues, have found this question difficult to resolve. Some apply Marxist criteria and see all blue-collar workers and employees, however stratified, as belonging to a politically homogenous working class.[3] To others, workers as a group appear highly "fragmented" and hard to define—"in some respects homogenous and in some a heterogenous category."[4] Clearly there is no simple or easy answer.

Much depends, of course, on what is meant by class. Traditional Marxist class criteria seem unlikely to be useful in a society where the state owns the means of production. Given the continuing salience of occupational, educational, material, and prestige distinctions and inequalities, Weberian concepts of market capacity,

[2] Some of the most interesting and scholarly empirical studies are those by sociologists O. I. Shkaratan, N. A. Aitov, Yu. V. Arutyunyan and E. K. Vasil'yeva. For an excellent discussion of the Soviet debates, see M. Yanowitch, *Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union. Six Studies,* London, Martin Robertson, 1977, ch. 1.

[3] See, for instance, D. Lane and F. O'Dell, *The Soviet Industrial Worker,* London, Martin Robertson, 1978, pp. 44-50.

[4] W. D. Connor, *Socialism, Politics and Equality. Hierarchy and Change in Eastern Europe and the USSR,* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1979, p. 81; see also Yanowitch, op. cit., p. 32.

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life chances, and status appear to be more appropriate. The category of "class group"[5]—an amalgam of Weber's notions of "class" and of "status group"—seems a useful tool of analysis in examining problems of workers and the working class. The concept of "class group" contrasts with the category of "social stratum." A stratum includes individuals who are similarly ranked along a certain scale of differentiation, be it in terms of income, education, or sports activities. Quite conceivably, individuals may belong to different strata in different spheres of their lives, which is the kind of stratification pattern emerging from many of the Soviet empirical studies of the working class. Membership in class groups, by contrast, cannot vary, since such groups are the "multibonded" products of converging dimensions of differentiation. Members of a class group share common locations across several dimensions of differentiation; their social attributes cluster together horizontally.[6] Such attributes need not be exclusively connected with work or the material economy, as in traditional concepts of class. They may also relate to educational resources and opportunities, mobility chances, prestige, and influence. Most important, class groups—unlike strata—cannot exist in a social vacuum. They are defined in relation to and by comparison with other class groups, i.e., by relative rather than absolute inequalities and differences in the resources at their disposal.

Below, I shall map the social contours of Soviet workers according to various dimensions: material resources, educational assets and opportunities, prestige, mobility chances, and influence and power. In all these dimensions, the focus will be on assessing the extent to which the respective attributes divide blue-collar workers among themselves and how clearly they set these workers apart from other occupational groups. In short, are workers so interwoven into the social fabric as not to be readily discernible or are the fibers of blue-collar attributes sufficiently distinctive and clustered to make them stand out clearly? Furthermore, I shall attempt to compare blue-collar distinctiveness across the various dimensions so as to gauge the evidence for the existence of class groupings among Soviet workers. Last, to complement the examination of workers' objective attributes, I shall explore how these attributes are felt and perceived. Blue-collar workers' perceptions of their resources and position may throw some light on the nature of workers' interests, an issue central to the whole problem of the "working class" as a political category.

[5] This category was coined by Alex Inkeles. See "Myth and Reality of Social Classes," in A. Inkeles and K. H. Geiger, Eds., *Soviet Society: A Book of Readings*, Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin, 1961, pp. 560–61.

[6] The multibonded nature of class is stressed in D. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1965, pp. 124 ff.

Occupational Distinctions

The obvious place to begin such an investigation of the Soviet "working class" is the broad occupational categories used in official Soviet class statistics. These define the working class as all manual workers in the state sector, including those on state farms (collective farmers constitute a separate class by virtue of their distinctive property relations). Workers are contrasted to "employees"—a catch-all class category for all persons engaged in nonmanual work in the state sector. Since the major distinctions of job type and work environment dividing state farm workers from non-agricultural workers are far more important than the property relations they share, we shall treat workers throughout as blue-collar workers *outside* agriculture.

Even thus defined, workers and their families bulk very large in the population (see Table 1). However, over the last 20 years, their dominant share of total urban population has slowly declined in the face of the growth of white-collar groups. This shift from blue- to white-collar employment emerges more clearly when one looks at labor-force trends over the last two decades. As can be seen in Table 2, manual workers have lost ground steadily to non–manual employees, especially to the burgeoning professional and semi-professional specialists, a group that has more than tripled in size. At the same time, the profile of the blue-collar labor force has undergone gradual change. Increasing numbers of blue-collar workers are moving into nonproduction jobs in the service sectors, which have expanded far more rapidly than the traditional industrial core of the working class.

These trends are typical of modern industrial societies. What distinguishes the Soviet Union from the West in this regard is the slow pace of change. By Western standards, the Soviet working class remains unusually large and heavily anchored in traditional industrial sectors. Soviet manual workers also tend to have low skill levels, a profile closer in most respects to that of Italian rather than to that of American blue-collar workers (see Table 3). In the USSR, most industrial workers and the overwhelming majority of other blue-collar workers fall into the low- and semi-skilled bands. To be sure, over the last 20 years, the working class has taken on a more skilled profile. In this development, younger workers have rapidly climbed the skill ladder to dominate its higher rungs, leaving the lower echelons

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Table 1: The Soviet Population by Major Occupational Group, 1959–79[a]

Occupational group	1959	1970	1979	Growth (decline), 1959–79, in percent
TOTAL POPULATION				
Workers,[b] thousands	92,041	116,220	134,343	45.96
(as a percent of total population)	44.2	48.1	51.3	
Employees, thousands	41,903	54,552	65,667	52.42
(as a percent of total population)	20.1	22.6	25.1	
Collective and state farmers, thousands	74,270	70,204	61,925	(16.62)
(as a percent of total population)	35.4	29.1	23.6	
URBAN POPULATION				
Workers, thousands	66,033	89,247	106,066	60.62
(as a percent of urban population)	66.2	66.0	65.3	
Employees, thousands	30,478	42,629	52,908	73.59
(as a percent of urban population)	30.5	31.5	32.6	

[a] Total population is assigned to occupational group according to the occupation of the head of the houshold.

[b] The data for "workers" have been recalculated to exclude all state agricultural workers, who are instead grouped with collective farmers. The official percentages for workers in total population for 1959, 1970, and 1979 were 48.2, 56.7, and 60 respectively.

SOURCES: for 1959, *Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1959 g. SSSR (svodnyy tom)* (Results of the 1959 All-Union Census. USSR [Summary Volume]), Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1962, pp. 91–92, 159; for 1970, *Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 g.* (Results of the 1970 All-Union Census), Vol. 5, Moscow, Statistika, 1973, pp. 8–9, 26, 295; and for 1979, census results given in *Vestnik statistiki* (Moscow), No. 1, 1981, pp. 66–67.

Table 2: Composition of the Soviet Nonagricultural Workforce, 1960–80

	1960	1970	1980	Percent growth 1960–80
TOTAL NONAGRICULTURAL WORKFORCE				
All manual workers, thousands	39,513	55,978	68,117	72.4
(as a percent of total nonagricultural workforce)	72.2	69.7	67.9	
All non–manual workers, thousands	15,196	24,356	32,273	112.4
of which, specialists,[a] thousands	3,545	6,853	12,073	240.6
MANUAL NONAGRICULTURAL WORKFORCE				
Industrial workers, thousands	19,701	26,631	30,479	54.7
(as a percent of total man. nonagric. workforce)	49.9	47.6	44.7	
Construction workers, thousands	5,393	7,174	8,460	56.9
(as a percent of total man. nonagric. workforce)	13.6	12.8	12.4	
Transport and communications workers, thousands	5,610	7,416	9,466	68.7
(as a percent of total man. nonagric. workforce)	14.2	13.2	13.9	
Nonproduction service-sector workers, thousands	8,809	14,757	19,712	123.8
(as a percent of total man. nonagric. workforce)	22.3	26.4	28.9	

[a] All those with higher education or specialized secondary education employed in professional and semi-professional positions.

SOURCES: *Vestnik statistiki* (Moscow), No. 8, 1980, pp. 76–77; and *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1980 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1980), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1981, p. 367.

largely to older blue-collar workers.[7] Just the same, trends toward a higher-skilled working class have slowed in recent years even according to the official skill grades for industrial labor. And such data give an overly rosy picture, for large numbers of younger skilled workers—particularly women—are actually employed in lower-skilled jobs, which enterprises cannot manage to eliminate.[8] There seems to be little prospect this situation will change, given the sluggish pace of mechanization and automation. What is more, the sectors where

[7] E. K. Vasil'yeva, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaya struktura naseleniya SSSR (statistiko-demograficheskiy analiz)* (The Socioeconomic Structure of the Population of the USSR [A Statistical-Demographic Analysis]), Moscow, Statistika, 1978, pp. 93–94.

[8] Recent research on Gor'kiy Oblast revealed that the actual number of those doing simple manual jobs was two-thirds greater than official figures showed. See P. N. Fedoseyev, "The Working Class and Scientific-Technical Progress," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* (Moscow), No. 4, 1980, p. 17.

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Table 3: Skill Groups Among Blue-Collar Workers, a Comparison

(in percent, rounded)

	Soviet Union							United States	Italy
	Industrial manual workers			Urban manual population[a]					
				Total		Health and social security	Industrial	All manual workers	Industrial manual workers
Skill level	1962	1972	1979	1959	1970	1970	1970	1965	1972
Low- and unskilled	38	28	26	26	19	77	16	15	29
Semi-skilled and skilled	49	52	51	68	75	22	75	41	38
High-skilled	13	21	23	6	6	1	9	44	34

[a] Calculated as the total of urban manual workers and their families.

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: for Soviet industrial manual workers, *Vestnik statistiki* (Moscow), No. 11, 1973, p. 78, and No. 6, 1980, p. 63 (the three skill levels were derived by pairing the first and second, third and fourth, and fifth and sixth skill grades—*razryady*); for the Soviet urban manual population, calculated from census data given in O. I. Shkaratan, O. V. Filippova, and L. G. Demidova, "Social Stratum and Profession," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* (Moscow), No. 3, 1980, p. 32 (compiled from census data); for the US, A. B. Shostak, *Blue-Collar Life*, New York, NY, Random House, 1969, p. 41; for Italy, C. Saunders and D. Marsden, *Pay Inequalities in the European Community*, London, Butterworth, 1981, p. 141.

the numbers of blue-collar jobs are expanding most rapidly are precisely those with the largest demand for unskilled labor.

This slow pace of change within the working class is viewed with concern by Soviet academics and politicians alike.[9] Not only do rising skill levels reflect technological progress; they are also regarded as a hallmark of a developed socialist society's advance toward classlessness. Since it is taken as axiomatic that social differentiation under socialism stems from the division of labor, the elimination of the divide between manual and mental work is seen as the main road to social homogeneity. Here highly skilled workers have a key role. Because workers operating complex machinery or supervising automated production lines spend a large part of their time on technical, nonmanual activities, they are seen as straddling the boundary between workers and the intelligentsia. Many Soviet empirical sociologists use the term "worker-intellectuals" to describe this skilled elite, which they view as the focal point of convergence between workers and the intelligentsia.[10] Traditionalists criticize such notions for elevating intellectual work above manual work and splitting the working class.[11] Ideological objections apart, the arguments surrounding the concept of "worker-intellectuals" do rest on the questionable equation of what is essentially manual work with complex mental work. Supervising automatic equipment may require little physical effort, yet it hardly qualifies as intellectually complex and demanding. Rather than "worker-intellectuals" these skilled workers might more fittingly be described as "worker-technicians." In skills and job content they do overlap with the technicians who make up the lower echelons of the semi-professional engineering-technical personnel (*inzhenerno-tekhnicheskiye rabotniki*—hereafter ITR's).

Together with craftsmen and other high-skilled manuals, these "worker-technicians" make up a skilled blue-collar elite amounting to no more than a tenth of the working class. Below them in the skill and job ladder come the mass of skilled and semi-skilled manual workers, employed as assembly-line workers, repairmen, and truck drivers in traditional sectors—industry, construction, and transport. At the bottom of the ladder is a large minority of low-skilled workers, typically old and female, employed in nonproduction sectors.

How socially significant are the occupational distinctions separating the working class from other groups or the skill/job lines that divide blue-collar workers into the three groups described? Do these skill groups undermine the notion of a unified working class or merely make its structure more complex? To answer such questions, we will begin by tracing the contours of occupational and skill groups in material and other terms.

[9] See A. Shalayev's report to the XVI All-Union Trade Union Congress, *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Mar. 17, 1982, p. 3; and A. Zdravomyslov, "The Social Sphere—Current Problems," *Kommunist*, No. 16, 1981, pp. 58–59.

[10] A. M. Gelyuta and V. I. Staroverov, *Sotsial'nyy oblik rabochego-intelligenta* (The Social Characteristics of the Worker-Intellectual), Moscow, Mysl', 1977, esp. pp. 53–57. Data for this work-content case for "rapprochement" may be found in T. V. Ryabushkin, "Indicators of the Social Development of the Working Class," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, No. 4, 1980, pp. 19–24.

[11] See, e.g., Ts. A. Stepanyan, "The Incontestable and the Controversial in the Discussion about the Social Structure of Soviet Society," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, No. 4, 1980, p. 80.

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The Material Dimension

To see how the material position of blue-collar workers relates to that of other groups we need to consider three general areas: pay, family income and assets, and consumption.

Pay. Given their professed commitment to a classless society, one might expect Soviet leaders to use pay policy to moderate the job-type differences that are proving so difficult to erase. At the same time, there has been an offsetting concern with maximizing efficiency in labor allocation and performance by using pay differentials. Thus, if in the period from the mid-1950's to the late 1960's pay policy tipped in favor of social equity, recent years have witnessed some movement in the other direction.[12] Overall, however, earnings differentials have become decreasingly salient as a factor separating blue-collar workers from other groups.

To be sure, pay still divides blue-collar workers clearly enough from senior professionals and executives. Senior management salaries may be three or four times as large as the pay checks of skilled workers; directors of important enterprises can earn six to eight times as much as the unskilled manual workers they employ. Needless to say, similar margins separate top specialists, administrators, and political leaders from the working class they lead.[13] On the whole, though, professional and managerial groups do not stand out clearly from blue-collar workers. While salaries of middle management remain comfortably higher than workers' wages, the pay of supervisors and foremen overlaps with that of skilled blue-collar workers. From 1965 to 1980, the average monthly pay of industrial workers grew from 58 percent to 85 percent of the average monthly pay of

[12] Thus, by 1976, the overall distribution of earnings had reverted to the same degree of inequality that existed in the early 1960's. See M. Ellman, "A Note on the Distribution of Earnings in the USSR under Brezhnev," *Slavic Review* (Champaign-Urbana, IL), December 1980, pp. 669–71. For a penetrating discussion of pay policy, see A. McAuley, *Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union: Poverty, Living Standards, and Inequality*, London, Allen and Unwin, and Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, pp. 182–86.

[13] See M. Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union: A Study of Elite Life-Styles under Communism*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1978, chs. 1 and 2. For management salaries, see J. C. Chapman, "Recent Trends in the Soviet Industrial Wage Structure," in A. Kahan and B. Ruble, Eds., *Industrial Labor in the USSR*, New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1979, pp. 157–59.

Members of a team that operates numerically-controlled machine tools at the Kirov turbine plant in the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv.

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ITR's. Over the same period, industrial workers maintained their traditional modest lead over clerical workers in industry.[14] Many skilled workers earn more than teachers and technicians and as much as doctors, and the earnings of the most highly skilled manual workers overlap with the salaries of middle-ranking engineers and managers. Pay, then, provides no clear-cut divide between blue-collar and white-collar workers at either extreme. It might be noted that the pay gap between industrial workers and state farm workers is also narrowing. Industrial workers now enjoy a 20 percent margin, half that of 20 years ago.[15]

What makes it still more difficult to discern any pay-based blue-collar working class are the pay differences that dissect the ranks of blue-collar workers themselves. According to official pay rates, the high-skilled can earn up to twice as much as their unskilled counterparts in the same factory. As few workers are actually paid at the lowest rates, real differentials in pay by skill are perhaps half the paper maximum, but even that is an appreciable distinction.[16] Moreover, there are important regional and sectoral pay differences. Those willing to live in inhospitable climates can earn up to twice as much as their less intrepid fellows. Blue-collar workers in the most developed republics are likely to be markedly better paid than those in Central Asia or Moldavia. And the industry in which one works may make an even greater difference. Those in heavy industry and high-technology plants—particularly those producing defense-related goods—can earn up to double the pay of their typically female counterparts employed in light manufacturing or in the consumer service sector.[17] Sector and skill thus combine to separate blue-collar workers widely. Taking the polar extremes, the pay elite of coal miners and skilled metalworkers can earn three times as much as factory or hospital cleaners. The unskilled worker in general is as far removed in pay from his skilled manual fellows as is the average industrial worker from middle management.

Income and material assets. If pay levels cut across and obscure distinctions based on occupation, data on family and per capita income confuse the picture still more. As can be seen from Table 4, in Leningrad machine-building enterprises in 1970, differences in income between workers' families and management families were only a fraction of the pay distance between workers and managers. Data from a recent survey of Soviet émigrés, shown in the same table, confirm that income flattens differences between occupational groups, but perhaps less dramatically than suggested by the Leningrad study. And, the survey data indicate, outside the manufacturing sector, income differences may be somewhat greater than pay differences. While professionals in these other sectors actually lagged behind production workers in pay, they led them in per capita family income. (The same kind of switch is observable in the Odessa data displayed in Figure 1 on p. 9.) The reasons appear to be twofold. In the first place, production workers outside manufacturing received less from social consumption funds, from relatives, and from other nonwage sources than did service workers, white-collar, or professionals. More important, they also possessed less family earning power: secondary wage earnings were lower, and less income was derived from "additional" activities (frequently in the "second economy"). It is worth noting that here again the main dividing line runs through blue-collar ranks rather than between manual workers and non–manual workers. Similarly, with regard to per capita income, production workers cluster with ITR's, and service workers cluster with office workers.

A somewhat clearer picture of how income is occupationally patterned emerges from the data on Taganrog in Figure 1. In that city, income per family member among unskilled workers was more than twice as likely as that in professional and semi-professional families to fall below the poverty line. Skilled workers and clericals were not as disadvantaged, yet were still appreciably worse off than members of the professional and semi-professional groups, who were clearly skewed toward the affluent category.[18]

Looking at material assets, we find that distinctions along occupational lines stand out more rather than less sharply. Higher-income nonmanual groups typically benefit most from subsidized services like cafeterias, health care, and housing. For example, although little differentiates unskilled workers and managers when it comes to the number of square feet of dwelling space, greater disparities appear when one considers the type of housing occupied. Twice as many managers and pro-

[14] *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1980 g. Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1980. A Statistical Yearbook—hereafter *Narkhoz 1980*), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1981, pp. 364–65.

[15] Ibid.

[16] O. I. Shkaratan, O. V. Stakanova, and O. V. Filippova, "Features of the Social Growth of the Soviet Worker (On the Basis of Materials Relating to Leningrad Workers, 1918–1977)," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya,* No. 4, 1977, p. 41. In Leningrad machine-building, the gap between average pay for the most skilled and for unskilled workers narrowed from 33 percent to 25 percent between 1965 and 1976/77.

[17] Chapman, loc. cit., pp. 154–55. For regional differences, see McAuley, op. cit., chs. 5 and 6; and Gertrude Schroeder, "Regional Income Differentials: Urban and Rural," in *Regional Development in the USSR: Trends and Prospects* (from a NATO colloquium held in Brussels in 1979), Newtonville, MA, Oriental Research Partners, 1979, pp. 28–29.

[18] Socially significant as social group patterning at the income margins may be, it must be seen within the general context of relatively narrow income differences: in Odessa and Taganrog, some two-thirds of all occupational groups fell into the average-income band.

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Table 4: Some Comparative Data on Pay, Income, Housing, and Education in the USSR

(comparative indices)

A. Pay, income, housing, and education in Leningrad Machine-Building, 1970.

	Workers	Routine white-collar workers	Routine ITR's	Lower management	Senior ITR's	Managers
Average pay	100	76	101	115	126	155
Per capita family income	100	93	100	102	108	115
Square meters of dwelling space	100	93	99	101	101	110
Average number of years of education	100	126	157	118	182	144

B. Family earnings and income in émigré sample, 1972–74.

	Manufacturing			All branches				
	Production workers	Professionals[a]	Managers	Production workers	Service workers	Managers	Professionals	Office workers
Main earner's wages	100[b]	102	132	99	77	132	97	89
Other wage income[c]	100[d]	101	132	107	126	128	123	128
Nonwage income	100[e]	184	160	134	266	185	251	185
Income per family member	100[f]	100	127	102	108	129	113	106
Number of families	*130*	*76*	*125*	*285*	*55*	*325*	*308*	*21*

[a] Mostly engineers and technicians (ITR's).
[b] Equal to 176.8 rubles a month.
[c] Secondary earners, plus additional jobs held by main wage earner.
[d] Equal to 136.1 rubles a month.
[e] Equal to 16.4 rubles a month.
[f] Equal to 98.6 rubles a month.

SOURCES: for Leningrad, L. S. Blyakhman, *Proizvodstvennyy kollektiv* (The Production Collective), Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p. 91, Table 6; indices for the émigré sample derived from the results of a "Family Budget Survey of Jewish Emigrants from the Soviet Union, 1972–74," in A. Vinokur and G. Ofer, "Family Income Levels for Soviet Industrial Workers, 1965–75," in A. Kahan and B. Ruble, Eds., *Industrial Labor in the USSR*, New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1979, p. 203, Table 9.9.

fessionals as workers live in self-contained, well-furbished apartments; even ITR's are better off than blue-collar workers in this respect.[19]

Here as elsewhere, though, other factors cut across occupational differences. The quality of housing varies considerably between town and country, between large and small cities, and from one economic sector to another. Those employed in power-engineering, for instance, undoubtedly benefit from the large investments recently made in housing construction for the workforce in that sector—50 to 60 times the amount spent for such purposes by the light-industry ministries.[20] Within sectors, too, much can depend on how large or important the enterprise is, as well as on management policy. As a result, a worker in a large enterprise of the machine-building industry may well be better housed than an engineer in a small processing plant of the food industry.

Consumption. Like income and housing, consumption differences separating workers from professionals are readily visible, but those distinguishing blue-collar workers from semi-professionals are harder to discern. Most workers, ITR's, and professionals share a common pool of consumer goods. Significant disparities appear only when one considers certain more expensive household items with which professionals are typically better supplied. Still, much depends on who is able to get to these items first. For instance, service workers in Odessa are apparently in a far better position to acquire consumer durables than are the more "affluent" workers in construction or even the intelligentsia of that city.[21]

Differences in consumption patterns may also reflect differing preferences rather than disparate resources. Workers continue to spend proportionately more on food and drink than professionals, who focus on household goods. Perhaps because income discriminates relatively little between groups, professionals concen-

[19] See Yanowitch, op. cit., pp. 40–41; and L. Blyakhman and O. I. Shkaratan, *Man at Work: The Scientific and Technological Revolution, the Soviet Working Class and Intelligentsia*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 179.

[20] V. Z. Rogovin, "Distributive Relations as a Factor in the Intensification of Production," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, No. 1, 1982, p. 12.

[21] V. S. Panyukov and V. M. Golovatyuk, "Social Passportization (*pasportizatsiya*) of a City's Labor Resources," ibid., No. 3, 1978, p. 191.

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Figure 1: The Distribution of Poverty and Affluence Among Soviet Social Groups

(percent falling above or below average-income band[a])



[a]In the case of Taganrog, families were divided into *vysokoobespechennyye* and *maloobespechennyye*—signifying those possessing many and those possessing few resources, respectively; these categories were taken to indicate family incomes falling above or below the average-income band. In the case of Odessa, per capita family incomes above 100 rubles and below 50 rubles a month were deemed to fall into the affluent and poor categories; the corresponding levels for pay of family heads were 140 and 80 rubles.

[b]*Engineering and technical workers.*

SOURCES: For Taganrog, A. Kh. Karapetyan and N. M. Rimashevskaya, *Differentsirovannyy balans dokhodov i potrebleniya naseleniya* (A Differentiated Balance of the Incomes and Consumption of the Population), Moscow, Nauka, 1977, p. 205 (a survey of 4,000 families); for Odessa, V. S. Panyukov and V. M. Golovatyuk, "Social Passportization (*pasportizatsiya*) of a City's Labor Reources," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* (Moscow), No. 3, 1978, p. 191 (a "fragment" of the social "passports" of the city).

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trate on accumulating goods that symbolize the social status they feel they possess. Indeed, there is some concern in the Soviet Union that as disposable income rises, consumption will increasingly become a major channel for expressing social differences, particularly between blue-collar and professional life-styles.[22]

What kind of map of workers and of the working class emerges, then, from contours drawn along material lines? At the margins, to be sure, material differences mirroring occupational groups are evident. Higher professionals and executives stand out as enjoying superior living standards. Conversely, unskilled workers are conspicuous among the poor, the badly housed, and the ill-provided. But, since the great majority of all occupational groups fall within the average, well-off band, it is difficult to detect any clear-cut economic classes according to occupation. A glance at the distribution of income and housing in Kazan', depicted in Figure 2, confirms that occupational groups overlap rather than spread into a hierarchy in this respect. Other factors further complicate the picture. To a large extent, each region, sector, or enterprise reproduces within itself the general material map. At the same time, where one works and lives can make more difference than what job one performs—regional and sector disparities cut across any notion of nationwide occupational-economic classes in the USSR. Material differences thus provide little basis for talking about a traditional Marxist working class.

Education

With regard to educational level, occupational groups become more readily discernible, with blue-collar workers both more cohesive and more clearly separated from non–manual workers in general and professionals in particular. Within the machine-building workforce in 1970, for instance, educational differences tended to sharpen the blue-collar/white-collar division, which the distribution of material resources blurred (see Table 4 on p. 8). Education and occupation are in fact more strongly bound together in the USSR than in most Western countries, including the United States.[23] Formal qualifications determine advancement through the occupational pyramid; higher education opens the door to employment as professionals and, increasingly, to executive ranks. Soviet society threatens to become a kind of "diplomacracy."

While education is central to the Soviet pursuit of an open, meritocratic, and efficient society, it has also been expected to foster social equality. The tension between these somewhat incompatible goals has been eased by the sheer volume of investment in education. Huge outlays over the past two decades have produced a situation where all youths now complete eight grades of general schooling, and the majority of young workers start their job with a complete ten-grade secondary education. This rise in educational levels has reduced disparities between skill groups and halved the education distance dividing blue-collar and white-collar workers. At the same time, the pace of change has opened up an educational gap between different blue-collar generations. In Moldavia, to take an extreme example, few of the oldest unskilled blue-collar workers are literate while, at the other end of the scale, some skilled young workers have completed specialized secondary education.[24] As suggested above, the growing minority of younger workers with vocational and technical diplomas blurs the educational divide between blue-collar workers and ITR's. Education thus underscores the skill and job contours that delineate the four-to-six million-strong category of worker-technicians.[25] Still, even this qualified blue-collar elite remains educationally distinct from the professional groups. Instead of the overlaps typical of the material hierarchy, workers are separated from the professional intelligentsia by a five-year educational gap.

This gap might seem hardly noteworthy in a social sense; it would be remarkable indeed if workers typically had college degrees. What is socially significant, though, is that higher educational opportunities are conditioned by occupational background—blue-collar children have a far slimmer chance of getting to college than those from white-collar, let alone professional, families. Educational paths diverge from the age of fifteen. Eighth graders from professional homes are twice as likely as blue-collar children to stay on for another two years in general secondary school; white-collar children,

[22] See, e.g., Zdravomyslov, loc. cit., p. 62. A rare discussion of consumption classes may be found in I. M. Rimashevskaya and L. A. Levkova, "On Methods of Clarifying Stable Types of Consumption," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya,* No. 2, 1978, pp. 137–39.

[23] Compare the 0.35–0.60 range of correlation for three Tatar cities in the late 1960's given in O. I. Shkaratan, *Problemy sotsial'noy struktury rabochego klassa SSSR* (Problems of the Social Structure of the Working Class of the USSR), Moscow, Mysl', 1970, pp. 373–75, with the figure of 0.292 given for the US in V. T. Covello and K. R. Bollen, "Status Consistency in Comparative Perspective. An Examination of Educational, Occupational and Income Data in Nine Societies," *Social Forces* (Chapel Hill, NC), December 1979, p. 533.

[24] Yu. V. Arutyunyan, L. M. Drobizhava, and V. S. Zelenchuk, Eds., *Opyt etnosotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya obraza zhizni (po materialam Moldavskoy SSR)* (An Ethno-sociological Study of the Way of Life [From Data on the Moldavian Republic]), Moscow, Nauka, 1980, pp. 262–63. Also see *Narkhoz 1980,* p. 30.

[25] See M. N. Rutkevich, "The Rapprochement Between the Working Class and the Engineering-Technical Intelligentsia," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya,* No. 4, 1980, p. 29; and Gelyuta and Staroverov, op. cit., p. 181.

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Figure 2: Soviet Educational, Material, and Prestige Hierarchies



SOURCES AND NOTES. The first two diagrams are based on indexes derived from a study of 3,516 Kazan respondents in 1974 given in O. I. Shkaratan and V. O. Rukavishnikov, "Social Strata in the Class Structure of a Socialist Society: An Attempt at Theory Building and Empirical Research," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* (Moscow), No. 2, 1977, pp. 68-69; the third diagram is based on occupational prestige scores compiled from (1) a sample of Leningrad secondary school graduates in 1965 (see V. V. Vozdinskaya, "Orientations Toward Occupations," in M. Yanowitch and W. A. Fisher, Eds., *Social Stratification and Mobility in the USSR*, White Plains, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1973, pp. 153-86 [use has been made here of scores as recalculated in D. J. Treiman, *Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective*, New York, NY, Academic Press, 1977, pp. 482-84]), and (2) results of a 1975 survey of 1,305 tenth graders in Kiev, given in V. F. Chernovolenko, V. L. Ossovskiy, and V. I. Paniotto, *Prestizh professii i problemy sotsial'no-professional'noy orientatsii molodezhi* (Occupational Prestige and Problems of the Socio-Professional Orientation of Youth), Kiev, Naukov Dumka, 1979, pp. 203-05.

All the scales involved have been reduced to a uniform 10-point range, and hence the diagrams are only a guide to the relative disposition of occupational groups.

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too, are more likely to take this higher education track. What happens to blue-collar children depends partly on the skill background of the parents. Roughly half of those with skilled parents continue into the ninth grade (often at one of the specialized secondary technical schools), a course followed by only a few pupils from unskilled families. For the most part, the latter go either straight into the factory, or enter trade school. In theory, the specialized secondary technical schools offer an alternative, rather than inferior, further education and can lead on to college. In practice, they cater to students with poorer academic prospects, few of whom make it into full-time higher education. For those who stay on in the general secondary school, the next critical juncture comes with graduation and competition for admission to college (more strictly speaking, to an institute of higher education, or VUZ—*vyssheye uchebnoye zavedeniye*). Here another process of social sifting takes place. Once again, relatively few students from blue-collar families get through the sieve. One Leningrad study in 1968 found that, regardless of skill background, only one in four secondary-school graduates with worker background went on to college, a path taken by the majority of those from white-collar, and nearly all from professional, families.[26]

The impact of such socially patterned flows through the school system on the composition of the student population in higher education is predictable. The figures in Table 5 show clearly the disproportionately low number of blue-collar children who get to this apex of the educational pyramid. Blue-collar presence also depends on which part of the apex one considers. More blue-collar students find their way into technical institutes than into universities, let alone into professional strongholds like the medical schools. Generally speaking, children from white-collar backgrounds are approximately three times as likely as those from workers' families to get to college. And the disparity between blue-collar and professional-group access is wider still. Even if youngsters from Soviet workers' families still stand a far better educational chance against professionals than do their West European counterparts, they are worse off in this respect than their American equivalents.[27]

However strenuously Soviet commentators may claim that such disparities are the result of equal competition based solely on talent, it is clear that educational success in the USSR, as elsewhere, remains socially conditioned. Social background, in fact, may be more important than performance at school. In the Leningrad study already referred to, children from unskilled blue-collar homes who had good grades were far less likely to get to college than were professionals' offspring with poor academic records. Blue-collar candidates for college entrance fare substantially worse than their academic equals from white-collar or professional backgrounds. One reason why blue-collar children do worse may lie in the fact that they rarely enjoy the benefit of private tutoring, on which white-collar and professional families lavish up to 1.5 billion rubles a year, a sum equal to one fifth of the total annual budget for general secondary schools.[28] Tutoring is only the most obvious and glaring way in which non–manual workers use the system to convert their own material capital into educational assets for their children. Social and cultural "capital" may be less tangible but is probably an even more important factor in giving children from white-collar, and particularly from professional, families a head start in the educational race. After all, learning is likely to be easier in a book-filled intelligentsia home than in a television-centered blue-collar household.

Concern about the ways in which the educational system works against blue-collar offspring has prompted various attempts by Soviet political leaders to reduce social inequalities in this sphere.[29] Responding to the lop-sided social profile of university students in Moscow and elsewhere in the late 1950's, Khrushchev shortened the odds against blue-collar children by giving priority to students with "production experience." As a result, white-collar numbers fell, blue-collar access improved, and disparities declined. However, anxiety that such egalitarian measures were damaging educational standards led to their reversal by Khrushchev's successor. Renewed stress on academic excellence then resulted in a larger influx of students from nonmanual background, and social-access disparities widened (see Table 5). So, in an attempt to balance equality with educational excellence, blue-collar children were given an alternative route to college. Since 1969, growing numbers of youngsters with work experience have taken one-year courses at special preparatory departments attached to VUZy. Judging from recent admissions figures, these policies have increased worker admissions to VUZy in general, but blue-collar access to the more selective university sector remains largely unchanged.

[26] See E. V. Vasileva, *The Young People of Leningrad: School and Work Opinions*, White Plains, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975, pp. 50–53.

[27] R. Boudon, *L'inégalité des chances* (Inequality of Opportunities), Paris, A. Colin, 1973, p. 86.

[28] Rogovin, loc. cit., p. 5. For an account of the tutorial "system," see R. Dobson, "Education and Opportunity," in J. G. Pankhurst and M. P. Sacks, Eds., *Contemporary Soviet Society: Sociological Perspectives*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1980, pp. 128–31.

[29] For a recent survey of changing Soviet policies on admissions to higher education, see M. Matthews, *Education in the Soviet Union: Policies and Institutions since Stalin*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1982, chs. 4 and 5.

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Table 5: Access to Full-Time Higher Education by Family Occupation, Selected Data for 1958–78

Family background	USSR, all years 1960	USSR, first year 1964	USSR, first year 1969–70	USSR, first year 1973–74	USSR, first year 1975–76
Worker, percent of students	35	39	37	44	46
Access ratio[a]	*0.70*	*0.73*	*0.65*	*0.73*	*0.74*
Employee, percent of students	46	41	54	49	47
Access ratio	*2.46*	*1.95*	*2.40*	*2.34*	*2.10*
Collective-farmer, percent of students	19	20	10	7	8
Access ratio	*0.61*	*0.79*	*0.48*	*0.37*	*0.45*
Disparity between access ratios of employees and workers[b]	**3.51**	**2.67**	**3.69**	**3.21**	**2.84**

Family background	Six regions, first-year day students 1973	1978 in European RSFSR[c] First-year students: All institutions	Technical	Medical	Moscow State University 1958	Moscow first-year day students, all institutions 1973
Worker, percent of students	31	35	43	23	20	24
Access ratio	*0.52*	*0.56*	*0.69*	*0.37*	*0.40*	*0.40*
Employee, percent of students	31	47	44	68	75	57
Access ratio	*1.72*	*1.52*	*1.42*	*2.21*	*3.99*	*2.10*
Of which:						
Specialist, percent of students		41	37	64		
Access ratio		*2.19*	*1.98*	*3.4*		
Collective-farmer, as percent of students	8	9	4	3	6	4
Access ratio	*0.62*	*1.36*	*0.58*	*0.46*	*0.18*	*0.25*
Other,[d] as percent of students	16	9	9	6		16
Disparity between access ratios of employees and workers[b]	**3.31**	**2.71**	**2.06**	**5.97**	**9.98**	**5.25**

[a] The access ratio is the relative weight of representatives of the social group in the student body divided by the group's weight in the population as a whole. In calculating these ratios, the social composition of the whole population was used except in data for 1973 and 1978, where data on the employed population were used (for the RSFSR only in 1978), and students were identified by the father's current occupation.

[b] Equal to the access ratio for employee children divided by that of worker children.

[c] Data for 13 cities of the European RSFSR.

[d] Apparently includes some types of military personnel and pensioners.

SOURCES: for 1960 and 1964, M. Matthews, *Education in the Soviet Union: Policies and Institutions Since Stalin*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1982, p. 159; for 1969–70, 1973–74, 1975–76, M. N. Rutkevich, *Vysshaya shkola kak faktor izmeneniya sotsial'noy struktury razvitogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva* (The Higher School as a Factor in the Transformation of the Social Structure of Developed Socialist Society), Moscow, Nauka, 1978, p. 110; for 1973, G. S. Slesarev, *Demograficheskiye protsessy i sotsial'naya struktura obshchestva* (Demographic Processes and the Social Structure of Society), Moscow, Nauka, 1978, p. 138; for 1978, Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Institut Sotsiologicheskikh Issledovanii, *Formirovaniye sotsial'noy odnorodnosti sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva* (The Formation of Social Homogeneity of Socialist Society), Moscow, Nauka, 1981, p. 102; for 1958, V. I. Mishin et al., "Problems of the Social Composition of the Contemporary Student Body," in *Sotsiologiya i vysshaya shkola II* (Sociology and the Higher School II), Gor'kiy, 1970, p. 9.

As is clear from Table 5, the poor chances for children of worker background to get into Moscow's VUZ network—the country's best—in the mid-1970's were only marginally better than 15 years earlier.

To be sure, far larger numbers of workers' children are now getting college degrees than in the late 1950's. Yet the socially divisive effects of education seem hardly to have diminished. Even as secondary education levels rise across the whole social-occupational spectrum, the requirements for entry into the professions and the intelligentsia tend to inflate. As the educational lines running between blue-collar skill groups and between skilled workers and technicians have become more fuzzy, those separating blue-collar workers from professionals have held fast. Precisely because material distinctions are becoming less salient, educational and cultural ones may become more prominent and refined. In this sense, the educational-occupational nexus is hardening rather than softening as the backbone of the Soviet social hierarchy.

Prestige Rankings

That a general social hierarchy exists in the public mind is borne out by evaluations of occupational prestige. Prestige rankings give us a good idea of the social esteem and status attached to various occupational

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Tension builds before exams for admissions to Moscow higher educational institutions in August 1978.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

groups. They throw light on the view from within, and thus serve as a useful complement to the distributions of "objective" resources discussed so far.

The very fact that Soviet citizens rank occupations hierarchically belies the official contention that whatever differences and inequalities may exist, they do not coalesce into any vertical order. Survey evidence reveals a ladder of occupational prestige that bears a remarkable resemblance to its counterparts in Western societies. As can be seen in Figure 2, manual workers occupy the lower and middle rungs of the Soviet prestige ladder, coming below the professionals but generally higher than low-level white-collar workers. Taken as a whole, blue-collar workers command more prestige in the Soviet Union than in Western industrial societies.[30]

Yet, as Figure 2 also shows, it is difficult to talk about any one level of blue-collar prestige, since worker occupations span the average and lower prestige bands. In fact, workers fall into three prestige groupings. The unskilled are placed on a par with agricultural laborers and most clerical workers (who do very poorly, even by Western standards) on the bottom rung of the ladder. All other workers cluster around the average prestige level, which they share with ITR's and other semi-professionals. The blue-collar workers here further divide into below- and above-average prestige categories. Most of the semi-skilled workers and also the highly-skilled worker-technicians fall into the below-average band, whereas skilled manual workers and craftsmen command appreciably more respect, and rank alongside the semi-professionals. It is these skilled workers, particularly those in heavy industry, who stand far higher in Soviet public esteem than do their equivalents in American society. Even so, this manual elite still comes well below the professionals, who attract possibly even more popular respect than such persons do in the West.

How do these blue-collar prestige rankings compare with the material and educational rankings? As Figure 2 shows, the configuration of prestige in some ways resembles an exploded version of rankings in the latter two dimensions. In each case, skilled and many semi-skilled workers are well-placed, outstripping routine white-collar workers and overlapping with the semi-professionals. Cause and effect, though, are difficult to disentangle. Should the high prestige commanded by the blue-collar skilled elite be attributed to their material well-being or does income here reflect, as well as underpin, status? Arguably, the official image of coal miners and steel founders as leaders of "socialist construction" may have played a part originally in boosting their pay. This, together with a halo of the traditional image, may help sustain their above-average ranking.

Yet neither income nor media image necessarily ensures social esteem. Take unskilled workers for instance. Despite the glorification of manual labor in the press and the relatively good money it brings, unskilled jobs have as little prestige as in the West. Education and work complexity provide a surer guide than earnings to the relative prestige of workers and professionals. Bus drivers may make more than doctors, just as most semi-skilled workers are better off than nurses, yet the situation is reversed when it comes to prestige and status. In general, specialized secondary education apparently does not suffice to compensate for middling material reward in the prestige scale (compare the educational and prestige locations of semi-professionals). But higher education seems to lift professionals well clear of blue-collar workers in the public mind.

Class Groups and Class Identification

Across the three hierarchies depicted in Figure 2, certain patterns stand out. In the lower segments, below the fourth point on the scale, one finds low-skilled manual workers and most clerical workers. Semi-skilled and skilled workers operating machinery fall fairly consistently into the lower half of the average range (between the fourth and fifth points), where some of the

[30] See D. J. Treiman, *Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective,* New York, NY, Academic Press, 1977, pp. 483–84.

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worker-technicians are also to be found. The skilled worker elite share the upper part of the average band (fifth to sixth points) with the rest of the worker-technicians and the semi-professionals. Only a few of the blue-collar elite penetrate the higher echelons dominated by professional and executive groups. If one stresses material factors, blue-collar workers, especially the unskilled, tend to cluster more in the lower part of the average band, which seems to approximate most closely a "working class."

So the distributions of job complexity and education, of material differences, and of prestige yield neither a simple picture of an inclusive "working class" nor one of a clear-cut blue-collar/white-collar divide. Instead, a synthesis of all three dimensions produces a structure suggesting three class groups: (1) a lower class group that includes agricultural laborers, many unskilled workers, and clerical workers; (2) an "average" class group made up of some unskilled, most semi-skilled and skilled blue-collar workers, together with some worker-technicians and the rest of the routine white-collar workers; and (3) an "above-average" class group embracing a blue-collar elite plus most semi-professionals but clearly inferior to upper professional and executive groups.

How real are these class groups to the persons we have placed in them? Including prestige as one of the contours in our social map helps to guard against constructing an "objective" picture of class that is totally out of line with the image of social structure that exists in the Soviet social mind. Still, prestige gives no clues how individuals class themselves. In the absence of published Soviet data on social identification, émigré evidence may be useful in enabling us to go beyond anecdotal generalization. A survey of recent Jewish and German émigrés from the USSR reveals that they evaluated their own former occupations in very much the same way as suggested by our class-group construct.[31] As can be seen in Table 6, just under half the workers in the surveyed group placed themselves within the working class. A handful of blue-collar workers located themselves at the upper and lower poles of the social spectrum. Of the remainder, a minority considered themselves to be "employees," while one in every four workers said they had belonged to the middle class. This measure of social "upgrading" is predictable—even in Britain a considerable proportion of skilled workers rate themselves middle class.[32] And it is among the skilled blue-collar workers here that middle-class or employee affiliation is greatest. The unskilled typically feel part of the working class. Not surprisingly, most technicians and white-collar workers gravitate to the middle-class/employee range. Professionals, on the other hand, identify very strongly with the intelligentsia. This identification is stronger than that of the unskilled with the working class.

If, as seems likely, this self-classification among Soviet émigrés is reflective of the self-classification of the Soviet population as a whole, the subjective class structure would differ markedly from official statistics. The "working class" would be significantly smaller, at around a third of the population, and would consist

[31] Émigré opinions on class identity, as well as on a variety of other issues discussed later in this article, are drawn from a survey of 1,161 émigrés--most of them Jewish—who left the Soviet Union in the later 1970's. The sample included 262 workers, a quarter of whom were ethnic Germans, the rest largely Jewish (a very few were Russian or Ukrainian). The survey project, entitled "Bureaucratic Encounters in the Soviet Union," was funded by a grant from the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. I am extremely grateful to the project's director, Zvi Gitelman of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, for allowing me to make use of the data collected. The process of extracting the data was greatly facilitated by the assistance of Wayne DiFrancesca.

[32] Nearly one in five did so in the early 1960's. See D. Butler and D. Stokes, *Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice*, London, Pelican Books, 1971, p. 97.

Table 6: Class Self-Identification of Recent Jewish and German Émigrés from the USSR

Responses to the question: "What social class did you belong to in the USSR?"

(in percent, rounded)

	Class identification						
Occupational group	Working	Lower	Middle	Employee	Intelligentsia	Higher	Other/ Don't Know
All workers (N=263)	46	4	22	16	7	1	2
Of which:							
Unskilled (N=88)	61	13	16	7	2	—	1
Skilled (N=175)	38	2	25	21	10	1	3
Employees (N=211)	9	2	25	36	26	2	—
Technicians (N=281)	15	1	24	29	28	1	3
Professionals (N=282)	3	1	9	7	74	2	4

SOURCE: from the survey project "Bureaucratic Encounters in the Soviet Union," directed by Zvi Gitelman of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and funded by a grant from the National Council for Soviet and East European Research.

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almost exclusively of blue-collar workers. At the other end of the spectrum would stand an intelligentsia, amounting to perhaps a fifth of the total and containing almost all professionals plus some ITR's and white-collar workers. In the middle would be the intermediate employee and middle classes—both numerically dominated by blue-collar workers and including most ITR's and some white-collar workers—embracing about one quarter of the population.[33] Thus, blue-collar workers divide themselves in class identification between a "working class" and a "working middle class."

Why do some workers think of themselves as members of the working class and others as belonging to the employee or middle class? It is obvious from Table 6 that there is a strong link between occupation and social-class identification. Income seems to play an insignificant part. Only those who are badly off materially place themselves in the lower class. Yet, blue-collar workers with high incomes are just as likely as those lower down the material scale to think of themselves as part of the working class. The correlation between education and class is the strongest. Among blue-collar workers, whether one has had grade-school or secondary-school education matters little, but specialized secondary education tends to produce identification with employees or the middle class. Needless to say, those with college degrees place themselves overwhelmingly among the intelligentsia.

Social Change and Mobility

Having discerned two class groups among workers, the next task is to see how these groups are formed and whether they are socially stable. Classes can exist, of course, regardless of whether their memberships are fluid or not. To use Joseph Schumpeter's analogy, classes may be like hotels and buses, always occupied but always by different people.[34] At the same time, the social flow through a class obviously affects its nature. A stable hereditary working class will be far more likely than one peopled by social transients to nurture working-class values and an awareness of class traditions and interests. Class depth fosters class solidarity.

Among Soviet blue-collar workers social depth is patchy. As can be seen in Table 7, large shallows of first-generation workers remain—as many as one in three workers in some areas are from a peasant background. Yet the flow from the villages to the factories has fallen off rapidly since World War II. Among the younger generation of industrial blue-collar workers, those from agricultural families are a dwindling minority. Nowadays almost as many workers have a nonmanual as have an agricultural background. By far the largest flow into the occupational working class, though, comes from blue-collar families. To be sure, few workers can trace "working class" antecedents beyond their grandparents; even in large cities perhaps only a fifth of the workers belong to what are officially described as "workers' dynasties."[35] But second-generation workers now typically form a majority among blue-collar workers even in less developed regions of the country. To this extent, the occupational working class has gained in social depth. Predictably, the hereditary core is far larger among industrial skilled workers than among unskilled labor in the service sector. Most workers' children try for the better-paid and more interesting skilled trades, leaving the more laborious jobs for incomers from the villages. Thus, social origins are yet another factor marking the unskilled off from other blue-collar workers. This source of distinction is declining, however, as ever larger numbers of second-generation workers find themselves having to take unskilled jobs. Coupled with the diminishing inflow from the countryside, this trend is creating a more socially homogenous blue-collar group. With three out of every four workers' sons following in their fathers' footsteps,[36] the process of social deepening is likely to continue.

At the same time, growing social stability and depth here does not necessarily mean greater class attachment. Among émigrés it was the hereditary skilled workers who figured most prominently in the working-middle-class group; those from peasant backgrounds felt more strongly drawn to the working-class group. And it is clear from Soviet evidence that most young workers follow in their fathers' footsteps as a matter of necessity rather than choice. Blue-collar school leavers find the professional office far more attractive than the shop floor. True, they set their sights somewhat lower than do children from intelligentsia families and aim to become engineers rather than research scientists. Yet, overwhelmingly, they want to follow a professional or at the least a semi-professional career. Nor do their parents urge them to continue in the family tradition.[37]

[33] These are approximate calculations and omit farm workers, since these did not figure in the émigré sample.

[34] Cited in R. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959, p. 220.

[35] G. M. Korostelev, B. S. Pavlov, and A. I. Savenkov, "Workers' Dynasties and the Upbringing of the Younger Generation," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, No. 4, 1978, p. 130.

[36] This was the rate of blue-collar inheritance revealed in the Vasil'yeva study cited in fn. 7. Vasil'yeva's 1974 study was conducted in Kazan', and the rate may well be higher in older industrial centers.

[37] G. A. Slesarev, *Demograficheskiye protsessy i sotsial'naya struktura sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva* (Demographic Processes and the Social Structure of Socialist Society), Moscow, Statistika, 1978, p. 214.

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Table 7: Social Origins of Soviet Blue-Collar Workers

(in percent, rounded)

Occupation of head of household at time of respondent's first job	Kazan', 1967	Leningrad, 1970 (in machine-building only)	Moscow Oblast, 1973	Chelyabinsk, 1973–74	21 machine-building enterprises 1971–78[a]
Worker	49.0	54.7	55.8	56.2	69.9
Peasant, collective farmer	31.9	14.5	15.2	18.7	17.2
White-collar worker	6.9	6.7	19.6	16.2	—
Semi-professional, professional	4.8	14.5	5.4	8.3	11.3[b]
Other	7.4	9.6	—	—	1.6

[a] Data from a study of 4,061 younger machine-building workers from diverse parts of the USSR.

[b] Only intelligentsia origins given.

SOURCES: for Kazan' and Leningrad, M. Yanowitch, *Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union. Six Studies,* London, Martin Robertson, 1977, p. 109; for Moscow Oblast and Chelyabinsk, G. A. Slesarev, *Demograficheskiye protsessy i sotsial'naya struktura sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva* (Demographic Processes and the Social Structure of Socialist Society), Moscow, Nauka, 1978, p. 116; for the 21 machine-building enterprises, V. I. Mukhachev, *Uchit'sya upravlyat': molodëzh v upravlenii gosudarstvennymi i obshchestvennymi delami* (Learning to Govern: Young People in the Administration of State and Social Affairs), Moscow, Znaniye, 1979, p. 40.

On the contrary, most workers are keen for their children to become specialists; few bring them up to admire the blue-collar life. Such attitudes are hardly conducive to building workers' dynasties or fostering pride in the working class. (They also compound shortages of manual labor.)

Why this general reluctance to take up blue-collar jobs? Evidently, media emphasis on the glory and value of physical labor and the privilege of belonging to the "leading" class has had less impact on public consciousness than the status conferred by education, the value of which has also been widely praised. Ambition to rise out of the working class is also part of an ethos of social mobility nurtured by decades of rapid social change plus constant encouragement to think in terms of self-improvement. Continuing the family tradition, in fact, may mean to many workers following their parents' example in climbing the social-occupational ladder.

But they find the climb increasingly difficult. The massive structural changes that gave their parents the scope for mobility have largely ceased. Whereas even after World War II most people were able to move up the occupational ladder, only a minority can now expect to do so. More recently, perhaps one in three blue-collar workers has been able to take up a nonmanual career. Of these, a largely female minority move sideways into routine white-collar jobs; the rest become professionals, or more commonly, semi-professionals. Typically, therefore, if workers' children move, they travel socially from the working class to the employee/middle class rather than to the intelligentsia. Only one in ten at most end up as professionals.[38] And they are likely to be from skilled "middle-class" rather than unskilled backgrounds. Blue-collar social ascent, in short, typically has now become a matter of climbing one rung—from skilled to semi-professional—rather than of skipping one or more as was frequently the case in the past. Gone for the most part are the days when workers could rise from the shop floor to engineer or manager by dint of practical "experience" and night-school qualifications.[39] Now engineers start on the job already equipped with all the appropriate paper qualifications. A college degree has become an essential passport for entry into professional ranks and thence into the intelligentsia.

Given the considerable social handicaps under which workers compete in the higher-education stakes, their chances of moving into the occupational and social uplands of Soviet society are far slimmer than those enjoyed by offspring of the intelligentsia. Those born to intelligentsia families are almost three times as likely as blue-collar offspring to enter professional ranks. Further, aspiring blue-collar offspring also have to compete on unfavorable terms with children from white-collar and semi-professional families.

This is not to argue that occupational and social class groups have become hermetically sealed and isolated from one another. Even if workers' opportunities for moving into professional ranks have declined, recent flows have been sufficiently strong to leave an appreciable imprint upon the intelligentsia—a third of its members come from blue-collar families.[40] Given this, there is surprisingly little social intercourse across the blue-collar/professional divide. Considerable social mixing does take place, however, between skilled blue-

[38] Vasil'yeva, op. cit., p. 94. Since Kazan', to which this figure refers, has a relatively mobile population, elsewhere still fewer workers may reach these social heights.

[39] See Yanowitch, op. cit., pp. 124–31; and O. I. Shkaratan and V. O. Rukabishnikov, "Social Strata in the Class Structure of Socialist Society. An Attempt at Theory Building and Empirical Research," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya,* No. 2, 1977, p. 72.

[40] See the results of several mobility studies set out in Yanowitch, op. cit., p. 109.

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Father and son working in the same Soviet factory: at left, Oganes Stepanyan, a prize-winning foreman; at right, his son Migran. The sign reads: "Here works a master tutor, Oganes Stepanyan."

—TASS from Sovfoto.

collar and semi-professional groups, i.e., within the social bounds of the working middle class. Increasingly now, ITR's come from skilled manual backgrounds. Conversely, as social room at the top contracts, more children from semi-professional families—and even some from professional homes—skid to the shop floor.[41] Both trends broaden the social base of the working middle class. And as the hereditary core of skilled blue-collar workers expands, the working class itself will drift increasingly in a middle-class direction.

Power and Influence

How does the distribution of power in Soviet society affect our composite picture of working-class, working-middle-class, and professional/upper-class groups? The status and material advantages that attend holding of positions of authority within bureaucratic hierarchies reinforce as well as reflect the divide between professionals on the one hand and the working-class and working-middle-class groups on the other. Admittedly, most enterprise directors and government officials do come from blue-collar families; many even started their working lives on the shop floor. Yet few if any retain social links with the working class; they are workers by reminiscence only. And even the ranks of officials from blue-collar backgrounds are decreasing rapidly in the face of the professionalization of management and administrative careers. The career path to positions of authority now lies through a standardized series of educational channels that militate strongly against the journey from shop floor to executive office. Once in the factory, blue-collar workers have only a fraction of the chance enjoyed by semi-professionals and professionals of achieving executive power.[42]

The invariable Soviet counter to such generalizations about the cumulation of social, educational, material, and power attributes is to point to blue-collar prominence within political organizations. And, indeed, impressive numbers of workers are deputies to soviets and belong to committees of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) at all levels. In 1981, blue-collar workers comprised nearly one third of the members of regional and of republic party committees and two fifths of city and district committees.[43] Without discounting the importance of such large-scale contingents of workers, it is significant that the blue-collar presence dwindles dramatically when one looks at decision-making executive bodies: it is small even at the local level, and disappears altogether toward the apex of the organizational pyramid. In the party, the Komsomol, and the trade unions alike, executive jobs are the province of professional/upper-class groups in general and of their administrative sub-group in particular. Even in the soviets, where workers commonly form a majority of deputies, professionals dominate the executive committees and monopolize their chairmanships.[44]

Both political and nonpolitical power, then, broadly confirms divisions between class groups. However, power also produces a simpler map. It is concentrated with a group that belongs to, but is by no means coextensive with, the professional/upper-class group. So,

[41] For a discussion of these trends in Leningrad in the mid-1970's and their projection to 1990, see Vasil'yeva, op. cit., pp. 100–09.

[42] Shkaratan and Rukabishnikov, loc. cit., p. 72.

[43] "The CPSU in Figures," *Partiynaya zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 14, July 1981, abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Oct. 21, 1981, p. 5.

[44] This was found to be the case in Leningrad in both 1969 and 1971. See B. K. Alekseyev and M. N. Perfil'yev, *Printsipi i tendentsii razvitiya predstavitel'nogo sostava mestnykh sovetov* (The Principles and Tendencies of Development of the Representative Composition of Local Soviets), Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1976, p. 167.

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even if professionals are socially proximate to powerholders, they typically do not possess power and therefore fall into the catch-all category of the "powerless," where the working-class and working-middle-class groups are also to be found.

Contours showing the distribution of influence present a far more variegated picture. Influence as such is notoriously difficult to pin down—it assumes informal as well as formal guises. Let us take membership in the CPSU and high levels of activity within party and other "public" organizations as a rough index of influence. Admittedly, activity of this kind usually involves implementing rather than influencing policy; nonetheless, it will do as a convenient litmus test of influence within the community and workplace.

So huge are the numbers supposedly involved in "public" activity of various kinds—between one third and one half of all workers—that any influence this brings might be thought to cut across all social distinctions. However, the actual proportion of blue-collar "participants" is probably closer to one fifth, and the degree of activism varies along class group lines. The working-middle-class group share a level of activity that places them on a par with professionals and clearly segregates them from the relatively inactive working-class group.[45]

Party membership points up similar patterns. Despite a steady rise in blue-collar recruitment, which has brought the worker contingent to over 43 percent of total membership, the party remains heavily skewed toward strategic professional groups. The more education, and especially the more responsibility one has, the more likely one is to be a Communist. To this extent, party membership underscores occupational and class-group divisions. At the same time, it also stretches distinctions among workers and reduces the distance between professionals and the working-middle-class group. Approximately one in eleven workers is a Communist; among male industrial blue-collar workers this rises to one in five. And since party ranks include relatively few unskilled manuals, membership among skilled industrial workers—at around one in three—equals saturation levels found among the ITR and many professional groups. Among worker-technicians, a majority are party members, which places them on a par with college graduates.[46] Thus, while accentuating the lowliness of the unskilled, party membership elevates the skilled working class and pinpoints the working middle class as an influential group. It is, in fact, from the working middle class that the most active Communists within enterprises are drawn.[47] Even if the hours spent organizing and attending meetings every week give such workers no power, they do provide the information and contacts that are the stuff of influence within the framework of enterprise and shop-floor politics.

Generally speaking, workers differ from ITR's and professionals in feeling a very low sense of efficacy. But membership in the *aktiv* (the activists) seems to make a difference. One recent study found that in contrast to the labor force as a whole, the bulk of the most actively involved workers felt they had an important say in what went on in their enterprise.[48] By harnessing skilled workers and especially those from the working-middle-class group to the *aktiv,* the party not only makes use of their energies, it also lends them a greater sense of influence and involvement.

The Political Dimension

Much of what has been said so far contradicts the official Soviet view of the working class. Yet none of it strikes at the heart of the political myth, for the leading position of the working class hinges on the contention that its interests and political outlook are at one with the CPSU and the Soviet system. Clearly, any thorough analysis of this contention would involve a wide-ranging comparison of working-class needs with Soviet policies. The more limited aim of this concluding section is twofold: first, to examine how far the social inequalities we have discussed generate working-class grievances, and second, to assess the political attitudes and outlook of the working-class groups and locate them within the context of the Soviet political system.

Given the position of the working-class group in most of the resource hierarchies, worker deprivation and upper-class group privilege might seem to be obvious sources of class grievance. Certainly some Soviet academics have indirectly hinted that the potential exists.[49] Yet, of course, how inequalities are perceived and evaluated depends not so much on their size as on the perspective from which they are viewed. The reality of slowing rates of social mobility or declining chances of getting into university documented in academic studies may not be as keenly perceived by those affected.

[45] See A. K. Orlov, *Sovetskiy rabochiy i upravleniye proizvodstvom* (The Soviet Worker and the Management of Production), Moscow, Profizdat, 1978, p. 146; also, Shkaratan, Stakanova, and Filippova, loc. cit., p. 42.

[46] Shkaraton, Stakanova, and Filippova, loc. cit., p. 37; and N. P. Konstantinova, O. V. Stakanova, and I. O. Shkaratan, "Changes in the Social Characteristics of Workers in the Epoch of Developed Socialism," *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), No. 5, 1978, pp. 13–14.

[47] For a portrait of the blue-collar activist, see V. A. Chulanov, *Sovremennyye sovetskiye rabochiye* (Contemporary Soviet Workers), Moscow, Mysl', 1980, pp. 170–73.

[48] Orlov, op. cit., p. 166.

[49] For instance, Zdravomyslov, loc. cit.

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Without hard evidence it is difficult to generalize about working-class group notions of social justice. Evaluations of occupational prestige, though, suggest that there is a high measure of agreement on the allotment of social worth. Workers do tend to "upgrade" the prestige of their blue-collar jobs, while persons from intelligentsia backgrounds think highly of the professions and treat manual jobs with scant respect. There is no clash of class-group values here: all seem to acknowledge the same occupational hierarchy.[50]

If the substance of the social hierarchy is thus not a matter of social contention, surely the almost universal ambition to climb to the top of the social ladder presents problems. After all, the high social aspirations of working-class offspring are becoming increasingly difficult to realize as educational and social opportunities narrow. However, declining blue-collar expectations may be lowering the potential for working-class group frustration on both fronts—educational and social.

In the 1960's, blue-collar school leavers typically set their educational sights as high as their white-collar and professional counterparts—nearly all planned to go to college. Since then, however, overall ambitions have become more modest, and blue-collar aspirations have fallen markedly below those of the other groups. Increasingly, students from blue-collar backgrounds plan to take one of the alternative, specialized, secondary-education routes.[51] Not only has this shift relieved pressure on college places, it has probably reduced blue-collar frustration at the social handicaps under which workers' children labor in the educational race. Those from working-class–group families may still lose out more frequently than those from professional families in college entrance. But over the whole length of the route from the eighth grade on, the overwhelming majority of students from blue-collar backgrounds drop out of the race of their own accord; only a relatively small proportion stay in and fail. By contrast, among white-collar and professional groups those who opt out are almost matched in number by those who try and fail. Proportionately, therefore, the educational contest generates more frustration among professional-class youth than among their working-class–group counterparts. While this may reduce working-class-group frustration, it also hardens the educational divisions separating this group from the professional group.

Quite conceivably, workers may also be adjusting their social aspirations to changing mobility opportunities. Just as specialized secondary education presents an increasingly attractive alternative to college, so working-middle-class status may offer an acceptable step up the social ladder for ambitious worker offspring. Even if it is not always so in objective terms, most in the working-middle-class group still think that they have done better than their parents in the mobility stakes.[52] (By contrast, those who have "skidded" from the professional/upper-class group into the working-middle-class group are likely to feel grievances.)

But perhaps the most critical gauge of progress for the working-middle-class or working-class groups is their material situation. Not only are material disparities more readily visible than those in the social dimensions, they are also more harshly judged. For it is in this area that equity is most closely linked in the popular mind with notions of equality.[53] Nevertheless, several factors operate to blunt the class edge of material inequality. As we have already noted, sectoral and regional variations make class-group differences less conspicuous. More important, while many workers may be aware of the privileged living standards enjoyed by the local upper-class groups, they do not use these to measure their own material lot. Instead, the common yardsticks are comparisons with the past and with fellow members of the working class. Feelings of relative deprivation, therefore, are not necessarily most widespread within the most disadvantaged groups. Émigrés' assessments of their own material well-being showed that feeling better or worse off than average can be as much a matter of social location as of family income. Although only half as many professionals as unskilled workers fell below the low-income line, the proportion of those who felt worse off than the average was equal in both groups. The perception of falling living standards thus further blurred the already fairly moderate class disparities in income.[54] Likewise, attitudes toward pay seem to run across rather than along class-group lines. Low-paid clerical workers are the least happy with what they earn, but little divides ITR's and professionals from workers in the attitudes toward pay levels—if anything, skilled blue-

[50] See the results of surveys of prestige among 1,305 secondary-school seniors in Kiev reported in V. F. Chernovolenko, V. L. Ossovskiy, and V. I. Paniotto, *Prestizh professii i problemy sotsial'no-professional'noy orientatsii molodëzhi* (Occupational Prestige and Problems of the Socio-Occupational Orientation of Youth), Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1979, p. 206.

[51] M. N. Rutkevich, Ed., *Vysshaya shkola kak faktor izmeneniya sotsial'noy struktury razvitogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva* (The Higher School as a Factor in the Transformation of the Social Structure of Developed Socialist Society), Moscow, Nauka, 1978, pp. 88–90. The following discussion of relative rates of attrition and de-selection is based on data in Rutkevich and in F. R. Filippov, "The Role of the Higher School in the Transformation of the Social Structure of Soviet Society (Results of All-Union Research)," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, No. 2, 1977, pp. 42–51.

[52] Blyakhman and Shkaratan, op. cit., p. 199.

[53] According to one Soviet sociologist now in emigration, unpublished opinion polls reveal that on material issues egalitarian ideas are widespread.

[54] These generalizations are based on data from the émigré research project cited in fn. 31.

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Second-year technical students receive instruction from N. Nikolayev in the tool-making shop of Moscow's Likhachëv auto works in April 1980.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

collar persons in the working class and in the working middle class emerge as the most satisfied of all.[55]

Not that the picture is one of general contentment, either on the pay or the general material front. In all groups, only a minority are happy with their earnings. What is significant for our purposes is the absence of any clear-cut pattern of attitudes reflecting class group. Existing inequalities seem neither to have generated class-group grievances in general nor to have produced working-class–group discontent in particular.

If we turn to consider political attitudes, outlook, and behavior, class-group differences emerge somewhat more clearly, and the working class appears to become more embedded in the system. "Embedded" rather than "incorporated," since the political stance of most workers is typified by indifference, caution, and parochialism. Despite the official image of high political consciousness among Soviet workers, blue-collar workers appear to be politically less attentive and informed than white-collar workers, let alone professionals. At least this is the picture that emerges from the émigré data on which we have to rely given the absence of published Soviet evidence on political attitudes and opinions.[56] Predictably, the unskilled stand out as the least interested and the least literate group politically—by and large they are bewildered by the complexity of the Soviet political system. Skilled workers, particularly those who fall into the working-middle-class group, seem to be as attentive to political events as their semi-professional middle-class counterparts. Where the former fall behind, however, is in understanding what they read and hear about politics. Semi-professionals and professionals, on the other hand, usually claim that they can understand what is going on.

Ignorance and incomprehension might be one set of reasons why the unskilled seem more inclined than any other group to favor strong, authoritarian leadership. Anecdotal evidence about blue-collar nostalgia for a "strong boss" is borne out to some extent by émigré assessments of Soviet leaders. Stalin found far more favor among the unskilled than among professionals. However, skilled workers turned out to be less "authoritarian" in their choices than white-collar workers and no more favorably disposed to Stalin than the profession-

[55] Arutyunyan et al., op. cit., pp. 56–57.

[56] From the research project cited in fn. 31.

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als. Yet, while these patterns might suggest that the working class is more authoritarian-minded than the working middle class or professionals, the degree of overall social consensus among the émigrés was striking—a clear majority of all groups evaluated Stalin and Lenin positively.

Likewise, little distinguishes blue-collar from other opinion on related questions of law and order. Soviet society as a whole places a high priority on the preservation of order, and workers do not emerge as unusual in this respect—if anything they have more lenient attitudes than others do toward those who break the rules.[57] Similarly, little distinguishes working-class–group from general émigré opinion on issues of freedom and government control.

Where workers do stand out is in their political caution and skepticism. An unofficial opinion poll tapping Soviet attitudes toward the Polish trade union *Solidarity* on the eve of Warsaw's December 1981 imposition of martial law found that a larger proportion of workers than of other groups expressed no opinion. Semi-professionals and professionals, by contrast, were either for or against. (Soviet workers were no more hostile to the Polish unions than were other social groups—roughly half of all respondents viewed *Solidarity* in a negative light.)[58] A similar mixture of indifference and skepticism emerges in blue-collar views on major domestic changes. When asked in 1967 to evaluate the prospects for economic reform, many workers in a Taganrog survey took a neutral or skeptical stance. Relatively few believed that reform would achieve any substantial improvement.[59] It is not that workers are against change because they cleave so strongly to the existing economic system—at least the émigré data reveal no significant differences here between workers and others in their dissatisfaction. Rather, to a greater degree than even other groups in Soviet society, workers seem resigned to the status quo and see little point in trying to change the immutable.

Closely connected with this tendency to fatalism is the workers' low sense of political efficacy. Blue-collar workers are even less optimistic than the population in general about the influence public opinion can exert on policy.[60] Émigré data, too, reveal the working-class group as peculiarly pessimistic on this count. Workers also turned out to be more skeptical than others about the effectiveness of any kind of organized action, let alone protest—which blue-collar workers, in particular, saw as counterproductive. Moreover, workers, to a somewhat greater extent than other groups, thought that "connections" were the best way of getting things done in local politics. This belief in "fixing" things, coupled with complete acceptance of bureaucratic venality, fits in well with the workers' general view of politics and their near-total cynicism about the scope for public influence.

It is only when one gets to enterprise-level politics that any evidence of a blue-collar feeling of political efficacy appears. Most émigré workers said they had felt free to express their disagreement with a decision taken at their workplace, and a majority had done so from time to time. Predictably, many more professionals and engineers had been able to voice their objections in the same way. Yet skilled workers in the working middle class turned out to have been just as assertive in this respect as many ITR's. What émigré testimony and Soviet data on industrial conflict point to, then, is the existence at shop-floor level of a widespread assertiveness that contrasts sharply with public, and particularly working-class–group, silence and quiescence at all other levels.[61]

Precisely because there is greater assertiveness and scope for grass-roots opinion at the enterprise level, it is within the factory that workers want more say. After all, it is here that at least some of the more specific issues that concern them most—such as the distribution of bonuses—are decided. If there is any clearly articulated working-class-group demand that falls within the sphere of politics, it is for more effective "control" over management. Almost unanimously, workers polled in 1969 on the idea of electing managers favored the innovation as a way of improving management accountability. While managers, not surprisingly, argued that workers already had sufficient control through the various forms of organized participation, no members of the working-class group shared this opinion.[62]

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[57] See A. J. Targonsky, "A Research Project on Legal Consciousness Carried out by the All-Union Institute for the Study of the Causes of Crime," Soviet Institution Series, No. 9, Jerusalem, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, The Soviet and East European Research Center, 1977.

[58] S. Pukhov, "The Attitudes of Moscovites to the Solidarity Union," mimeo (1982). The survey seems to have been conducted professionally within the obvious constraints that obtained. The poll of 618 respondents (including 163 workers) took place between late September and early December 1981.

[59] B. A. Grushin, *Gorodskoye naseleniye i ekonomicheskaya reforma: Kolichestvennyy rezultaty issledovaniya* (The Urban Population and Economic Reform. Quantitative Research Results), mimeo., Moscow, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Institute of Sociological Research, Public Opinion Project, 1973, pp. 41–48, 77–78. The survey was conducted with a representative sample of 932 citizens of Taganrog.

[60] R. A. Safarov, *Obshchestvennoye mneniye i gosudarstvennoye upravleniye* (Public Opinion and State Administration), Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1975, pp. 74, 121.

[61] From the research project cited in fn. 31. For evidence of the broad involvement of workers and employees generally in workplace conflict, see V. I. Sin'kov, "Conflicts in the Work Collective," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, No. 2, 1982, pp. 170–71.

[62] See Ya. S. Kapelyush, *Obshchestvennoye mneniye o vybornosti na proizvodstve* (Public Opinion on the Principle of Elections in Production), Institute of Empirical Sociological Research of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, *Information Bulletin* (Moscow), No. 39 (54), 1969, pp. 13–14, 40, 46. Parts of this report (pp. 4–24 and 95–97) are translated in M. Yanowitch, Ed., *Soviet Work Attitudes*, White Plains, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1979, pp. 60–80.

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Workers at an iron and steel complex in Rustavi.

—Henri Cartier-Bresson/Magnum.

In any event, the election idea never got beyond the experimental stage. Instead, attention has been focused in recent years on upgrading participation at the brigade level, improving communications between officials and workers, and invigorating the trade unions' "protective" role. At the most recent CPSU congress (in 1981), General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev pointedly urged the unions to keep in touch with blue-collar opinion and to defend workers' rights more assiduously.[63]

Clearly, such measures will not resolve the problems of accountability and control. Yet, their failure to do so is unlikely to result in any serious strain on the political system from the direction of the working class. The system will remain resilient because it is segmented in at least two ways. First, national politics are separated in most workers' minds from local and enterprise politics. Second, at the local and factory level, contentious issues are commonly resolved through informal channels, using "connections" in a network that constitutes a sort of "second polity."[64] Just as "second economy" transactions help to oil the creaking economic machine, so exchanges within the second polity may relieve pressure on the major political institutions. This segmentation helps make it possible for the Soviet system to manage diversity while avoiding pluralism.

[63] See *Izvestiya*, Feb. 24, 1981, p. 8.

[64] For a discussion of the "second polity" in the context of bureaucratic encounters in general, see Z. Gitelman, "Working the Soviet System: Citizens and Urban Bureaucracies," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Asilomar, CA, Sept. 20–23, 1981.

Conclusions

In a sense, Soviet workers and the "working class" are also segmented. The working-class and working-middle-class groups that we have identified might also be conceived of as being "old" and "new" segments of the working class. The working-class group, in fact, possesses many of the features associated with a traditional working class. Even if most of its members are placed well on average, some are poor and many are disadvantaged in educational and status terms. The best educated and most successful workers, on the other hand, have more in common with ITR's than with the majority of the working-class group. Together with the ITR's, the skilled manual workers and worker-technicians who make up the working middle class exhibit many of the features associated with the "new" working class.[65] They also embody most of the official "working-class" values and attitudes that the actual Soviet working-class group patently lacks: technical knowledge, a key economic role, education, prestige, political involvement, and interest in innovation.

In actual political outlook and behavior, however, it is the "old" working-class group that comes closer to fulfilling the role of the "state class." Objectively worse off than the "new" working class, the "old" perceives its disadvantages less acutely and generally feels less aggrieved. As we have seen, disparities are greatest in those areas—education, prestige, mobility and power—where they are least visible and salient for the working-class group. Inequalities are smallest in the material sphere where most working-class–group attention is centered. Inasmuch as the working-class group accepts its lot and looks to stability rather than change, it provides the social ballast for the status quo.

The working-middle-class group—the "new" working class—by contrast, is at once more advantaged and more volatile. Paradoxical though this might appear at first sight, it is precisely its advantaged middle-class position that makes it less content and less securely embedded in Soviet society and in the political system. Being closer to professional/upper-class groups, members of the working middle class are more likely to use them as reference groups and to question the privileges they enjoy. Likewise, proximity to management within the enterprise makes the working middle class more prone to criticize management performance and support moves for greater accountability. Most techni-

[65] For a seminal exposition of "the new working class" as found in France, see S. Mallet, *The New Working Class*, Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1975.

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cians are in favor of electing not just foremen and supervisors but middle and top management as well. In the national political sphere, too, the ITR members of the working middle class come out more strongly than the working-class group in favor of change. They were appreciably more positive toward *Solidarity*. And of all the Taganrog groups polled on economic reform, it was the ITR's who emerged as by far its most enthusiastic and optimistic supporters. One might venture that this support stemmed from a belief that they would gain from the changes economic reform would bring. Indeed, as a middle-class group the "new" working class has a general vested interest in change. Immobility is more to the liking of the resigned and cautious "old" working-class and the privileged upper-class groups.

Not that this "new" working class is a radical force that poses any imminent threat to the status quo. Some of the very features that make its members restless and discontented also weaken its collectivity and solidarity. Some of the most ambitious members of the working middle class will continue to be drawn up into the upper-class groups and thus effectively neutralized. All the same, it is from the "new" working class, the working middle class, that any challenge to the myth of the Soviet "working class" is most likely to come.

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Labor Unrest in the Soviet Union

by Betsy Gidwitz

Workers, according to official Soviet pronouncements, are the "leading force of the entire economic, social and political life of the country."[1] In light of this, it is not surprising that the Soviet leadership exhibited such obvious concern over events in Poland: the formation of an independent trade union there might have repercussions in the USSR.

Several demographic characteristics of the Soviet labor force doubtless contribute to Soviet concern about potential worker unrest. The impact of both a general manpower shortage and a territorial imbalance in the labor supply have been discussed in numerous Western and Soviet publications.[2] As one means of filling the national labor gap, the party and government are urging pensioners to return to the work force.[3] *Literaturnaya gazeta* has written sympathetically about removing the stigma against childbearing out of wedlock, in part as a solution to the population crisis.[4]

Although there has been no suggestion that these measures were applicable only to certain sectors of the population, Soviet authorities are most concerned about the declining birthrate and labor shortages in regions of the country populated by Europeans. Areas as far apart as the Baltic republics and the developing industrial complexes in Siberia are affected by deficits in the labor resource pool. Exacerbating the tight labor supply is the fact that numerous Soviet workers—including many with specialized vocational training—are abandoning factory and other blue-collar jobs for less onerous work in the service sector.[5]

Manpower shortages, however, are not a problem in Central Asia. In his report to the 26th Congress of the CPSU in early 1981, Leonid Brezhnev referred to "surplus manpower" in "Central Asia and a number of areas in the Caucasus." He continued: "This population must be drawn more actively into the development of the country's new territories."[6] Whether Central Asians and Caucasians will move in significant numbers into Soviet "new territories" is questionable; furthermore, such migrations might also increase existing social tensions between ethnic groups in the USSR, a circumstance Soviet authorities would surely prefer to avoid.

Shortages in the manpower resource pool alone will confront the USSR with overwhelming difficulties in the decades ahead. These problems will be compounded by the likelihood of increasing unrest among the existing work force. Although specific incidents of worker unrest in the Soviet Union have received coverage in the Western press for some time, this form of dissidence seems to be overshadowed in Western consciousness by expressions of opposition by Soviet intellectual, ethnic, and religious groups. Published material on labor unrest is sparse, perhaps because many incidents have oc-

[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 20, 1978.

[2] Among the most probing Western reviews of this issue are: Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapaway, "Soviet Population and Manpower Trends and Policies," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976, pp. 113–54; Feshbach, "Between the Lines of the 1979 Census," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February, 1982, pp. 27–37; and Jeremy Azrael, "Emergent Nationality Problems in the USSR," in Azrael, Ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices*, New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1978, pp. 363–90. See also *The New York Times*, Apr. 17, 1977; Jan. 9, and Oct. 7, 1978; and Feb. 10 and 28, 1980.

[3] See the decree "On Incentives to Encourage Pensioners to Take Employment in the National Economy," *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* (Moscow), both Oct. 2, 1979.

[4] *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow), May 4, 1977. Helping to counter labor shortages in the short run is the dispatch to the Soviet Union of "labor reserves" from less-developed socialist countries. See Nayan Chanda, "Now the 'Flot' People," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), May 14, 1982, pp. 28–29, for a report on 50,000 Vietnamese workers in Soviet-bloc countries. Vietnamese, North Korean, and Bulgarian laborers in the USSR were the subject of a front-page article in *The Washington Post*, June 3, 1982.

[5] *Sotsialisticheskaya industrya* (Moscow), Oct. 31, 1981, and Feb. 23, 1982; and *Komsomol'skaya pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 16, 1982.

[6] *Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1981. See also Peter Hann, "Soviet Joblessness May Be Illegal, But It's There," *Business Week* (New York, NY), July 23, 1979, p. 82.

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curred in outlying areas rarely visited by foreigners. Furthermore, Soviet workers are not well-versed about channels for transmitting news of their problems and protests to the West, and little contact seems to exist between workers and those in Soviet society who could articulate labor issues and transmit information to Western sources. Nonetheless, sufficient information does exist to permit a survey of the subject.

Causes of Worker Dissatisfaction

Issues concerning actual working conditions, compensation, and labor-management relations may be designated as direct causes of labor unrest. Specific worker complaints about working conditions center on schedules, production norms, mechanization, and health and safety. In his book-length essay, *My Country and the World,* Andrei Sakharov places two issues related to work scheduling at the head of his list of problems encountered by Soviet workers: the 41-hour work week, which, he notes, is longer than in most Western countries, and the short vacations which, moreover, are scheduled by the management without consulting the workers themselves.[7] The latter practice frequently prevents families from vacationing together. Several other writers have also criticized scheduling conditions imposed by the inflexibility of the economic plan, i.e., periods of relative idleness followed by "storming."[8]

The economic plan in Soviet enterprises imposes labor norms or standards of production output that must be met on a monthly basis. These norms are often based on the work output of small groups of favored "front-rank workers" (*peredoviki*) who use advanced, more efficient equipment and receive large pay bonuses for outputs that less favored workers cannot possibly match. The privileges received by *peredoviki,* most of whom are party members, generate strong feelings of resentment from ordinary workers and frequently lead to enduring grudges and payline fights. Waste, low-quality production, and even injuries are the inevitable outcome of ill-fated efforts to reach unrealistic norms.[9]

[7] Andrei Sakharov, *My Country and the World,* New York, NY, Alfred A. Knopf, 1975, p. 19.

[8] "Anatoly Marchenko on the Life of Soviet Workers," *A Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR* (New York, NY), No. 29, January-March 1978, p. 47; David E. Powell, "Labor Turnover in the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review* (Columbus, OH), June 1977, p. 275; and "Violations of Social and Economic Rights in the USSR. The Right to Work," Document No. 85 of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, *A Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR,* No. 34, April-June 1979, p. 32.

[9] See Hedrick Smith, *The Russians,* New York, NY, Quadrangle, 1976, p. 224, for a description of the norm-setting process in a Moscow-area textile plant. Kevin Klose in "Discontent Seething in Soviet Mines," *The Washington Post,* Jan. 30, 1981, p. A1, describes a similar procedure in a Donetsk coal mine. Both sources also portray tensions between groups of workers.



Construction workers at the site of a new Soviet apartment complex.

—John Launois/Black Star.

Another cause of discontent with working conditions is the low level of mechanization that prevails throughout much of Soviet industry. Human labor is widely used for lifting, hauling, and other tasks long performed by machines in the West. In his address to the 26th Congress of the CPSU in 1981, Leonid Brezhnev said:

. . . a highly important role has been assigned to the elimination of manual, low-skill and arduous physical labor. Millions of people in our country are still engaged in such labor. This is not only an economic but also a serious social problem.[10]

In 1979, the Moscow Public Group to Promote Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the Soviet Union identified a peculiarly Soviet aspect of "arduous physical labor" in the national economy:

Many jobs that involve heavy physical labor (construction, roadbuilding, etc.) are performed mostly by

[10] *Pravda,* Feb. 23, 1981.

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women—because of the low pay and the "lack of prestige." Women pushing wheelbarrows full of cement on construction scaffolds, and women in orange uniforms with shovels and crowbars in their hands working on railroad gradings, are among the most ugly sights in the Soviet world.[11]

In theory, the arduous lot of Soviet women has been eased by new regulations, effective January 1, 1981, that bar females from 460 occupations involving hard physical labor. However, neither the 1981 regulations nor the Brezhnev speech brought about the production of labor-saving equipment and machinery. Given the general shortage of labor and the slowness of Soviet industry to respond to changing conditions, one can anticipate that the directives barring women from heavy physical tasks will be ignored or interpreted in such a way that females will continue to perform arduous work for some time to come.[12]

Complaints about disregard for worker safety and about inadequate medical care are numerous, even in the official Soviet press. In 1978, for example, *Trud* published a letter from Kharkiv foundry workers saying that their workplace had no ventilation. It was so hot, they reported, that their overalls caught fire. The changing rooms, however, had no heating. It was so cold that ice formed on the shower room walls.[13] One month later, *Trud* printed a letter from railway car builders in Irkutsk. They complained that their workshop was a barn with open doors and no glass in the windows; they were forced to work in temperatures as low as −40 degrees Centigrade.[14]

In early 1980, *Trud* described a ceramics factory in the Khmel'nytsky area that was cold, drafty, damp, and slippery underfoot because of broken windows and doors that do not shut. The trade union chairman, *Trud* reported, shrugged off workers' complaints.[15] A 1981 article in a Ukrainian newspaper cited a Donetsk-region chemical coking plant where inadequate attention to safety procedures had caused an increase in gaseous fumes and dust. The Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, the account suggested, had not shown proper concern.[16]

Another *Trud* account told of a woman worker who suffered critical burns in an explosion at an animal-feed factory near Odessa. The accident occurred because



Aleksey Nikitin, a coal miner in Donetsk, whose efforts to point out unsafe working conditions in the mines brought him into trouble with the authorities.

—Kevin Klose.

superiors failed to provide the mandatory safety instructions or warn her of dangers inherent in the work procedure. Although seriously injured, she was twice forced by factory officials to leave her hospital bed and report to the plant so that she could be registered as being at work. Later, management demanded that she sign a statement accepting personal blame for the explosion, although the authorities themselves were clearly at fault. Hospital officials agreed to report that, contrary to their own records, her injuries were minor. Trade union leaders connived in the cover-up. The factory management, it was clear, did not want a serious accident on its records.[17]

In the mid-1960's, Aleksey Nikitin, a mining engineer, warned his superiors of a potential disaster at a Donetsk coal mine due to improper use of explosives and inadequate tunnel shoring. He was rebuffed and ridiculed. After a fatal explosion at the mine several years later,

[11] "Violations of Social And Economic Rights in the USSR," loc. cit., p. 31.

[12] *The Washington Post*, Jan. 5, 1981, and Sergei Voronitsyn, "Easing the Workload of Soviet Women—In Theory and in Practice," *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), No. 110, Mar. 8, 1982.

[13] *Trud* (Moscow), Jan. 10, 1978.

[14] Ibid., Feb. 7, 1978.

[15] Ibid., Jan. 29, 1980.

[16] *Radyanska Ukraina* (Kiev), Mar. 14, 1981.

[17] *Trud*, Sept. 13, 1979. See also ibid., Nov. 11, 1971, and June 11, 1982, for accounts of similar incidents.

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Nikitin was arrested and incarcerated in a special psychiatric hospital.[18]

The Moscow Helsinki Group stated in 1979:

At Soviet plants and factories—with a few possible exceptions involving defense plants, "model factories" and some other key enterprises—the work is poorly organized, health and safety measures are inadequate, and on-the-job accidents are frequent. Also, accidents are concealed by management, and accident reports are filed only with reluctance. Management even goes so far as to credit the victim with imaginary "working hours," in order to avoid listing him as injured on the job.[19]

In a detailed 1981 account of deteriorating health standards in the Soviet Union, author Nick Eberstadt identified accidents as a principal cause of declining life expectancy in the USSR. Eberstadt refers to work-related accidents as "carnage in the factories."[20] Although no statistics are available, it is reasonable to assume that the accident rate is in part a function of erratic production schedules, i.e., that it increases during the end-of-month "storming" period.

Less dramatic than accidents, but also detrimental to worker health are poor food services and inadequate sanitary facilities at workplaces. Also, various forms of environmental pollution accompany industrialization throughout the Soviet Union and cause additional damage to health, including an increase in the number of deformed and disabled children.[21]

Another direct source of labor dissatisfaction is inadequate monetary compensation.[22] The Moscow Helsinki Group charges that "genuine *poverty* persists among a considerable part of the population." Its account states that the "quasi-official" minimum subsistence level of 50 rubles per month "represents the threshold not of poverty but of *destitution.* Many pensioners, single mothers, and large families live on far less than that 50 rubles per capita."[23]

Although more subdued in language, recent articles in the Soviet press support charges of large-scale poverty leveled by dissidents. In early 1981, for example, the Soviet economic journal *EKO* (*Ekonomika i organizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva)* disclosed the results of a survey conducted among low-income families of workers at a machine-building plant in Dnipropetrovsk. Ninety-one percent of such families were headed by women. Less than one half had per capita family monthly income of more than 50 rubles. Housing was poor. Ownership of consumer durable items was low. Three quarters of the workers had worked at the factory for 10 to 12 years, yet found that the higher-ranking individuals—personnel department officials, trade union chiefs, section leaders—were indifferent to their plight.[24]

Apparently cognizant that conditions such as those in Dnipropetrovsk exist in many areas of the country, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution in March 1981 entitled "On Measures to Increase State Assistance to Families with Children." The resolution provides for specific financial allowances, extended paid leaves, construction of additional children's institutions (e.g., day-care centers, extended-day schools, summer camps), and other projects to assist families in rearing children.[25] Inadequate child-care facilities are a major source of labor turnover among women.[26] The need for such programs is so great that substantial resources will be required, resources that appear to be in short supply for the foreseeable future.[27]

A companion resolution to that assisting families with children was adopted on the same date. Entitled "On Measures to Further Improve Social Security for the Population," the decree raises the minimum monthly old-age pension (for a minimum of 20 years work) from 45 to 50 rubles (subsistence level) and increases disability and loss-of-breadwinner allowances. It also calls for improved housing for the aged and disabled, and expanded opportunities for pensioners to engage in part-time work.[28] As both Soviet dissident and Western sources have reported in recent years, this action, too, is sorely needed.[29] However, it is unlikely that the monthly increase of five rubles will lead to any perceptible improvement in the living standards of pension-

[18] Kevin Klose, "Labor Rights Activists Sent to Soviet Psychiatric Jail," *The Washington Post,* Feb. 1, 1981, p. A1. See also "In the Psychiatric Ward," *Newsweek* (New York, NY), Jan. 11, 1982, pp. 31–32.

[19] "Violations of Social and Economic Rights in the USSR," loc. cit.

[20] Nick Eberstadt, "The Health Crisis in the USSR," *The New York Review of Books* (New York, NY), Feb. 19, 1981, p. 24.

[21] Ibid. See also Boris Komarov (pseud.), *The Destruction of Nature in the Soviet Union,* White Plains, NY, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1980, esp. chs. 2, 3, and 10.

[22] See *EKO* (Moscow), No. 10, Oct. 1980, pp. 31–37, for official acknowledgment of the role of income level in labor turnover. See also Sakharov, loc. cit., p. 23, and Valery Chalidze, "A Workers' Movement in the USSR?," *A Chronicle of Human Rights,* No. 29, January-March 1978, p. 43.

[23] "Violations of Social and Economic Rights in the USSR," loc. cit.

[24] *EKO,* No. 2, Feb. 1981, pp. 114–21. The trade union at the plant announced that it would extend material assistance to the neediest families.

[25] *Pravda* and *Izvestiya,* both Mar. 31, 1981. See also *Pravda* and *Izvestiya,* both Sept. 6, 1981, for a more detailed report of the particular financial benefits awarded to families in specific situations.

[26] Powell, loc. cit., p. 278.

[27] See Seweryn Bialer, "The Politics of Stringency in the USSR," *Problems of Communism,* May-June 1981, pp. 19–33.

[28] *Pravda* and *Izvestiya,* Mar. 31, 1981.

[29] See Sakharov, loc. cit., pp. 18–19, and "Violations of Social and Economic Rights in the USSR," loc. cit. See also two feature articles in US newspapers: Craig R. Whitney, "Old-Age Pensions in Soviet Union Leaving Many Impoverished," *The New York Times,* Nov. 19, 1978, p. 1, and Kevin Klose, "Soviet Pensioners Lead Impoverished Lives at the Edge of Despair," *The Washington Post,* Jan. 31, 1981, p. A10.

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ers.[30] The measure also fails to address certain political aspects of Soviet pension policy, such as the denial of pensions to independent craftsmen. As in the case of the companion resolution on assistance to families with children, implementation of its provisions may be very difficult under current Soviet economic conditions.

Another source of Soviet worker dissatisfaction with matters of compensation is that of labor without remuneration. Dissidents write that workers are coerced to work overtime during the "storming" period at the end of each month. Frequently, they say, the overtime efforts are not recorded, thus eliminating evidence that overtime pay is due. Promised bonuses for plan fulfillment are at times withheld.[31] Observers also cite unpaid labor on national and local *subbotniks* and the dispatch of schoolchildren, students, and pensioners "to temporary work on collective and state farms, at vegetable storehouses . . ." during the harvest.[32]

A third direct cause of worker discontent is the unsatisfactory character of labor-management relations brought about by party and state manipulation of the trade union function. The Moscow Helsinki Group states:

The most serious violation of the rights of workers is their lack of any effective means of defending their interests. The right to strike is not recognized in Soviet legislation, and any attempt at collective bargaining is harshly put down. The trade unions in the USSR are essentially party-state agencies rather than workers' organizations to secure a better living standard and improved working conditions.

The notion of trade unions as "transmission belts" from the party to the masses dates from Lenin's time. Today trade unions have been turned into a means for the direct subordination of the working population. In the USSR, trade unions deal with problems of production, plan fulfillment, labor discipline, and indoctrination. (There is good reason for their being called "schools of Communism.") Their defense of workers' interests is marginal at best.[33]

Although some factory trade unions in the USSR defend workers against bureaucratic excesses, safety hazards, unwarranted dismissals, and other violations of labor rights, various accounts suggest strongly that the ability of unions to intervene with management on behalf of workers is severely restricted. Defense of worker rights is not a primary function of Soviet trade unions; the "central task" of Soviet labor unions—as defined in the Preamble to the By-Laws of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU)—is "to mobilize the masses for the attainment of our principal economic goal. . . ." Although the simultaneous pursuit of production maximization and worker protection would appear to many to be inherently incompatible, Soviet doctrine asserts that workers who produce more for the state ultimately produce more for themselves. On the other hand, human rights activists in the USSR argue that increased production is often achieved at the expense of worker welfare.

V. C. Tulin, chairman of the trade union committee of the "Nevsky Zavod" association in Leningrad, meets with his shop committee chairmen in November 1981 to sum up results of a "socialist competition" that saw 40 teams and over 300 individual workers fulfill annual plans ahead of schedule.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

[30] For an explanation of the Soviet pension system, see "The New Decree and Pensions: Crumbs for the Needy?" *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 185, May 5, 1981.

[31] See Peter Reddaway, "Recent Ferment in Estonia," *A Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR*, No. 40, October-December 1980, p. 38, and *The Washington Post*, Feb. 1, 1981.

[32] "Violations of Social and Economic Rights in the USSR," loc. cit., p. 32. See also Sakharov, loc. cit. A review of Soviet policy on *subbotniks*, including negative letters published in the Soviet press, can be found in "Soviet Workers to Take Part in Subbotnik on December 5," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 482, Dec. 4, 1981. Concern of some Soviet sources about the abuse of child labor in the USSR has been expressed in several recent issues of *Pravda* (Feb. 9, July 30, and Dec. 4, 1981, and Aug. 7, 1982).

[33] "Violations of Social and Economic Rights in the USSR," loc. cit., p. 33. See also "Anatoly Marchenko . . . ," loc. cit., p. 47.

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Each of the above conditions may be considered a direct source of worker dissatisfaction. Soviet labor unrest may also be provoked by more indirect "quality of life" issues, such as those relating to support systems, the general moral climate, and observance of basic civil and political rights. Failings in these areas may be considered indirect causes of worker discontent.

The major elements in the support systems required by Soviet workers are housing, availability of foodstuffs and other basic goods, medical care, education, and day care for children. Inadequate housing in the Soviet Union, including the utilization of substandard hostels for unmarried (and some married) workers,[34] is a broadly recognized problem. Although some factories build and administer their own apartment complexes, the shortage remains acute. The ability of a workplace to control a large housing estate does provide its employees with an advantage in the struggle to find adequate accommodations; it also vests in management additional opportunity for manipulating the workers. Those who are "shock workers of Communist labor [or] outstanding exponents of Socialist competition" are among the favored who are placed at the head of the housing wait list.[35] For others, acquisition of satisfactory housing may remain a major difficulty.

The availability of foodstuffs and other basic goods in the Soviet Union is often problematic. News reports in the mid-1970's and in 1980 indicate that worker protests erupted in several areas of the Soviet Union because of food shortages. For example, a 1980 account tells of "worker protests associated with food shortages in Sverdlovsk, Volgograd, and the Siberian coal fields" occurring in 1976.[36] In 1980, worker unrest over insufficient food supplies was reported in Tartu, Gor'kiy, Naberezhnyye Chelny, and Chelyabinsk.[37] Even in Moscow, the availability of foodstuffs and other commodities remains limited; many workers must stand in line several hours every day in order to obtain food, clothing, and other items for their families.

Disregard of worker safety in the USSR has already been noted. A related issue is medical care, another weak link in the support system for workers. Problems in both distribution and quality of health services are acute. Andrei Sakharov writes movingly of unsatisfactory nursing care, inadequate linens and medications, and poor hospital food. A class system of medical care exists, with better service available only to the elites on a scale according to their status.[38] Although health care is officially free, payment of substantial fees for medical services is commonplace, even among working-class citizens.[39] Admission to sanitoria is frequently governed more by "connections" and "pull" than by medical need.

Sakharov also writes disparagingly of the Soviet education system, noting the discrimination against "undesirable" people in the admissions process to institutions of higher education.[40]

It is, of course, difficult to define exactly such a concept as the "general moral climate." However, various observers speak of rampant corruption, widespread disillusionment, and other characteristics indicating a general degradation of human dignity in the Soviet Union. In 1979, an open letter entitled "Appeal to Nowhere" reached the West. From a group of workers at a Tol'yatti dairy products combine, the letter claimed that Soviet workers were ". . . gradually being turned into voiceless, depersonalized creatures, living appendages of machinery and equipment, robots which are not allowed their own opinion." The letter complained about "enforced silence" in the Soviet Union regarding workers' problems, "robot" elections, trade union chairmen who take bribes for allocation of apartments and places in day-care centers, and local newspapers refusing to print letters about abuses by workplace and union officials.[41]

In his series on Soviet coal miners in Donetsk, Kevin Klose writes of the powerlessness of miners in the face of interlocking control by the party, the enterprise, the trade union, and the secret police. The workers are divided and sullen, feeling themselves "surrounded by indifference and rejection." They accuse their leaders of corruption and admit that they themselves

[34] Particularly graphic descriptions of poor living conditions in hostels can be found in Aug. 16 and Oct. 3, 1981, issues of *Trud* (regarding Novocherkassk and Ufa respectively) and the Sept. 23, 1981, issue of *Pravda vostoka* (regarding Tashkent). The first of these accounts is a letter to the editor with 24 signatures, the second is an article written by a hostel staff member, and the third is a report by an investigative team from the newspaper. See also *Stroitel'naya gazeta* (Moscow), Apr. 25 and 28, 1982, for accounts of living and working conditions at the site of a nuclear power station under construction at Kalinin, north of Moscow.

[35] A. F. Bazuvluk, chief of the Moscow municipal housing authority, in an interview in *Literaturnaya gazeta*, Mar. 14, 1979. A complicating factor in the allocation of nominally workplace-controlled housing is that up to 50 percent of the apartments may be withheld from the workplace for transfer to the city soviet, the construction enterprise, and "certain other departments" of the municipality. See *Izvestiya*, May 16, 1979.

[36] John Bushnell, "The 'New Soviet Man' Turns Pessimist," in Stephen F. Cohen, Alexander Rabinowich, and Robert Sharlet, Eds., *The Soviet Union Since Stalin*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1980, p. 199.

[37] See the following: *Newsweek*, June 23, 1980, p. 41; *The Financial Times* (London), July 2, 1980; *Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, Surrey), July 23, 1980, pp. 6-7; and Peter Reddaway, loc. cit. The article in *The Financial Times* reports additional severe food shortages in Magnitogorsk, Arkhangel'sk, Kazan', and eastern Siberia; these shortages, apparently, did not lead to disruptive protests.

[38] Sakharov, loc. cit., pp. 21-22.

[39] See the following: *Izvestiya*, Aug. 31, 1966; *Nedelya* (Moscow), Apr. 11-27, 1977, p. 5; and *Literaturnaya gazeta*, July 19, 1978. Another interesting account is by Mark Ya. Azbel in *Refusenik*, Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1981, pp. 155-59.

[40] Sakharov, loc. cit.

[41] See "Inside the Soviet TU," *Soviet Analyst*, Aug. 30, 1979, pp. 6-8.

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

The working career of a Soviet vocational-school graduate begins with registration of his first employment—in this case at the Cherepovets metallurgical works—in his workbook.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

steal coal and lumber from the mines.[42] In writing about the Soviet military-industrial complex, a prominent émigré states that many workers prefer civilian industry because wages are often higher and discipline more lenient. "Many civilian workers use their work time and equipment to produce articles for the black market"; because security is less stringent in civilian industry, "contraband articles can be smuggled out."[43]

Accounts by Moscow-based foreign correspondents of wide-spread Soviet corruption, bribery, black-marketeering, fraud, manipulation, cynicism, and privileges for the elite abound in the Western general press.[44] The subject has also been treated in the specialized academic press. Konstantin Simis, another recent émigré, cogently observes that the pervasive corruption in the Soviet Union is a "lower echelon" version of:

the legalized privileges and benefits accruing to the middle and higher echelons (special networks of restricted shops retailing goods of higher quality than those available in shops serving the general public and at considerably lower prices, rent-free country housing complete with servants, et cetera).[45]

Last among the indirect causes of worker unrest is the lack of basic political and civil rights—"above all,

[42] Klose, "Discontent Seething in Soviet Mines," loc. cit.

[43] Mikhail Agursky, *The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex*, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, No. 31, Jerusalem, The Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1980, pp. 20–21.

[44] *The New York Times*, May 7, 1978, and July 4, 1980; *The Washington Post*, Jan. 30 and 31, Feb. 1, 1981; *Time* (New York, NY), Sept. 15, 1980, p. 102; Christopher S. Wren, "Russia in Entropy," *Harper's* (New York, NY), June 1978, pp. 31–38; David K. Shipler, "Making It—Russian Style," *The New York Times Magazine*, Feb. 11, 1979, p. 38; and George Feifer, "Russian Disorders," *Harper's*, February 1981, pp. 41–55.

[45] Konstantin Simis, "The Machinery of Corruption in the Soviet Union," *Survey* (London), Autumn 1977–78, pp. 35–36. See also: A. Katsenelinboigen, "Coloured Markets in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1977, pp. 62–85, and Gregory Grossman, "The 'Second Economy' of the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1977, pp. 25–40.

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freedom of speech, of the press, of association, and the right to form trade unions."[46] Soviet dissidents, émigrés, and Western observers include other specific problems in this area. Andrei Sakharov cites as one infringement of human rights the Soviet internal passport system which restricts the freedom of movement within the Soviet Union. Another infringement is the inability of most Soviet citizens to travel abroad.[47] Other sources have identified the workbook that all Soviet citizens must carry as a violation of human rights. The workbook records pertinent details of a citizen's employment, such as nature of work, salary, promotions and demotions, transfers, and disciplinary actions (including various types of corrective labor). Because it must be presented when applying for any new job, it can constitute "a kind of blacklist,"[48] permanently compromising a person's career opportunities. Threats by management of an unfavorable entry can dissuade a worker from complaining about conditions or from quitting his job. The Moscow Helsinki Group cites the workbook, the residence permit necessary for living in large cities, and the housing crisis as combining to severely restrict a Soviet citizen's choice of employment.[49]

Employment rights are further limited by the common Soviet practice of dismissing dissidents or would-be emigrants, who are then frustrated in finding other work because of their political views or intention to emigrate. Unwillingly unemployed, such citizens are subject to "anti-parasite" laws for not working.

Worker Unrest: The Record

Although Soviet media do not report the occurrence of strikes (and sometimes deny Western accounts of worker unrest), reports of numerous strikes in the USSR have reached the West. Below follows an account of the major known disturbances since the mid-1950's.

1950's. A "strike wave" occurred in Sverdlovsk in the fall of 1956.[50] Some 20,000 construction workers at a metalworks in Temir Tau rioted over poor living conditions in August 1959. Soviet army troops restored order, reportedly with heavy casualties, after the local militia proved unable to control the demonstration. Local party, Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Committee for State Security (KGB), and economic officials were all replaced within the next few months.[51]

1960's. The details of mass riots on June 1–2, 1962, in Novocherkassk (Rostov Oblast) are well known. The disturbance was precipitated by two simultaneous announcements—a national rise (25 to 30 percent) in prices of meat and butter, and an increased production rate at the Novocherkassk Electric Locomotor Factory (NEVZ). Several thousand workers from NEVZ and other plants gathered in the city square in front of party headquarters to present demands to officials. The officials, however, fled to Rostov. Workers occupied the party building and harangued the crowd from balconies. Army troops closed off all approaches to the city, seized all other important buildings, and surrounded the square. Reports indicated that soldiers from a local garrison defied orders to fire at the crowd and that their captain committed suicide (whether because he opposed the orders himself or because the troops refused to carry them out is not clear). A detachment of non-Russian troops, reportedly from the Caucasus, was brought in. They first fired into the air, killing some small boys sitting in trees, and then fired into the crowd. As demonstrators fled in panic, some were shot in the back. Between 70 and 80 people were killed, at least half of them with dumdum bullets.

A six-man Central Committee delegation headed by Frol Kozlov, a member of the Politburo, was sent to Novocherkassk within hours of the shooting and spoke with a small group of workers. Addressing local party workers on June 8, Kozlov criticized inadequate "ideological and educational work." More food and consumer items soon appeared in city shops. On July 12, a curfew was imposed which forbade young people under age 16 to be on the streets after 8:00 pm in summer and 9:00 pm in winter.[52]

In 1963 (the precise dates are uncertain) disturbances erupted in Kryvy Rih, Odessa, Ryazan', Baku, and Omsk. In Odessa, dockworkers refused to load butter on a ship bound for Cuba in protest against food shortages and high prices in Odessa. The Kryvy Rih riot—its origins are not clear—led to the imposition of martial law and a curfew for about one week.[53]

[46] "*Violations of Social and Economic Rights in the USSR,*" *loc. cit.*, p. 34.

[47] Sakharov, loc. cit., pp. 23–24.

[48] "Violations of Social and Economic Rights in the USSR," loc. cit., p. 32. See also Paul Barton, " 'Trade Unions' in the USSR," *Free Trade Union News* (Washington, DC), Sept. 26, 1979, p. 10, and Arch Puddington, "Lech vs. Leonid: Striking Out at the Kremlin," *The American Spectator* (Bloomington, IN), Apr. 1981, p. 8.

[49] "Violations of Social and Economic Rights in the USSR," loc. cit.

[50] Robert Conquest, "Russian Workers' Riots," *Soviet Analyst,* Dec. 15, 1973, p. 4.

[51] Ibid., p. 5.

[52] *The New York Times* published the first detailed account of the Novocherkassk disturbances in a front-page article on October 8, 1962. Its author, Max Frankel, wrote that initial reports of the incident reached the West through Soviet delegates attending the World Youth Festival in Helsinki during August. Word of the riots spread throughout the Soviet Union, Frankel related. See also a detailed account of the disturbances in Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918–1956,* Parts V–VII, New York, NY, Harper & Row, 1978, pp. 507–14. Another report appeared in *The Boston Globe,* Mar. 16, 1981.

[53] Conquest, loc. cit.

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In May 1969, workers at the Kiev Hydroelectric Power Station held an assembly to protest their barracks-type housing conditions. The demonstration was led by Ivan Hryshchuk, a retired major, who had been a tutor in the workers' dormitory until he was fired for assisting workers to obtain residence permits.[54]

In June 1969, workers and office staff of a plant in Chervonohrad (Lviv Oblast) struck for eight days to get pay raises for the night shift and the dismissal of specific managerial personnel. Although most of their demands were granted, the strike leaders were later fired on various pretexts, and one was imprisoned for a year.[55]

1970's. US trade union sources have reported that factory strikes occurred in the early 1970's in Kiev, Vitebsk, Vladimir, Sverdlovsk, and the Chelyabinsk Oblast city of Kopeysk. "A number of work stoppages" also occurred at construction sites in Moscow and Leningrad.[56]

In December 1971, some 200 workers at a Baku oil refinery met to protest substandard working conditions and to demand additional pay and vacation time. Three hours before the meeting took place, the authorities unsuccessfully try to force its cancellation by arresting 10 workers and three engineers for organizing the protest. Those arrested were later sentenced to terms of various duration on charges of anti-Soviet activity.[57]

In September 1972, several thousand workers in Dnipropetrovsk struck over wages and living conditions. Some fatalities occurred when Soviet authorities put down the strike. Riots reportedly erupted in the city one month later.[58]

In December 1972, workers at an agricultural machinery factory in Kamyanets-Podil'sky struck for one day. They demanded that production norms be lowered and their pay raised. Thirty workers with more than 20 years employment in the factory were dismissed, allegedly for instigating the strike. Two were subsequently sentenced to three years in prison.[59]

On October 3, 1973, approximately 660 workers from both the day and night shifts struck the Aleksotas woodworking plant in Kaunas over a cut in wages. Security agents and various Kaunas officials unsuccessfully attempted to cajole the strikers back to work. On October 4, the old wage rates were restored, and the workers returned to their jobs.[60]

In 1975 (precise date uncertain), construction workers on the Baikal-Amur Railroad walked out over poor organization of the work plan. Further details are not available.[61]

In May 1976, a wildcat strike of dockworkers delayed loading and unloading of ships in Riga. They were protesting food shortages in local shops. Four persons received prison sentences of two to three years.[62]

On December 14, 1977, workers struck the Kaunas rubber goods factory Inkaras after management—with the consent of the plant trade union committee—effectively reduced wages by decreasing the permissible rate of spoiled goods. The first shift of workers in the shoe-molding workshop refused to work at all, and the second shift walked out for four hours. State security officials were called in to admonish the workers, but the old spoilage rate was restored. One worker was beaten during a militia interrogation. A shift foreman was fired, a senior technician suspended, and the chief engineer severely reprimanded after the strike.[63]

On August 9, 1979, bus drivers walked out in Tol'yatti and blocked the exit of their garage with a long articulated bus in order to prevent strike-breaking. The drivers presented a list of 15 demands to authorities, ranging from the dismissal of a particular management executive to improved working conditions and increased salaries. Management, trade union, and party officials tried to persuade the strikers to resume work before discussing their demands. When the drivers refused, the authorities capitulated, and no immediate retribution followed. One source suggests that an arrest of strike organizers occurred some months later, directly or indirectly precipitating the 1980 disturbance at Tol'yatti.[64]

1980's. On May 6–7, 1980, an unknown number of Tol'yatti bus drivers struck in protest against the assignment of additional routes without commensurate increases in pay. They were joined by 70,000 assembly-line workers at the Tol'yatti Automobile Plant, producer of 660,000 Zhigulis (the Soviet Fiat 124) annually. The auto plant employees live in large apartment complexes approximately 10 miles from the factory—and

[54] Leonid Plyushch, *History's Carnival,* New York, NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979, p. 170.

[55] Barton, loc. cit., p. 13.

[56] Arch Puddington, "Soviet Workers: An Emerging Voice," *AFL-CIO American Federationist* (Washington, DC), May 1980, p. 3.

[57] Barton, loc. cit.

[58] Puddington, "Soviet Workers: An Emerging Voice," loc. cit.

[59] Barton, loc. cit.

[60] "Archdiocese of Kaunas," *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania,* No. 8, n.d., p. 27.

[61] "A Work Stoppage on the Baikal-Amur Railroad," *Radio Liberty Research,* No. 427, Oct. 7, 1975.

[62] *Le Figaro* (Paris), May 18, 1976; *The Times* (London) and *The New York Times,* both Oct. 31, 1976.

[63] "Events in Lithuania," *A Chronicle of Current Events,* No. 49, 1978, p. 51.

[64] " 'State Serfs' of the Soviet Bloc Unite," *Soviet Analyst,* July 23, 1980, p. 6. See also *The Washington Post,* June 14, 1980, and *The Boston Globe,* Mar. 16, 1981.

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Workers at a factory near the Estonian capital, Tallinn, produce garments while the woman in the foreground keeps tally on an abacus.

—Sven Simon/Katherine Young.

thus are dependent upon the bus drivers for transportation; however, during the 1979 disturbances, they managed to devise their own transportation. In 1980, angered over shortages of food (especially meat and dairy products), they joined the drivers. One Soviet citizen told a correspondent from *The New York Times* that "an unofficial worker leadership" at the plant "had become more influential than the official labor union" and was instrumental in organizing the strike. This leadership group, the source stated, had protested unsatisfactory working conditions earlier and had supported several previous 30-minute work stoppages. Soviet authorities were said to have moved quickly to restore order, usually stocking local stores with large amounts of food and consumer goods. Consistent worker activism at the Tol'yatti plant had led to the installation there of "some of the best social and medical facilities" in the USSR.[65]

On May 7–8, 1980, several thousand assembly-line workers walked out of the Gor'kiy Motor plant, builder of trucks and other automotive vehicles, in protest against local food shortages. Handwritten pamphlets listing various complaints had appeared in April. Food supplies in local shops improved immediately after the strike. However, four strike leaders were arrested.[66]

On June 2, 1980, a one-day walkout occurred in a Chelyabinsk tractor factory. Details are sketchy, but inadequate food supplies in local shops are thought to have spurred the disturbance.[67]

In mid-June 1980—following the departure of Politburo member Andrey Kirilenko who had asked them to work harder—employees of the showplace Kama River truck plant at Naberezhnyye Chelny struck for four hours in protest over food shortages.[68]

On October 1–2, 1980, approximately 1,000 workers struck the Katseremonditehas tractor factory in Tartu, Estonia, demanding recision of recently imposed increased production norms, payment of earned bonuses, and elimination of food shortages in shops. A special commission sent from Moscow quickly met the first two demands. The success of the Tartu strikers reportedly encouraged demonstrations in both Tartu and Parnu on October 10 on behalf of Estonian independence, reinstatement in Estonian institutions of higher education of students expelled for previous demonstrations, and other nationalist causes.[69]

In 1980 (precise dates are uncertain), one strike is reported to have occurred in Nikel', northwest of Murmansk, and a second took place in Vyborg, northwest of Leningrad. In the latter, workers protested police brutality toward workers in a previous incident.[70]

In early 1981, coal miners are reported to have struck in Vorkuta.[71]

In late March and early April 1981, two strikes occurred at the Kiev Experimental Design Plant of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Livestock-Breeding Machine-Building. The first disturbance was precipitated by an increase in production norms without an accompanying raise in wages. The strike led to a restoration of the old norms. The major issue in the second incident was the unavailability of water in the rayon where the plant is located. The most noteworthy aspect of this strike is that its organizers are reported to have

[65] *The New York Times*, June 14, 1980. See also *The Washington Post*, June 14, 1980. In an unusual admission to Western correspondents visiting the Tol'yatti auto works in 1981, Soviet officials acknowledged the occurrence of a labor dispute there in 1980, but insisted that it involved only 20 to 30 workers who held an unauthorized meeting in support of a lower pension age. See *The New York Times*, Nov. 18, 1981.

[66] *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, both June 14, 1980. See also "Strike of the Volga Workmen," *Newsweek*, June 23, 1980, p. 4.

[67] *The Financial Times*, July 2, 1980.

[68] Ibid., June 23, 1980. For a Soviet account of the Kirilenko visit, see *Pravda*, June 17, 1980.

[69] Peter Reddaway, loc. cit., and "*Samizdat* Report on Strikes in Kiev," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 267, July 6, 1981, p. 2.

[70] *The Boston Globe*, Mar. 16, 1981.

[71] Ibid.

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been members of the factory party and trade union committees. In response to this disturbance, the local water-supply system was repaired. However, the plant director was dismissed, and some changes were made in the leadership of the party and trade union committees. During the same period, a strike occurred at a Kiev-area factory producing reinforced concrete elements. As in the incident at the livestock-breeding-machinery plant noted above, the issue was a raising of production norms without an accompanying wage hike. Although few details of the settlement are available, it appears that this strike was resolved in favor of the workers.[72]

In August 1981, workers struck the Kiev Motorcycle Plant for one to two days to protest reductions in piecework rates and bonuses. When the earlier rates were restored, workers returned to their jobs.[73]

Also in 1981, labor disputes are reported to have occurred in the Latvian capital of Riga and in "various parts of Lithuania."[74]

There were also reports that 500 workers on two shifts at the Zhdanov Bus Factory in Pavlovsk, (Leningrad Oblast) struck for improved "economic conditions." Similar walk-outs have occurred in other Pavlovsk factories in recent years. The workers' demands have usually been satisfied.[75]

Until recently, the occurrence of strikes in the Soviet Union has been episodic. A disturbance occurred in one part of the country and was quelled; although word of the protest may have reached other cities, the event remained isolated in significance. Beginning in 1979 and 1980, however, a different tendency could be discerned. In Tol'yatti in 1979–1980 and in Kiev in 1981, one disturbance followed upon another in the same workplace. In Kiev, moreover, the two disruptions at the machine-building plant were themselves followed by strikes at two additional local factories. Of these four incidents, all of which occurred in a six-month period, three were the consequence of a single type of management decision—the imposition of higher production norms without an accompanying wage hike. That an unofficial "system" of communications exists in the Soviet Union has long been known; its role in these disturbances and in labor unrest in Pavlovsk cannot be determined at the current time, but it is not unreasonable to suggest that awareness of one strike was a factor in the precipitation of another.

Another sequence of demonstrations occurred in Estonia and, possibly, in "various parts of Lithuania" in 1981, as noted above. Anti-Soviet ethnic nationalism was a key element in the second Estonian disturbance and may have been a component in the Lithuanian incidents as well. In these and other non-Russian areas, the possibility of serial disruptions may be enhanced by the fusion of labor unrest with anti-Russian and anti-Soviet ethnic assertiveness.

Attempts to Form Independent Unions

Whereas a strike may be a short-term response to unacceptable working conditions, formation of an independent trade union is considered by some Soviet labor activists to be the long-term solution to labor abuse. In their view, the official Soviet trade union body—the AUCCTU is an agent of the CPSU and the government, and therefore is unsuited to represent the interests of workers. In recent years, three attempts to establish independent trade unions in the Soviet Union have been recorded.

The first labor union had its genesis in the Moscow waiting rooms of the General Procurator, the Supreme Soviet, and the Central Committee of the CPSU. Soviet citizens wishing to lodge complaints often make the rounds of such institutions and, while waiting for hearings, discuss their problems with one another. A small group centered around Vladimir Klebanov, who had been incarcerated in a psychiatric hospital after trying to organize an independent trade union among Donetsk-area coal miners in the 1960's, issued an "open letter" on Soviet working conditions on May 20, 1977. A second "Open Letter to the World Public on the True Situation of Blue- and White-Collar Workers on the Eve of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the USSR" was publicized in September 1977. A third letter followed on November 7, 1977, the anniversary of the 1917 Revolution; addressed to various Soviet authorities and the world press, it requested the establishment of a commission to investigate how the Central Committee of the CPSU responds to worker complaints. The November letter was signed by 33 people.[76]

After a press conference in which Klebanov and other workers outlined specific instances of dangerous working conditions, embezzlement and corruption, and

[72] "*Samizdat* Report on Strikes in Kiev," loc. cit., and Roman Solchanyk, "Poland's Impact Inside the USSR," *Soviet Analyst*, Sept. 9, 1981, p. 5.

[73] "*Samizdat* Report on Strike in Kiev and Food Supply Problems," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 477, Dec. 1, 1981, p. 1.

[74] Roman Solchanyk, loc. cit.

[75] From a samizdat article reviewed in "Annotations," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 293, July 20, 1982, pp. 1–2.

[76] John C. Micheal, "The Independent Trade-Union Movement in the Soviet Union," Radio Liberty Research, No. 304, Oct. 11, 1979, p. 13, *The New York Times*, Dec. 2 and 21, 1977, and *The Washington Post*, Dec. 10, 1977.

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serious worker-management conflict, Klebanov was detained and committed to a special psychiatric hospital for nine days.[77] An additional press conference and detention of two more activists preceded the announcement on January 26, 1978, of the formation of the Association of Free Trade Unions of Workers in the Soviet Union (*Assotsiatsiya Svobodnykh Profsoyuzov Trudyashchikhsya v Sovetskom Soyuze*). Klebanov and four others told foreign correspondents that 200 workers from around the country had joined their union. They said that they would welcome moral support from George Meany, then president of the American AFL–CIO, and that they would seek recognition from the International Labor Organization (ILO), a specialized agency of the United Nations. A charter of the group, released on February 1, stated that membership was open to anyone "whose rights and interests have been unlawfully violated by administrative, governmental, party, or judicial agencies." A spokesman said that the new union was concerned with more than working conditions and wage levels: "We want to help people whose rights have been violated."[78]

Within 10 days after the formation of the new union, the five who announced its establishment had all been detained and two other labor activists had been committed to psychiatric hospitals.[79] By the end of March, continued harassment and detention of workers affiliated with the union effectively neutralized its self-proclaimed mission. Although it did attract some foreign support,[80] it never attained any significance in the Soviet Union itself.

As persecution of the Klebanov group intensified, another group emerged to press for labor rights. Their leader was Vsevolod Kuvakin, a specialist on Soviet labor law and former legal inspector. Moscow party authorities had successfully sought his dismissal from the Central Commmittee of the Union of Oil and Gas Industry Workers after he had protested several aspects of Soviet internal policy in letters to the Central Committee of the CPSU. On February 10, 1978, Kuvakin announced that he intended to form a commission to study Soviet labor laws, working conditions, and other labor-related issues.[81] In April, Kuvakin and two others announced the formation of the Independent Trade Union of Workers of the USSR. They requested recognition from the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU, the ILO, and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Receiving no response from any of these bodies, Kuvakin and four others established another association, the Working Group for the Defense of Labor, Economic and Social Rights in the USSR. This group prepared several reports on Soviet labor abuse, some of which were published in Soviet samizdat. Their work bore more resemblance to human rights dissident activity than to trade union operations.

The formation of a third independent trade union was announced on October 28, 1978, at a press conference in the apartment of Mark Morozov, a mathematician. To be called the Free Interprofessional Association of Workers (*Svobodnoye Mezhprofessional'noye Ob'yedineniye Trudyashchikhsya*—SMOT), this group presented a detailed list of objectives to Western reporters. Morozov declared that the group had no political intentions, but aimed to provide legal, moral, and material assistance to its members, and to establish a variety of voluntary cooperative associations within SMOT—a credit union, health-care programs, vacation homes, and kindergartens. It would form "working groups" to investigate human rights abuses (economic, labor, social, cultural, religious, and emigration) of its members and would report its findings in regularly published documents and periodicals. He said that in 1978 the union had approximately 100 members belonging to eight autonomous groups. Each group was drawn from a specific workplace or residential area, and each specialized in a particular field of action, such as monitoring adherence to workplace safety regulations. One representative was elected from each of the eight groups to serve on the SMOT Council of Representatives, a coordinating body. In an effort to deter harassment of the membership-at-large by authorities, only the names of the eight representatives were publicized. By mid-1979, three of the eight plus Morozov had been arrested. Two others emigrated, one quit the Council under threat of criminal prosecution, and another dropped out voluntarily. Although additional representatives were elected to replace the missing, several of them later emigrated or dropped out. Dissident sources reported in 1980 that only four to six autonomous

[77] *The New York Times*, Dec. 21, 1977. His release may have been brought about by the strong protest lodged in his behalf by Arthur J. Goldberg, chairman of the US delegation to the 1977 Belgrade review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

[78] *The New York Times*, Feb. 28, 1978. See also *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, Feb. 27, 1978. The charter, signed by 110 workers, is reprinted in translation in Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander J. Motyl, and Adolph Sturmthal, *Workers' Rights East and West*, New Brunswick, NJ, League for Industrial Democracy, 1980, pp. 97–99.

[79] *The Washington Post*, Feb. 8, 1978, and *The New York Times*, Feb. 28, 1978.

[80] Support was expressed by the four largest unions in France (including the Communist-led General Confederation of Labor—CGT), the British Railwaymen's Union, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (the largest international association of non-Communist trade unions), and the Swedish section of Amnesty International, among others.

[81] "Persecution of Independent Soviet Trade Unionists," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 154, May 18, 1979, p. 2.

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groups with "a few dozen" members "scattered among ten or fifteen cities" remained active.[82]

A more optimistic report on SMOT fortunes in the early 1980's was provided by one of its founders, Vladimir Borisov, who had been forced to emigrate in 1980. In a 1981 interview, Borisov stated that "about ten to fifteen groups in all" with a total of 200 members continued to exist. Representatives of each group met monthly. Because the existence of SMOT served to "partially defuse" worker unrest, Borisov asserted, the government might not want to destroy it entirely. He predicted that its influence would increase.[83] Indeed, another SMOT founder, Albina Yakoreva, who was forced into exile in mid-1982, reported that the organization had about 300 active members and an additional 1,500 supporters. At least 21 groups existed, including new units in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic republics. Several of the new groups were formed by workers who had learned of SMOT from foreign radio broadcasts.[84]

Nearly 30 issues of the SMOT *Information Bulletin* have reached the West. Recent articles have included reports on popular support in the Soviet Union for Polish workers and the Solidarity trade union.[85] However, two factors suggest that optimism about the future of SMOT may be illusory. First, SMOT appears to be more of a general human rights organization than a trade union concentrating on labor issues. As such, it may have limited appeal to blue-collar workers whose concerns appear to be more narrowly focused on traditional labor questions, a point that is considered in more detail below. Second, just as the original leadership of SMOT was removed through imprisonment or forced emigration, any emerging leaders face similar administrative measures designed to isolate them.

[82] Gleb Vysotin and Valentin Sereda, "The Past, Present and Future of Independent Trade Unions: Fact and Fiction about the 'Mass Workers' Movement in the USSR'," *A Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR*, No. 39, July-September 1980, p. 33. Some of the labor activists received severe prison sentences. For example, Mark Morozov was sentenced in January 1981 to eight years in strict-regime prison camps and five years in internal exile. Vsevolod Kuvakin of The Working Group for the Defense of Labor, Economic and Social Rights in the USSR and later of SMOT was also arrested and was sentenced in December 1981 to one year in strict-regime camps and five years in internal exile.



Vladimir Borisov, a leading figure in the formation of the Free Interprofessional Association of Workers (SMOT) in the Soviet Union, pictured in Marseilles in 1980 after his expulsion from the Soviet Union.

—Pascal Parrot/SYGMA.

Workers and Intellectuals

A key element in the formation of Poland's Solidarity trade union was the cooperation between Polish workers and Polish intellectuals. In the Soviet Union, relations between workers and intellectuals are characterized by mutual dislike and suspicion. One Western observer noted that the latter are "almost wholly lacking in contact with the former."[86] Hedrick Smith quotes a Soviet metalworker speaking "contemptuously of intellectuals as *nakhlebniki,* parasites living off the bread of others." The metalworker repeats a "workers' proverb deriding the intelligentsia: 'A fish begins rotting from the head.'" The workers were "loyal to the Soviet system and the Party."[87] They wanted only their share of "the Big Deal; the rewards, privileges, and public esteem extended to the middle class caused the workers to feel slighted in their own proletarian state."[88] For their part,

[83] "An Interview with Vladimir Borisov, Founding Member of the Soviet Independent Trade Union SMOT," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 372, Sept. 18, 1981, pp. 2–4. An adaptation of the interview, conducted by Charles Allen, appears in "Talking with a Soviet Free Trade Unionist," *The New Leader* (New York, NY), Sept. 21, 1981, pp. 6–9.

[84] "KGB Campaign to Crush SMOT," *Soviet Analyst*, Aug. 18, 1982, pp. 7–8.

[85] "Russian Group Issues Proclamation of Support for Polish Workers," *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 291, July 24, 1981, pp. 1–4. See also "Soviet Workers: 'Struggle for Democracy,'" *Soviet Analyst*, March 10, 1982, p. 8, and "KGB Campaign to Crush SMOT," loc. cit., for reviews of several *Information Bulletin* issues.

[86] Conquest, loc. cit.

[87] Smith, loc. cit., p. 226.

[88] Bushnell, loc. cit., p. 195

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the intellectuals have been condescending toward workers. Andrei Sakharov told Western reporters in 1977 that he would not support the labor activism of Vladimir Klebanov because some protesting workers "did not understand the risks of open dissent" and Klebanov himself may not be committed to individual liberty.[89] Klebanov acknowledged the rebuff, saying of the intellectuals: "They consider themselves above us."[90]

Sakharov's wife, Yelena Bonner, later expressed support for dissident workers, and several intellectuals subsequently wrote sympathetic monographs about Soviet blue-collar workers.[91] However, worker activists have openly disdained backing from the intelligentsia; an organizer of the early Klebanov union said of Bonner's statement: "These people are swindlers."[92] Many worker activists appear to regard the sudden concern for them by a few intellectuals as insincere and patronizing.

The dispatch into exile—internal or external—of the small number of intellectuals who have expressed support for Soviet workers suggests that Soviet authorities recognize the threat of such linkages. Generally more articulate and with access to the foreign press, the Soviet dissident intelligentsia could enhance Western awareness of Soviet labor conditions. Soviet officials can only be satisfied by the continuing estrangement between intellectuals and workers.

Labor Activism and Ethnic Awareness

Soviet authorities are less likely to be able to isolate dissident workers from non-Russian ethnic nationalists in Soviet border republics. Indeed, the samizdat literature in the Western republics regularly associates local labor unrest with Russian domination.[93] Recent labor unrest in the Estonian cities of Tallinn, Tartu, and Parnu had anti-Soviet and anti-Russian overtones.[94] So strong is anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiment in the Baltic republics that spontaneous nationalist demonstrations have been provoked in recent years by cancellation of pop music concerts in three Estonian cities and in Liepaja, Latvia. Soccer games between a home team and teams from Smolensk and Yaroslavl' led to Lithuanian nationalist demonstrations in Vilnius in 1977 and 1982.[95] The transformation of future labor disturbances into nationalist protests, similar to the 1980 events in Estonia described earlier, remains likely in the tense atmosphere prevailing in all three Baltic states.

That existing tensions in the European republics have been exacerbated by local cognizance of the events in neighboring Poland is suggested by the especially harsh statements about Solidarity in early 1981 by officials of the Lithuanian and Ukrainian republics. In mid-1981, the First Secretary of the Latvian CP also condemned developments in Poland.[96]

It is possible that anxiety over the interaction of ethnic and labor dissent motivated Soviet officials to name blue-collar workers of the local nationality to the bureaus of the central committees of republican parties in Latvia, Lithuania, and the three Transcaucasian republics in early 1981.[97] All five appointees are long-time party members and delegates to the Supreme Soviet; their nominations probably have more cosmetic than substantive significance. Nonetheless, authorities may hope that the presence of ethnic blue-collar workers on republican bureaus will persuade local workers and others with strong ethnic identification that their interests are being represented and will provide the bureaus with information about worker and local ethnic concerns. Ethnic particularism finds substantial resonance in each of the five republics affected by this decision. However, the significance of the appointments may be diminished by the failure to take comparable action in two other republics with similar ethnic and labor unrest, Estonia and Ukraine.

[89] *The New York Times*, Dec. 21, 1977.

[90] *The Washington Post*, Jan. 27, 1978.

[91] The Bonner statement is reported in *The New York Times*, Feb. 28, 1978. Bonner is one of six intellectuals whose names appear on the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group Report, "Violations of Social and Economic Rights in the USSR," loc. cit. See also Ludmilla Alexeyeva, "Worker Participation in the Dissident Movement," *A Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR*, No. 39, July-September 1980, pp. 50–56.

[92] *The New York Times*, Feb. 28, 1978.

[93] See, for example, issues of *The Chronicle of Catholic Church in Lithuania*. Workers' rights are also a subject of Ukrainian samizdat.

[94] Reddaway, loc. cit., and Solchanyk, loc. cit.

[95] For information on nationalist demonstrations in Estonia, see: *Radio Liberty Special Report*, No. 107, May 10, 1977; "Student Demonstrations in Estonia," *Soviet Analyst*, June 16, 1977, pp. 4–6; *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, both Oct. 5, 1980; and "Open Letter from the Estonian SSR," *Freedom Appeals* (New York, NY), No. 8, January-February 1981, pp. 3–8. The Liepaja incident is reported in *Laiks* (New York, NY), Oct. 19, 1977, and *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 243, Oct. 25, 1977. The demonstrations in Vilnius are reported in *The Washington Post*, Oct. 31, 1977; *Radio Liberty Research*, No. 5, Jan. 3, 1978, and No. 55, March 7, 1978; and "Police Suppress Demonstration in Vilnius," *Soviet Analyst*, Sept. 29, 1982, pp. 2–3.

[96] Petras Griskevicius, First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, was the first republican party chief to mention the Polish situation in a public pronouncement. He observed that "Soviet Communists and toilers" were following developments in Poland with "anxiety" (*Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1981). Earlier in February, without mentioning Poland by name, Vitaliy Solohub, Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions, castigated those who would "shatter the socialist system from within" by "speculating on the demogogic slogans of free trade unions" (*Radyanska Ukraina*, Feb. 12, 1981). Latvian First Secretary August Voss cited the situation in Poland as an example of the "serious economic, political and moral cost" resulting from inadequate ideological education (*Sovetskaya Latviya* [Riga], July 19, 1981.

[97] See *Kommunist* (Yerevan) and *Zarya vostoka* (Tbilisi), both of Jan. 25, 1981, and *Bakinsky rabochiy, Sovetskaya Latviya*, and *Sovetskaya Litva* (Vilnius), all of Jan. 31, 1981, for announcements of these appointments and biographies of the men involved.

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Makhfirat Dodobayev (third from right, in flowered scarf), a weaver at the Leninabad Silk Mills and a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet, chats with fellow workers upon her return from an autumn 1977 Supreme Soviet session that adopted the new Soviet constitution.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

A New Soviet Labor Policy for the 1980's?

The Soviet response to recent industrial unrest recorded earlier in this article suggests that the Kremlin has developed a three-step, short-term approach to dealing with strikes in recent years: (1) the immediate material demands of the strikers are satisfied, whether in terms of restoring lower production rates or in terms of increasing stocks of food in local shops; (2) individual leaders of the strike and certain managerial and party personnel in the affected plant may be fired or otherwise disciplined, usually after a period of time has elapsed during which tension is dissipated; and (3) reports in foreign media about worker unrest are denied.[98] Although one source asserts that the Soviet Union has established a "new military force, euphemistically called the motorized militia" to deal with strikes,[99] no firm accounts have been received in the West in the last decade of firing by Soviet forces (military, security, militia) into crowds of striking workers as in Novocherkassk in 1962.

Apart from reacting to specific labor disturbances, Soviet authorities instituted a press campaign on labor issues between mid-1980 and late 1981. (This campaign was probably prompted by Solidarity's emergence in Poland.) Many articles exposed shortcomings of the official trade unions, accusing them of indifference to workers' complaints and failure to fully utilize the extensive powers accorded unions by Soviet law. Leonid Brezhnev himself spoke critically of Soviet trade unions in his address to the 26th Congress of the CPSU in Feburary 1981:

At times the trade unions lack initiative in exercising their extensive rights. They are not always persistent in questions of fulfilling collective contracts and of labor protection, and they still react only feebly to instances of the violation of labor legislation and cases of bureaucracy and red tape.[100]

[98] The most numerous and strident denials to date appear to have been issued about the strikes at the Gor'kiy Motor Works and the Kama River truck plant in May and June, 1980. See *Pravda* of June 19, 20, and 21, and both *Izvestiya* and *Trud* of June 21, and 22, 1980. Several of the *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* accounts include angry letters from workers at the two factories.

[99] Vladimir Borisov, quoted in *The Boston Globe*, Mar. 16, 1981.

[100] *Pravda*, Feb. 24, 1981.

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Other articles, although noting mistakes of trade unions, asserted that such errors were being rectified and that Soviet unions were effective and important instruments in protecting workers' interests.[101] These articles, in some instances, castigated management for failure to adhere to labor laws and for inattention to the everyday, social needs of workers.[102] Whatever the precise focus of the articles, the number dealing with labor abuse increased dramatically between mid-1980 and late 1981.

Since late 1981, however, media attention to labor relations shortcomings seems to have abated in favor of the traditional emphasis on increased labor productivity.[103] This change in focus appears to have predated the imposition of martial law in Poland and the consequent demise of independent trade union activity there; it may have been designed to underline the conventional Soviet approach to labor issues in preparation for the opening of the 17th Congress of AUCCTU in March 1982.

Another and, apparently, longer-lasting phenomenon of the early 1980's has been the initiation of "open letter days" in factories and farms across the Soviet Union. On such occasions, various officials (from factory or farm management, trade unions, local and oblast party units, local and oblast governments, transportation administrations, consumer service organizations, etc.) appear in open meetings to answer written questions submitted in advance by workers about living conditions. Additional questions are posed from the floor. Press reports indicate that many such meetings are quite lively. Pointed questions about the unavailability of food in shops, nonoperating bus routes, the housing shortage, etc., are passed to the officials. When the latter give evasive or superficial answers, they are frequently challenged by the audience.

Letters to newspapers and agencies have provided Soviet authorities with a measure of public opinion for some years. In 1976 and again in 1981, the Central Committee of the CPSU issued decrees calling for more active study of workers' letters.[104] The institution of "open letter days" may be seen as an extension of more conventional letter-writing activity, providing workers with opportunities to voice their opinions, and officials with on-the-spot information about local conditions. The new program appears to have commenced in the first half of 1980. *Trud,* the newspaper of the AUCCTU, has organized many "open letter" events. It also follows up on the issues raised if only to complain that problems have not been solved. Another advocate of "open letter days" has been the newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya.*[105]

The 1981 appointment of blue-collar workers to bureaus of central committees in five republican party organizations, noted earlier in this article for its relevance to Soviet ethnic pressures, is also pertinent to Soviet labor unrest. Because such nominations have been made in only one-third of the 15 Soviet republics, however, it is difficult to assess the significance of such action for all Soviet workers.

The Impact of Events in Poland

Although Soviet publications ignored the initial outbreak of strikes in Poland in July 1980, Soviet media have devoted regular, though selective, attention to labor unrest and other aspects of Polish life since August 19, 1980. TASS, Radio Moscow, and Soviet television then reported on Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) leader Edward Gierek's address of the previous day, which reviewed economic problems in Poland. Numerous reports on the Polish situation have appeared in a variety of Soviet media since that time. Soviet citizens, it would seem, are indeed interested in the subject. The prominent Novosti commentator Spartak Beglov noted in July 1981:

Today, regardless of what kind of Soviet audience one addresses with a lecture or discussion on a topic of international affairs, the first question asked of the speaker inevitably touches on Poland.[106]

Two months later, an Associated Press reporter observed that many questions directed to the speaker at a Moscow lecture on United States policy in the Middle East concerned Poland and Solidarity.[107] The interest of the Soviet public in Poland at this later date, in mid-September 1981, may well have been aroused by a concurrent extensive anti-Solidarity press campaign mounted, it can be assumed, in response to the national Solidarity Congress just concluded in Gdansk. It was at

[101] See, for example, four articles appearing in April 1981: A. Shibayev, "The Largest Organization of Laborers," *Kommunist,* (Moscow), No. 4, 1981, pp. 72–83; Yu. N. Korshunov, "Soviet Trade Unions: Defense of Workers' Rights," *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), No. 4, 1981, pp. 122–31; "The Party's Concern for the Working Man," *Trud,* Apr. 14, 1981; and the editorial "An Import Task of the Trade Unions," in *Pravda,* Apr. 16, 1981. See also *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), June 14, 1981, for commentary on the press campaign.

[102] See, for example, *Radyanska Ukraina* of Jan. 6, Feb. 12, and Mar. 14, 1981, and *Trud,* Apr. 26, 1981. See also *The Washington Post,* Jan. 30, 1981.

[103] An example of this type of article is an editorial in *Trud,* Jan. 6, 1982.

[104] *Pravda,* May 4, 1976, and Apr. 4, 1981.

[105] See, for example, *Trud* of July 29 and 31, Aug. 5, 11, 23, and 27, Sept. 24, and Dec. 31, 1981; and *Sovetskaya Rossiya* of Aug. 11, Oct. 2, and Dec. 11, 1981.

[106] Novosti, July 7, 1981.

[107] *The Boston Globe,* Sept. 14, 1981.

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this congress that the Polish trade union approved a resolution supporting workers in other Warsaw Pact countries (and Albania) "who have decided to enter the difficult road of struggle for free trade unions."[108] Soon after this statement was made, mass meetings of Soviet workers were convened to condemn their Polish counterparts, and numerous harsh appraisals of Solidarity appeared in the Soviet press.[109]

On September 18, the official Polish press agency PAP released the text of a stiff message to the Central Committee of the PUWP from the Central Committee of the CPSU. The letter castigated the congress as a "tribune from which slanders and insults sounded against our state" and termed the resolution supporting free trade unions throughout the Soviet bloc a "revolting provocation." It condemned the "anti-Soviet character" of Polish nationalism, invoked the memory of the "vast sacrifices" of the Soviet people in liberating Poland during World II, cited the "selfless" Soviet help extended to Poland, and claimed a "full moral right to demand that an end be put to the anti-Soviet impudence in Poland."[110]

By November, *Literaturnaya gazeta* was referring to Solidarity leaders as fascists and Polish equivalents of Maoist Red Guards.[111] A subsequent issue of *Literaturnaya gazeta* accused the Polish union of selling out Polish interests to "imperialist America."[112]

A full review of Soviet concern about evolving conditions in Poland in late 1981 is not germane to this article. It is, however, useful to list those elements in the Polish situation that impinge upon labor-management relations in the Soviet Union. First, as acknowledged in the Novosti report cited earlier, numerous Soviet citizens were aware of and curious about the events in Poland. More ominous, in Moscow's view, was that such curiosity led to sympathy and expressions of support for Solidarity by residents of several Soviet cities.[113] Although such sympathy was not widespread—indeed, most ethnic Russians retain an historic antipathy toward Poles, regarding Poland as little more than a colony that ought to maintain a properly deferential attitude toward



Lunchtime in the canteen of an aluminum factory in East Siberia.

—Henri Cartier-Bresson/Magnum.

Russia and resenting the Soviet economic assistance extended to their western neighbor—Soviet authorities could only be disturbed about those expressions of support that did occur.[114]

Second, the existence of an independent trade union in a socialist state posed a challenge to Soviet ideology. The impotence of the Communist party and the irrelevance of official doctrine to real life was readily apparent.

Third, the first two factors seemed to converge with especially strong resonance in those republics of the Soviet Union that share borders with Poland and whose populations resent Soviet control. It was Polish human rights activist and longtime Kremlin bête noire, Jacek Kuron, who articulated what the Soviets feared to hear. Before a large audience at Warsaw University in late 1980, he predicted that the "Polish disease" would spread to the western border republics of the USSR, mentioning the Ukraine specifically.[115] In fact, 20 dissidents from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania sent a joint

[108] *The Washington Post,* Sept. 9, 1981.

[109] See the accounts of the meeting at the ZIL auto and truck plant in Moscow in *The New York Times* and in *Pravda,* both Sept. 12, 1981. The *Pravda* report reprints an "open letter" to Polish workers from the ZIL "workers' collective." A similar letter from the "workers' collective" at the Leningrad Kirov Plant appeared in *Pravda* on Sept. 13, 1981. See also *Pravda* of Sept. 14–18, and *Izvestiya* of Sept. 13, 15, and 18, 1981.

[110] See *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post,* Sept. 19, 1981.

[111] *Literaturnaya gazeta,* Nov. 11, 1981.

[112] Ibid., Nov. 18, 1981.

[113] Various samizdat documents indicate support by several Soviet rights groups—human, labor, national, and religious—as well as by Leningrad students and individual dissidents. An underground support group was also formed. See "Russian Group Issues Proclamation of Support for Polish Workers," *Radio Liberty Research,* No. 291, July 24, 1981.

[114] To deter Soviet citizens from developing an awkward interest in Polish affairs, the USSR resumed jamming of Western radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union shortly after the August 1980 eruption of strike activity in Gdansk. Restrictions on travel to and from Poland and on importation of Polish newspapers and magazines were also imposed.

[115] Adrian Karatnycky, "A Polish Voice," *The New Leader,* June 15, 1982, pp. 3–4.

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message of support to Lech Walesa in September 1981, and other instances of backing for Solidarity, tinged with local nationalist sentiments, were reported from additional persons in the Baltic republics, from Belorussia, and from the Ukraine.[116]

Fourth, quite apart from sympathy expressed for the Polish independent trade union from within the USSR, Soviet authorities doubtless were concerned about the impact of the Polish situation on other Warsaw Pact countries. Every East European country suffers to some extent from the same type of economic difficulties and general malaise affecting Poland.

Finally, the compliance or at least passive cooperation of Polish labor with Soviet domination is required if Soviet communication links across Poland, connecting East Germany and the Soviet Union, are to be protected.

It probably was not coincidental, as Soviet authorities themselves would say, that the second edition of Leonid Brezhnev's book *Soviet Trade Unions in Conditions of Developed Socialism (Sovetskiye profsoyuzy v usloviyakh razvitogo sotsializma)* was published in December 1981 and was the subject of a 2,800-word review in *Pravda.* In praising "Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's book," the *Pravda* article condemned "trade union independence" in very harsh terms and set forth in considerable detail the proper relationship "between the party and trade unions in a socialist society."[117]

Worker Discontent and the Future

In March 1982, less than two weeks before the opening of the 17th Congress of the AUCCTU, Aleksey Shibayev was replaced as chairman of the Soviet trade union body by Stepan Shalayev. Whether the former's downfall was due to Politburo infighting or genuine concern over trade union and labor issues remains unclear. Whatever the reason, Shalayev is distinguished from most of his predecessors by actually having previous experience in trade union affairs and by his relatively young age of 53.

Although Shalayev's credentials appear appropriate to his new position, one may question whether the AUCCTU will be able to deal with worker discontent effectually. The constraints imposed on trade union activity by Soviet ideology and the structure of the Soviet economy would appear to restrict severely the unions' possibilities to address labor dissatisfaction.

Worker discontent is likely to continue and expand in the Soviet Union. It will be fed by the consequences of a stagnant economy, unsatisfactory labor conditions, a demographic imbalance, the general repressiveness of Soviet society, and the susceptibility of such discontent to fusion with ethnic assertion in Soviet border areas. Further disturbances, such as those in Tol'yatti and the labor-ethnic incidents in the Baltic states, can be predicted with some confidence.

The growing number of such events, however, does not imply that worker unrest will erupt throughout the Soviet Union or that a Soviet version of Solidarity will emerge. The traditional passivity of Russian workers, the lack of contact between workers and intellectuals capable of articulating and publicizing labor grievances, the tight controls on communications, the power of the party and police, and the demonstrated willingness of Soviet authorities to meet immediate material demands of striking workers, all combine to suggest that the consequences of such expressions of worker discontent will be transient. Outbreaks of worker unrest may escalate in number, occur in more locales, and be precipated by more varied or even more intractable causes, but the strictures of Soviet society will limit their impact. Despite an expansion of the industrial dissident base, it is likely that the future of Soviet labor relations will resemble their past.

[116] See the following 1981 *Radio Liberty Research* reports: No. 267, July 6, 1981; No. 291, July 24, 1981; No. 303, Aug. 4, 1981; No. 372, Sept. 18, 1981; and No. 389, Sept. 29, 1981. See also Solchanyk, loc. cit., pp. 3–5, and *The Boston Globe,* Sept. 14, 1981.

[117] *Pravda,* Dec. 25, 1981.

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Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement

by J. A. Emerson Vermaat

Over the last decade, there has occurred a marked rise in neutralist and pacifist tendencies throughout Western Europe.[1] Coinciding with these trends toward pacifism have been differences between various sectors of American and European opinion over the proper approach to dealing with the Soviet Union and its recent arms buildup, particularly in Europe. These differences have crystallized around the defense posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) vis à vis the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), and more especially around European strategic defenses. Against this background, the proposed deployment of new nuclear weapons on the territories of NATO member states has raised alarm over the possibility of a nuclear war in Europe and galvanized into action a number of indigenous peace movements.

During the debate within NATO over the modernization and strengthening of its forces, the Soviet Union launched a "peace" campaign aimed at preventing the deployment of improved Western nuclear weapons in Europe. In pursuit of this goal, the Soviet Union not only resorted to diplomatic contacts with governments but also sought to arouse Western public opinion and to direct it against the measures aimed at redressing the eroded European strategic balance. A major role in Moscow's strategy was played by the orchestration of a "peace offensive" through a variety of front organizations as well as the utilization of the organizational skills available in some West European Communist parties.

It is the aim of this article to describe the tactics and instruments employed by the Soviet Union in this "peace" campaign and to assess its effectiveness. In so doing, it is not my intention to suggest that the West European peace movement became a mere tool for Moscow's foreign policy objectives. Rather, it is my intention to describe how Moscow sought to stimulate and control the locally-based peace movements, and to make some tentative estimates regarding where it succeeded and where it failed. In brief, Moscow succeeded reasonably well in the initial period between 1977 and 1980. Thereafter, its ability to manipulate the peace movement for its own interests became increasingly problematic, as a result, first, of the impact of the invasion of Afghanistan and, later, of Soviet conduct with respect to Poland. An analysis of how and why these changes took place requires, in the first place, a description of the concepts and organizational forms customarily used for these purposes by Moscow.

[1] Joris J. C. Voorhoeve, "European Neutralism," in *The Trans-Atlantic Crisis*, New York, NY, The Orwell Press, 1982, pp. 1–17. See also, Gerd Schmidinger, "The New Pacifism," *Swiss Review of World Affairs* (Zurich), a monthly publication of *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, October 1982, pp. 27–31.

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Utility of Fronts

The tradition of using front organizations to promote Soviet foreign policy interests goes back to the early days of the Soviet state. Before the 1922 Genoa Conference, Lenin gave this advice to his foreign minister, Yuriy Chicherin:

We Communists have ***our*** *communist program (the Third International);* ***but*** *we still consider it to be our*

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duty ***as businessmen to support*** *(even if the odds are 10,000 to 1) pacifists in the* **other**, *i.e. bourgeois, camp. . . . This will both have bite and be "polite" and will help to demoralize the enemy.*[2]

Contemporary Soviet leaders continue to take Lenin's advice seriously in this as in other matters of statecraft. Indeed, it may be more applicable today than at the time of the Genoa Conference. The Soviets today, in the words of an authoritative source, consider Lenin's advice "of enormous significance in defining the tactics of Communist parties in the struggle for peace (*mir*) and Socialism, in the cause of building a broad democratic *front* of democratic forces around the Communists for the struggle against imperialist reactionary forces. . . . With all the inconsistency of the pacifists, their campaign against a nuclear war constitutes an important social factor which cannot be discounted."[3]

Ever since the founding of NATO, it has been Moscow's publicly expressed intention to court the West European public by a variety of "peace offensives" directed at dismantling the Western defense system or splitting the Alliance. For this and other purposes the Soviets have maintained a number of front organizations. Such organizations espouse a range of purportedly nonideological goals, and they are thus under certain circumstances operationally more useful to the Soviet Union than are groups with formally avowed Communist membership and purposes. It has been estimated that the propaganda and political activities of the major front organizations cost the USSR at least US$63 million annually.[4] A list of the major fronts reveals their missions in broad outline.[5]

Communist fronts like the World Peace Council (WPC) and the Christian Peace Conference (CPC) usually defend or justify the East European military buildup while condemning "imperialism" and "war preparation" in the West. They follow Georgi Dimitrov's dictum that "the struggle for peace is a struggle for the victory of socialism throughout the world."[6] According to Dimitrov, "One sympathizer is generally worth more than a dozen militant communists. A writer of reputation, or a retired general, are worth more than five hundred poor devils who won't know any better than to get themselves beaten up by the police."[7]

At the same time, the Soviet attitude toward pacifism is highly one-sided. While supporting pacifists "in the other camp," Moscow and its allies vehemently denounce the slightest indication of pacifism in the countries of the "socialist commonwealth," that is, the Soviet orbit. For example, when East German students started adopting the cry "swords into plowshares" and wearing buttons with this slogan, the East German Minister of Defense, Heinz Hoffmann, made it absolutely and immediately clear that "socialism needs both swords and plowshares."[8] While the East German Peace Council was hosting a meeting of some leaders of the Danish Ban the Bomb movement, the East German authorities undertook a vigorous campaign to stamp out indigenous signs of pacifism in their state which explicitly refers to itself as "a state of peace" (*Friedenstaat*).[9] Similarly, nonofficial peace movements and Helsinki Monitor groups are vigorously suppressed in the Soviet Union. During the so-called peace march in July 1982, some Scandinavians were permitted to "march for peace" in Moscow, Minsk, and Leningrad; however, the authorities on the spot took great care not to allow them any contact with unofficial groups within the Soviet Union.

A similarly partisan policy is followed by the front organizations themselves. According to the President of the World Peace Council, the Indian Communist Romesh Chandra, the WPC "positively reacts to all Soviet initiatives in international affairs."[10] At a peace conference held in Moscow in 1973, Chandra asserted that those peace organizations that took an anti-Soviet stance "ceased to be genuine peace organizations."[11]

All major Soviet foreign initiatives, including major propaganda campaigns, are approved by the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Responsible to it are various elements of the Soviet party

[2] V. I. Lenin, *Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy* (Collected Works), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1964, Vol. 45, p. 34.

[3] A. S. Milovidov and V. G. Kozlov, Eds., *The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War,* a translation of *Filosofskoye naslediye V. I. Lenina i problemy sovremennoy voyny* (Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1972), Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 37.

[4] Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, US House of Representatives, *Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive),* Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence—House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 79, 80.

[5] For example, the World Peace Council was founded in 1949 and has over 135 branches in different countries; the World Federation of Trade Unions, founded in 1945, claims over 200 million members; the International Organization of Journalists, founded in 1946, claims over 180,000 members. For a fuller listing, see Richard F. Staar, "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1982, pp. 71 ff.

[6] Georgi Dimitrov, *Selected Works,* Sofia, Sofia Press, n. d., p. 150.

[7] Georgi Dimitrov, as quoted by Ian Greign in *The Assault on the West,* Petersham, The Foreign Affairs Publishing Co., 1968, pp. 244–45.

[8] Heinz Hoffmann, "Defense Is a Basic Human Right,' *Aussenpolitische Korrespondenz* (East Berlin), Apr. 2, 1982, p. 99.

[9] *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), April 2, 1982.

[10] *New Times* (Moscow), July 1975. The World Peace Council was officially referred to as an "instrument of Soviet foreign policy" in its "Foreign Affairs Note," of April 1982.

[11] Chandra was quoted in a declassified study of Soviet propaganda operations by the US Central Intelligence Agency published in Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, US House of Representatives, *The CIA and the Media,* Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence—House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 570.

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Key figures in the Soviet apparatus for dealing with political movements in non-Communist countries seen in France at the October 1981 Congress of the French Socialist Party, from left to right: Yuriy Zhukov, head of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace; Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; and Boris Ponomarëv, assumed to be ID chief.

Daniel Simon/Gamma-Liaison.

and government bureaucracy. Those that are likely to be engaged in a Soviet propaganda campaign are: (1) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Andrey A. Gromyko; (2) the Committee for State Security (KGB) under Vitaliy Fedorchuk (who recently succeeded Yuriy V. Andropov as KGB Chairman); (3) the CPSU's International Department (ID) under Boris N. Ponomarëv; and (4) the CPSU's International Information Department (IID) under Leonid M. Zamyatin.

The International Department has operational control of all fronts, and is responsible for relations with all non-ruling Communist parties, including those in Western Europe. The IID was created in 1978 with a view to making Soviet propaganda abroad more effective. Its creation may well have had to do with Moscow's intention to stimulate the rise of the West European peace movements in the late 1970's. Major propaganda initiatives can involve lead times comparable to those required for deployment of weapons systems. Since the groundwork for the Soviet strategic weapons buildup against Western Europe was laid in the early 1970's, it is plausible to assume that provisions in Politburo planning were also made for the propaganda required to accompany it. The primary IID responsibility is "directing foreign propaganda." The IID controls all Soviet media directed abroad, including the external activities of two news agencies, TASS and Novosti. Before his appointment as head of the IID, Zamyatin was Director of TASS.

There is little public direct evidence on the nature of coordination of the operations of these two CPSU departments, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the intelligence apparatus. The late Mikhail Suslov was reported by a number of sources to have exercised Politburo oversight of all such instruments of statecraft, and there is indirect evidence that following his death in early 1982, the brief was assumed by Politburo member Yuriy Andropov. There is probably much competition and overlapping of activity, particularly in the activities

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

Leonid Zamyatin, head of the International Information Department created in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1978.

—Sven Simon/Katherine Young.

of the ID and IID. There may also be frictions between the KGB and the ID, since both are involved in disinformation activities. Thus, Department A—responsible for disinformation and propaganda—within the KGB's First Chief Directorate utilizes positions in Soviet diplomatic missions to recruit journalists, writers, or clergy as "agents of influence."[12] In this respect the KGB performs a clandestine function corresponding to the more open activities of the IID. TASS correspondents in many cases work for the KGB directly in initiating news stories. An entire division of Novosti (the "Tenth Section") is staffed with KGB agents.[13] The ID, responsible for liaison with foreign CP's, assists by enlisting the organizational skills needed to run the main propaganda events such as meetings, marches, and demonstrations. The campaign in Western Europe against the neutron bomb was largely stimulated and partly organized by the ID through front organizations and Western Communist parties, the Dutch in particular. The IID was also deeply involved through a massive propaganda campaign mounted in Soviet and friendly Western media, and the KGB provided clandestine support.[14]

Launching the Peace Offensive

At the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, a consensus was reached that popular movements in the West could play an essential role in advancing socialism and "peace." The Basic Document of the conference stated:

In Western Europe the movement against the aggressive NATO bloc, for the normalization of relations and the development of cooperation among states and for ensuring European security is encompassing ever wider strata of the population. . . . ***The existing situation calls for unity of action of the Communists and all anti-imperialist forces so that maximum use can be made of all the new possibilities for launching a broader offensive against imperialism, against the forces of reaction and war.***[15]

The success of the anti–Vietnam war movement, when, according to one Soviet observer, "the demand to end the aggression became the universal demand of various political movements, including those in the United States,"[16] demonstrated to Moscow the efficacy of public opinion in the West. Plans to create a peace movement patterned after the anti–Vietnam war movement were worked out during and after the World Conference of Peace Forces in Moscow in 1973. The Soviets felt that the "correlation of forces" had never been so favorable to them. Leonid Brezhnev declared:

One can say with confidence that the present changes in the world situation are largely the result of the activities of public forces, of the hitherto unparallelled activity of the people, who are displaying sharp intolerance of arbitrary rule and aggression and an unbending will for peace.[17]

[12] John Barron, *KGB. The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents,* Reader's Digest Press, New York, NY, 1974, pp. 164 ff.

[13] Ibid., p. 11.

[14] Barron, "The KGB's Magical War for 'Peace,'" *Reader's Digest* (Pleasantville, NY), October 1982, pp. 211 ff.

[15] See the translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Aug. 6, 1969, pp. 16, 14. All documents of the Moscow 1969 conference are published in *Internationale Beratung der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien, Moscow 1969* (International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969), Prague, Verlag Frieden und Sozialismus, 1969.

[16] Georgiy Shakhnazarov, "Policy of Peace and Our Time," in *Soviet Policy of Peace,* Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1979, p. 64.

[17] As quoted by Vitaliy Korionov, in *The Policy of Peaceful Coexistence in Action,* Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 52.

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According to Vitaliy Korionov, a political commentator of *Pravda*, "favorable conditions enabling the peace-loving democratic forces to launch a decisive offensive against the imperialist forces of war and aggression had arisen by the beginning of the seventies."[18] It is evident that the Soviet side had become well aware of the impact movements for disarmament could make on the decision-making process in the West.

It was now a matter of finding a proper issue around which to mobilize public opinion in NATO countries against the military strengthening of NATO. The issue was soon found—the "enhanced radiation weapon" (ERW) or "neutron bomb," which was to be introduced by NATO as a tactical weapon to counter Soviet tank superiority. In July 1977, US President Jimmy Carter indicated that he supported production of the neutron bomb warheads but had not yet decided whether to deploy the weapon.[19] Initially, the ID was the main instrument used by the Soviets to conduct the campaign against the neutron bomb. After 1978, the IID, as a separate unit, became more and more involved in it.

The first shots in this war of propaganda were fired by TASS. After several initial attacks on the neutron bomb, TASS produced a major statement on July 30, 1977. Immediately, the whole front apparatus began to move. The WPC organized an "action week" during August 6–13, 1977, with a view to "launching a mass campaign aimed at achieving a ban on this weapon of mass destruction." A declaration by 28 Communist parties, published on August 8, denounced the "barbarous nature" of the new weapon, and called upon Social Democrats, Communists, and Christians to protest against its introduction.[20]

A key role was to be played by the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN), which had recently reestablished relations with Moscow, after years of isolation. An "initiative for a broad movement of the people" was launched by the CPN under the slogan "stop the neutron bomb."[21] The Dutch movement against the neutron bomb soon spread to other countries. It was led by orthodox Communists who followed instructions from the ID. (According to Dutch intelligence data, which leaked to the press in November 1982, a prominent Dutch Communist, Joop D. Wolff, regularly informed the Soviet embassy in the Hague of political developments that would be of interest to the Soviets. Wolff and other leading Dutch Communists frequently visited East Europe to discuss matters related to the Dutch peace Movement.[22]) The secretary of the Stop the Neutron Bomb movement, Nico Schouten, attended a special meeting of the WPC in East Berlin in February 1979, where the United Group Against the Neutron Bomb was established.[23]

On March 18, 1978, an International Forum was organized in Amsterdam by the CPN, after intensive consultation and in close collaboration with East European sister parties and Communist front figures.[24] Romesh Chandra had paid a visit to Amsterdam in December 1977 in order to bring this initiative into line with the international campaign orchestrated by the WPC. The Dutch activists presented Chandra with a report and discussed plans for the future.[25] The International Forum was attended by scientists, politicians, theologians, church leaders, artists, and, last but not least, high-ranking CP members from East and West. At another convocation of the Forum, a year later, several ambassadors from East European countries were present. According to Dutch intelligence data, KGB and ID figures have been instrumental in promoting sentiments for unilateral disarmament in the Netherlands. ID official Anatoliy Popov visited Holland in January 1982 to consult with key people in the peace movement about the organization of the International Forum, which was to take place on February 13–14, 1982.[26]

The impact of all this began to make itself felt. Public opinion in the Netherlands and elsewhere began to shift, and with it, the attitude of governments in NATO states. From now on, any substantial proposal made by NATO to strengthen the defense of Europe would face serious opposition from large sectors of the European public led by action groups and antiwar movements. In September 1979, the Chief of the International Department of the Hungarian Communist Party, Janosz Berecz, wrote:

The political campaign against the Neutron Bomb was one of the most significant and most successful since World War Two. . . . It was a good program that the European Communist and Workers' Parties adopted in Berlin three years ago, but we think it is in our common interest to make greater efforts than so far for the implementation of this program and for strengthening the anti-imperialist unity.[27]

[18] Ibid., p. 53.
[19] *The New York Times*, July 13, 1977.
[20] *Neues Deutschland*, Aug. 9, 1977; and *Soviet News* (London), Aug. 9, 1977.
[21] *De Waarheid* (Amsterdam), Aug. 19, 1977.
[22] *De Telegraaf* (Amsterdam), Nov. 6, 1982.
[23] *Neues Deutschland*, Feb. 5, 1979.
[24] See J. A. E. Vermaat, "The East-European Relations of the Dutch Peace Movement," *Ons Leger* (Rotterdam), October 1981, pp. 95 ff.
[25] *Neues Deutschland*, Dec. 24–25, 1977.
[26] *De Telegraaf*, Nov. 13, 1982.
[27] Quoted in *Soviet Covert Action*, p. 75.

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

Nico Schouten (left) of the Stop the Neutron Bomb movement in the Netherlands presents a petition with 162,757 signatures against the enhanced-radiation weapon to Dr. Anne Vondeling (right), Moderator of the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament, on April 18, 1978.

—ANP.

The Stop the Neutron Bomb movement has cooperated with the Soviet international front apparatus from the very beginning, and it can be argued that the movement would hardly have existed without stimulation from Moscow. It is estimated that more than US$100 million was expended on this campaign alone by the Soviets. Part of the money went to the CPN and its front Stop the Neutron Bomb.[28] Soviet financial support for "peace" movements and related activities in Europe has taken both clandestine and relatively open forms. In an interview with an Austrian paper in 1982, Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the Soviet ID, said quite candidly that Soviet peace groups:

have several peace committees for European security. They are printing newspapers, and all Soviet participants in peace demonstrations here in Vienna, Amsterdam or Brussels are being paid with the money from this [Soviet Peace] Fund. I think that we do not inform the public sufficiently about our peace movement. . . .[29]

Broadening the Peace Movement

The success of the neutron bomb issue in arousing public interest in the West led to a decision in 1979 by the leaders of the Stop the Neutron Bomb movement to broaden its scope. "Stop the neutron bomb—stop the nuclear arms race" was the new slogan to be adopted everywhere. At the February 1979 WPC meeting in East Berlin, the slogan "Stop the arms race!" surfaced as "the main demand in the present stage of the struggle for peace."[30] The target quickly became NATO's "double-track" modernization decision finally reached in December 1979. In addition to pursuing arms control talks, NATO members agreed to deploy new interme-

[28] Quoted in ibid., p. 76. This is also apparent from German intelligence data. See in particular *Bundesverfassungschutzbericht* (Bonn, Ministry of the Interior), 1981, p. 3.

[29] *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (Vienna), May 21, 1982, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), May 24, 1982, p. CC/13.

[30] *Neues Deutschland*, Feb. 5, 1979.

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diate-range Pershing II and cruise missiles to counter SS-20 superiority. The WPC and its affiliates immediately started to mobilize Western public opinion again. Already in December 1979, a Conference of Soviet Peace Champions, meeting in Moscow, declared that "the peace-loving public has launched a mass-scale protest campaign against NATO's militarist plans. . . ." The conference's organizer, the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, was not shy about acknowledging Soviet official sponsorship:

The Soviet peace champions are profoundly grateful to the Party and Government for their continuous care and attention and for the vigorous and comprehensive support given to the peace-loving public forces.[31]

"All forces for maintaining peace!" was the slogan issued by the World Parliament of Peoples for Peace convening in Sofia in September 1980 and sponsored by the WPC. Hundreds of speakers voiced the need for a broad antiwar movement and "for creating a worldwide antiwar front, able to materialize the anxiety of hundreds of millions of people in mass actions to prevent war."[32] The conference adopted the WPC's Programme of Action 1981, which stressed "the urgency of bringing together in common mass actions, people belonging to different political parties and tendencies" and pledged: "Let us make 1981 the springboard of the 80's, a year of decisive offensive of peace forces to achieve a breakthrough in curbing the arms buildup."[33]

The WPC began at this point to prepare plans for massive demonstrations against NATO's modernization, to be held in the second half of 1981. In doing so, the WPC and its affiliates used the traditional front strategy of involving in the demonstrations a mix of political and social groups whose views do not necessarily converge with Soviet policy in other areas. Most of the activities outlined in the Programme of Action actually occurred, which spurred Soviet émigré Vladimir Bukovsky to ask pointedly, "How on earth could the Soviets have known in 1980 about events that would take place at the end of 1981, unless they were running the whole show?"[34]

In August 1981, Romesh Chandra instructed the national affiliates of the WPC to accelerate the peace campaign. Peace Committees were instructed to involve trade unions, churches, and civic organizations. A Guide of Action in the Autumn Offensive was distributed to WPC affiliates. A "call for a broad international campaign for peace" was made on the occasion of World Peace Day 1981.[35] At a press conference in October, Romesh Chandra announced "world-wide actions for the maintenance of peace."[36]

Communist parties in Western Europe were activated in support of the campaign. Numerous individual Communists promoted and participated in all major demonstrations. However, the West European Communist party organizations adopted, either for tactical reasons or out of conviction, quite flexible attitudes. Several parties criticized the Soviet SS-20's, as well as NATO weapons. Unity of action prevailed over unity of doctrine.

It must be borne in mind here that the West European peace movement had its origins in the Netherlands. The initiative to hold these demonstrations was born in Stop the Neutron Bomb circles in Holland, which were in touch with functionaries of the ID and the WPC. The idea was to "Europeanize" the movement. Similar ideas were prevalent among the leaders of the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV). Apart from

[31] *XX Century and Peace* (Moscow—official organ of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace), January 1980, p. 2.

[32] Ibid., November-December 1980, p. 6.

[33] World Peace Council, *Programme of Action 1981*, Helsinki, WPC, 1981, pp. 5, 8.

[34] Vladimir Bukovsky, "The Peace Movement and the Soviet Union," *Commentary* (New York, NY), May 1982, p. 34.

[35] *Neues Deutschland*, Aug. 29–30. 1981.

[36] Ibid., Oct 3–4, 1981.

Romesh Chandra (right), President of the World Peace Council (WPC), presents an Amilcar Cabral banner to a representative of the Zimbabwe African People's Union during an extraordinary WPC meeting in East Berlin in February 1979.

—Eastfoto.

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Signs at the massive peace demonstrations in Bonn on October 10, 1981, support the Krefeld Appeal, call for West Germany's departure from NATO, support an atom-free zone, and propound the "Peace, Freedom, Socialism" slogan of the German Communist Party.

—Bossu/SYGMA.

these two Dutch organizations, a front organization of the pro-Moscow German Communist Party (DKP) named the Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation (KFAZ) was instrumental in preparing the draft for the first major European demonstration to be held in Bonn on October 10, 1981. The final text of the call was adopted on June 19 during the West German *Kirchentag* (Conference of the West German Lutheran Church) in Hamburg. It was signed by at least 80 organizations.[37] A key role throughout the campaign was played by the DKP and its various fronts. Officially, the Bonn demonstration was organized by two West German peace movements, the "Action Reconciliation" (*Aktion Sühnezeichen,* ASZ) and the "Action Community for Peace" (*Aktionsgemeinschaft für den Frieden,* AGDF). ASZ and the DKP have cooperated for years. Both ASZ and AGDF were represented at the Moscow Conference of Peace Forces in 1973, and ASZ was also represented at the 1980 World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace in Sofia. Having a religious background, ASZ closely cooperates with the Dutch IKV. A number of ASZ officials are involved in Communist organizations or Communist fronts. Volkmar Deile, who is also active in the Christian Peace Conference, is one example.

Just before the Bonn demonstration of October 1981, a series of meetings organized by what the London *Times* referred to as "the professionals behind the Moscow-orchestrated peace movements" took place. According to *The Times,* these professionals are full-time, paid officials of the movements, nominated by the ruling Communist parties.[38]

Particularly important was the October 3–4, 1981, meeting of the leaders of various official peace movements from the Soviet bloc at the Hungarian resort of Gardony, which discussed ways of widening cooperation among all "peace-loving" forces at both the national and international level. Attention was paid to the possibility of widening the links between the WPC and other peace movements.[39] The Gardony meeting was followed by a world conference of the International Federation of Democratic Women, also a pro-Soviet front organization having special links with the WPC. This conference was held in Prague and was attended by "the organizers of the big marches of recent years."[40] Key figures in the peace movement from 21 countries met in the Slovak city of Kosice, with consultations ending on October 6.[41] According to the Hungarian News Agency MTI, representatives of the West European peace movement were also present. Another Soviet front organization, the World Federation of Trade Unions, met in Bucharest at this time.

All of these meetings and conferences resulted in calls to intensify the peace campaign that was then under way. Various groups, formed along professional lines, began to organize: doctors, generals, writers, etc. A number of former NATO generals and admirals formed a Generals for Peace group. One of them, Francisco da Costa Gomes from Portugal, is a Vice President of the WPC. Other members of Generals for Peace are regularly interviewed in the East European press and attend

[37] For the list of all organizations involved, see Volkmar Deile, Ed., *Bonn 10.10.1981. Friedensdemonstration für Abrüstung and Entspannung in Europa* (Bonn, Oct. 10, 1981. Peace Demonstration for Disarmament and Détente in Europe), Bornheim, Lamuv Verlag, 1981, pp. 26 ff.

[38] *The Times* (London), Oct. 22, 1981.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] *Neues Deutschland,* Oct. 5, 1981, refers in a very brief article to "representatives of the peace movement coming from 21 countries." It must have been an important meeting, since East European media hardly paid attention to it!

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meetings of Soviet front organizations or their affiliates. Their book, *Generale für den Frieden,* was published by a German Communist publishing house. The introduction was written by Professor Gerhard Kade from the International Institute for Peace in Vienna, a pro-Soviet front closely linked to the WPC.[42]

In mid-October, the authoritative Soviet party ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, spoke of a "psychological war between East and West," in which Soviet ideas with respect to disarmament would be used to manipulate Western public opinion.[43] His words informed a Moscow meeting of party secretaries from 11 Communist countries in early November, which decided to intensify antiwar propaganda in the West and to launch an offensive aimed at neutralizing "the influence of reactionary militarist propaganda in non-socialist countries" and at demonstrating "the progressive and peaceful nature of the foreign policies of the socialist states." The communique of the meeting also stated that to concentrate all forces on the struggle for peace would result in the further strengthening of the position of socialism and contribute to the progressive development of world socialism.[44]

European Peace Movements: A Survey

What was the composition of the West European peace movements on which Moscow has been showering so much attention? Several strands can be distinguished. There are environmentalists, most notably "Greens" in West Germany; there are neutralists who tend to dislike both superpowers and to advocate a "third way"; there are pacifists who oppose use of force on principle; there are religious activists,[45] who feel that war and nuclear weapons have to be opposed on religious grounds. The peace movement has also found support on the political spectrum from the left socialists, and smaller leftist groups. Then there are the pro-Moscow elements which invariably support Moscow's policy initiatives. Naturally, these strands are not exhaustive, and also much overlap can be found among them.

The pro-Moscow elements have been influential in the European peace movements from the beginning. They usually have worked through Communist front organizations and in many instances through the West European Communist parties. The latter, however, are by no means uniformly well disposed toward Moscow. Therefore, the pro-Moscow elements tend to pursue a flexible "popular front" strategy within the peace movement.

The influence of the pro-Moscow and Communist elements within the peace movement rests largely on their organizational strength—they are able to organize events. This depends in large part on the organizational and financial backing provided by Soviet-bloc sources. Nevertheless, the degree to which the pro-Moscow elements are influential in the West European peace movement differs from country to country and has varied over time. For this reason, a brief survey of developments might be useful to provide a clearer picture of the complex reality that exists.

France and Italy. In both France and Italy (which have politically powerful local Communist parties), the involvement of Communists in the peace movement has been substantial. In the case of France, it is possible to say that the peace movement has been largely a Communist affair. The peace demonstration held in Paris on October 25, 1981, was organized primarily by the Movement for Peace (*Mouvement de la Paix*—a front organization of the French Communist Party—the PCF), by the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT), and by the Trotskyites. Although it is generally pro-Moscow, the PCF has taken care to have a balanced approach in its official position on the issue of nuclear weapons. For example, *l'Humanité,* the French party daily, has denounced the weapons development of both superpowers. Also, the major slogan of the Paris demonstration was: "Neither Pershing nor SS-20, but Disarmament."

In Italy, the major peace demonstration took place in Rome on October 24, 1981. The main forces behind it were an umbrella organization controlled by the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Committee for Disarmament, Pax Christi and the Catholic Left, environmentalists, and individual socialists (but not the Socialist Party per se).

The Italian peace movement's main target is the proposed deployment of cruise missiles in Sicily. However, the movement also criticizes the Soviet nuclear arms buildup. This is in line with the position of the PCI which favors a "third way," i.e., a Europe independent of both "superpowers." An influential figure in the Italian peace movement is former NATO general Nino Pasti, one of the Generals for Peace. Pasti has attended numerous

[42] Gerhard Kade, Ed., *Generale für den Frieden* (Generals for Peace), Köln, Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1981.

[43] *NRC Handelsblad* (Amsterdam/Rotterdam), Oct. 15, 1981.

[44] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), Nov. 11, 1981.

[45] The thesis has been defended that the European peace movement is mainly a Protestant affair, since it originated in the Protestant countries. See, for example, Michel Tatu, "Pacifism in Europe," *Le Monde* (Paris), Oct. 24, 1981, p. 5. I do not agree with this thesis. Particularly after October 1981, it is clear that the peace movement has made inroads in Catholic Italy. The reason why France has not (yet) been touched so deeply by the peace movement is of a political and not of a religious nature. In France, the Social Democrats are governing and they favor the French nuclear programs.

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Peace demonstrations in Paris: at left, an August 1981 rally against American missiles and the neutron bomb by the French Communist Party and its General Confederation of Labor (CGT); above, a scene from a massive October 25, 1981, rally showing a banner reading, "Neither Pershing nor SS 20—Disarmament!"

—Photoreporters and SYGMA.

events organized by the WPC, with which he has close ties. He was present at the WPC's Parliament of the Peoples for Peace in Sofia in September 1980, where the initiative to organize the group of former NATO generals was taken.

Holland and Belgium. The origins of the Dutch peace movement lie in Holland's long-standing tradition of neutrality.[46] Within the peace movement, the most important Dutch lobby has been the Interchurch Peace Council, to which all major Dutch denominations belong. Founded in 1967, the IKV did not have an impact on government policy until 1977, when it participated actively in the campaign against the neutron bomb. The IKV considers the denuclearization of the Netherlands to be a necessary first step toward the denuclearization of Europe. Its 1977 slogan was "Help rid the world of nuclear arms and start doing it in the Netherlands."

The political orientation of the IKV is openly left-wing. It has cooperated with the Communist-oriented Stop the Neutron Bomb movement ever since 1977. A number of local IKV chapters are dominated by Communists, members of Christians for Socialism, and other elements of the extreme Left. The IKV advised its constituency to vote for left-wing parties in the elections of September 1982. This proved counterproductive. The IKV lost much goodwill and is now facing a serious rival movement of multilateralists who support the double-track decision taken by NATO in December 1979. This group calls itself the Interchurch Committee for Multilateral Disarmament (ICTO) and has made deep inroads among all major denominations in the Netherlands.

Recently, the IKV has become increasingly critical of Soviet policies, particularly after the suppression of the Solidarity movement by the regime in Poland in December 1981. The IKV has established official relations with underground movements in Eastern Europe, such as Solidarity and Charter 77, as well as with nonofficial peace groups in East Germany.[47] The IKV's main emphasis is now on a "Europe without power blocs," i.e., a policy of nonalignment.

At a meeting of the Christian Peace Conference in Holland in October 1981, IKV Chairman Ben Ter Veer had indicated that the West European peace movement would be dramatically weakened should Solidarity in Poland be suppressed by either the Soviets or the Polish authorities themselves. Military intervention by the Soviets would result in a backlash movement in Europe leading to the eventual deployment of new NATO missiles, Ter Veer argued.[48]

At the Moscow conference of Religious Workers for

[46] See J. A. Emerson Vermaat, "Neutralist Tendencies in The Netherlands," *The World Today* (London), December 1981, pp. 482 ff.

[47] *Kernblad* (The Hague), October 1982, p. 5.

[48] *Parool* (Amsterdam), Oct. 26, 1981; *Trouw-Kwartet* (Amsterdam), Oct. 26, 1981.

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Saving the Sacred Gift of Life in May 1982, the International Secretary of the IKV, Wim Bartels, walked out of a meeting when—contrary to prior promises—he was not allowed to speak on such issues as the SS-20 and Solidarity. Before he left Moscow, he talked to leaders of the Soviet Peace Council, the Soviet Committee for Peace and Security, and to Metropolitan Filaret, the conference's chairman. The Soviets sought to smooth over the incident and it was agreed that relations would not be cut off. Bartels was the only person to take such a decided public stance on the handling of the Moscow conference. Not all in the Dutch peace movement agreed with the IKV stance. A Dutch member of the Generals for Peace, M. H. von Meyenfeldt, argued that the IKV was now in danger of losing credibility in Eastern Europe and could well be seen by the Soviets as being too pro-Western.[49]

The CPN, too, has begun to distance itself from Moscow, primarily due to developments in Poland. In April 1981, the party recalled its representative from the Czechoslovak party congress in Prague after Czech Communist leader Gustav Husak hinted at possible military intervention in Poland.[50] The CPN has now officially abandoned its Marxist-Leninist doctrinal rigidity in favor of a more open posture toward political alliances and a strong emphasis on feminism. Recently the traditionalists within the CPN, who advocate a return to the old policies of loyalty to the international Communist movement, have tried to regain some ground, but they remain a minority. Nevertheless, the CPN is still seen by Moscow as a useful instrument. For example, the latest CPN party program was hailed in the East German party paper *Neues Deutschland* for its emphasis on nuclear disarmament and its involvement in the campaign against NATO's modernization program.[51] The Dutch wing of the Stop the Neutron Bomb movement has followed a rather flexible line so far, probably for tactical reasons. It has not severed any of its ties with the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace or other WPC affiliates.

As in Holland, the peace movement in Belgium is made up of religious and secular components. The most important religious peace organization in Belgium is Pax Christi, which, like the Dutch IKV, has declared itself in favor of a Europe without power blocs. The Belgium Communist Party (KPB) plays an important role in the peace movement. The major peace demonstration of October 25, 1981, in Brussels was organized by two umbrella organizations, the Flemish Action Committee against Nuclear Weapons (*Vlaams Aktie Komité tegen Kernwapens—VAKA*) and the National Committee for Peace and Development (*Comité National d'Action pour la Paix et le Développement—CNAPD*). Both organizations are controlled to a degree by the KPB (VAKA was in fact created on Communist initiative). Another organizer of the demonstration was the Cooperation Center for Peace (*Overlegcentrum voor de Vrede—OCV,*) one of

[49] See *De Tijd* (Amsterdam), May 21, 1982; and *Hervormd Nederland* (The Hague), May 29, 1982. Bartels defended his attitude in an article published in the official organ of Stop the Neutron Bomb—Stop the Nuclear Arms Race, *N-Bulletin* (Amsterdam), June 1982, pp. 6-7. He indicated that the IKV would not break off relations with the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace.

[50] *NRC Handelsblad,* Apr. 7 1981.

[51] *Neues Deutschland,* June 29, 1982.



Pictured at the left, a session of the May 1982 world conference of "Religious Workers for Saving the Sacred Gift of Life" in Moscow; in the photo at the right, Wim Bartels (wearing glasses), International Secretary of the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), with IKV General Secretary Mient Jan Faber at a press conference in the Netherlands on May 13, 1982, that discussed Soviet refusal to let Bartels speak publicly to the Moscow gathering.

—TASS from Sovfoto and ANP.

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whose active constituents is Peace (*Vrede*), the official WPC affiliate in Belgium and a group considered to be the backbone of the Belgian peace movement. The chairman of Peace is André de Smet, who is also a member of the KPB and is active in Pax Christi.

More recently, the KPB has tried to be less one-sided than in 1979 when it openly criticized those who wanted the Soviet Union to dismantle its SS–20 missiles. In 1981, it fully accepted the slogan of the October demonstrations: "Neither cruise missile, nor Pershing II, nor SS–20." Yet, the KPB basically adheres to the Moscow line. André de Smet frequently has consultation with Soviet officials about the activities of the peace movement.

Federal Republic of Germany. In West Germany, the organizational core of the peace movement was formed by the local Moscow-oriented Communist party (the DKP). The party reportedly receives an annual sum of 50,000,000 Deutschemark from the East German Communist party (SED) to support its various fronts and peace initiatives.[52] Small as it is, the DKP is among the best-organized political units in Western Europe (some of its cadres have been trained in East Germany and the Soviet Union). However, its impact on the West German peace movement as a whole seems to have dwindled in 1982. The DKP's silence on the events in Afghanistan and Poland, its rigid pro-Soviet line, and its criticisms of the nonofficial East German peace movement (which has a strong base in the independent-minded East German Lutheran Church) have made the party vulnerable to attacks by other groups.

Apart from the Communists, the West German peace movement is largely made up of environmentalists, who call themselves the Greens. Toward the end of 1981, the Greens began to show their uneasiness with Communist domination over the peace movement, and during 1982, a major rift between the two groups began to manifest itself. This became obvious in the spring of 1982, when preparations were under way for a major peace demonstration in Bonn timed to coincide with President Ronald Reagan's visit to the NATO summit meeting on June 10. At a meeting of peace activists in Bad Godesberg on April 4, the Greens accused the Communists of trying to take over and of manipulating the peace movement. However, proposals to make the "call" for the Bonn demonstration more "balanced" by inserting references to events in Poland and Afghanistan were overruled by the Communists who apparently dominated the floor.[53] Because of this rift, the Bonn demonstration was not as successful as the organizers had intended.

The Greens may well become an important political factor in Germany. They are now operating as a political movement which has gained more votes than one of the ruling parties, the Liberal Party. Now that the Social Democratic Party is in opposition, it is likely to shift to the left in order to prevent the Greens from appealing to too large a section of the electorate. For their part, the Greens will have to strengthen their own organizational structure if they are not to remain dependent on that of the DKP.

The Communists are concerned about the widening gap between themselves and other groups in the West German peace movement, although they still control many of them. At a party meeting in Düsseldorf in May 1982, DKP chairman Herbert Mies indicated that his party intended to remain the driving force behind the peace movement: "Unity of action is required. The worst that could happen to the Federal Republic of Germany would be the inability to prevent the deployment of new American missiles."[54] At another party meeting, in October 1982, Mies called for "the broadest possible front of the peace movement" to prevent the deployment of new NATO missiles in 1983 and to oppose the new "right-wing conservative" government of Helmut Kohl.[55]

Scandinavia. Neutralist tendencies are rather strong among the public of Scandinavia, providing a fertile soil for the peace movement. At the same time, the Scandinavian peace movement is not particularly dominated by the Communists. In Norway and Sweden, the local Communist parties are relatively weak and isolated. In Denmark, however, the Danish Communist Party (DKP) has been deeply involved in the movement against the European Economic Community and on behalf of anti-defense causes. It was successful in promoting the anti-neutron bomb movement, and it is now actively campaigning for a nuclear-free zone and against the new NATO missiles.

Particularly important in Scandinavia is the Women for Peace movement, which had its origins in Denmark. Ten Scandinavian women organized a peace march from Copenhagen to Paris in the summer of 1982 "to promote the idea of a nuclear-free zone." Soviet President Brezhnev gave a spur to such sentiments in June 1981, when he reiterated that the Soviet Union would

[52] See *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Mar. 12, 1982. It is well known that the DKP receives substantial financial support from East Berlin. See for example: Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1979*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1979, p. 148.

[53] On the rift, see *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt/Main), Jan. 18 and Feb. 13, 1982; *NRC Handelsblad*, Apr. 9, 1982; *de Volkskrant* (Amsterdam), Apr. 6, 1982.

[54] As quoted in *Neues Deutschland*, May 24, 1982.

[55] Quoted in ibid., Oct. 4, 1982.

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not use nuclear weapons against those Nordic countries that would refuse to manufacture, acquire, or deploy nuclear weapons on their territory.[56] The Soviet proposal was clearly intended to prevent any future deployment of nuclear missiles in Scandinavia. This idea has wide appeal. In April 1982, an Action Week in support of a nuclear-free zone was organized by the Norwegian peace movement.

The WPC has also been active in promoting the idea of a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia. Its Presidential Committee, which met in Copenhagen in January 1982, issued a statement which called "on all peace movements and all peace workers to redouble their efforts to halt the arms race. The concerted actions of peoples must . . . create and enlarge nuclear-free zones in Europe."[57]

As in other NATO countries, members of Soviet Embassy staffs in the Scandinavian countries, which include NATO's critical northern flank, have been directly or indirectly involved in the promotion of peace movements. In November 1981, the Danish press reported that a Danish peace activist, Arne Herloev Petersen, had received money from undercover KGB-agent Vladimir Merkulov, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen. The money was used to finance advertisements in Danish papers favoring the idea of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. Petersen had been active in the Cooperation Committee for Peace and Security, an umbrella organization with WPC links. Its founding in 1974 had been inspired by the WPC (the Chairman of the Committee represented it at the meeting of the WPC's Presidential Committee in January 1982).[58] After these disclosures, prominent members of the Danish Social Democratic Party (SDP) publicly appealed to "the more serious part of the peace movement" not to identify itself with groups that could have been infiltrated by the KGB.[59]

A similar case arose in Norway, when two Soviet diplomats were expelled because of their direct involvement as KGB operatives in the peace movement. One of them was the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Oslo, Stanislav Chebotok (Chebotok's first post had been Copenhagen, where he was succeeded by Vladimir Merkulov in 1977).[60]

The Soviets themselves have implicitly admitted that they give financial support to "the pacifists in the other camp." The vice-president of the Soviet Peace Fund put it thus:

The Soviet Peace Fund materially supports many international events aimed at developing friendship and cooperation between nations, prohibition of all types of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, attainment of universal and complete disarmament.[61]

On Balance

The relationship between Moscow and the West European peace movement appears to reflect a certain congruence but not identity of interests. This applies both to the "pacifists in the *other* camp" who may, at times, criticize Soviet policies and the "pacifists in the *same* camp" who are not actually pacifists but staunch supporters of the Communist system in its Soviet manifestation. On the West European side, there are loose coalitions of attitudinal and interest groups of varying strength and duration. They represent, or at least feed upon, a range of dissimilar opinion. On the Moscow side, there is a much more unified, permanent group of organizations which are centrally directed to achieve a coherent set of national and ideological interests. It is useless to ask who is manipulating whom. Obviously, each side is seeking to advance its own interests. More important, it seems to me, is the question: Which side is achieving its main objectives and to what effect?

Those elements in the peace movement that are direct instruments of the Soviets, such as a number of Communist parties and Communist front organizations, seek to increase Soviet influence on the affairs of Western Europe. The other elements in the peace movement argue that "it is better to be red than dead," or claim that in the end their efforts will lead to multilateral disarmament.

At this point, the Soviet side appears to be having the better of it. The net result of their activities within the peace movement has been to generate pressures which may weaken NATO's defenses at the nuclear end of the military spectrum and generate disarray in the NATO alliance. However, Moscow cannot ignore the ever-present danger of a spillover of the peace movement to the Soviet bloc itself. There are already signs that the West European peace movement is turning East, i.e., is making inroads in some East European countries, particularly the German Democratic Republic. Moreover, relations between Moscow and the greater part of the European peace movement have clearly deteriorated since the suppression of Solidarity in Poland on December 13, 1981. Until then, military juntas had been

[56] As quoted in an interview in *Sosiaalidemokratti* (Helsinki), June 26, 1981.

[57] *Security and Cooperation in Europe. Negotiations, Not Confrontation!* Helsinki, World Peace Council, 1982, p. 22.

[58] *Berlingsk Tidende* (Copenhagen), Nov. 4 and 5, 1981.

[59] *Parool*, Nov. 12, 1981.

[60] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Nov. 29, 1981.

[61] *New Perspectives* (Helsinki), No. 3, 1982, p. 25.

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typical of right-wing regimes only. Now, a Communist regime has taken recourse to military repression in order to remain in power. The events in Poland came as a shock to many in the peace movement who had seen in the Solidarity movement the beginnings of a new era in Europe. In the words of one commentary,

For many in the peace movement it seemed as though the hopes of overcoming the military division of Europe into two warring camps and establishing the basis for autonomy and self-determination had been extinguished.[62]

Such disappointment soon translated itself into tensions in the peace movement between those loyal to the Moscow line and all others, as many participants came to identify their cause with the cause of East European dissidence.

The Soviets themselves have taken note of these new tendencies within the European peace movement. The chairman of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, Yuriy Zhukov, blamed American and NATO intelligence services for "directing the peace movement headed by the World Peace Council into an anti-Soviet channel." He added:

Taking advantage of the lack of truthful information in the West and the absence of proper experience among the new participants in the anti-war struggle, the opponents of detente are trying to spread among them the idea of the "equidistant approach to the two superpowers."[63]

Similarly, a Novosti commentator in March 1982 condemned "attempts . . . being made to equate the aggressive policy pursued by the United States with the defense measures forced upon the Soviet Union. . . ."[64]

On balance, I am inclined to believe that Moscow still derives many benefits from its support of the peace movement. It is often overlooked that pressure groups and peace demonstrations will be much more successful and effective in a democratic state than in a totalitarian state which has all the mechanisms for suppressing popular protest. The events in Poland have made this again abundantly clear. The peace movement, therefore, is likely to result in further disparities in the East-West military balance. It will, if it prevails, result in the unilateral weakening of the democratic nations, whose leaders depend on elections and the people's will. Leaders of the totalitarian East will not listen to the "pacifists in the other camp" who may, occasionally, also raise their voice against the SS–20 or General Wojciech Jaruzelski. If the Communist regimes ignore and suppress voices of protest within their own states, how much more easily will they ignore the voices coming from people in the "imperialist West," active in a movement which the Communists, in part, helped create?

An April 1982 peace march in Frankfurt, West Germany, proclaims "Solidarity with the Peace Movement in the GDR" and displays the "Swords into Plowshares" symbol of the East German movement.

—Bossu/SYGMA.

[62] *Disarmament Campaigns* (The Hague), April 1982, p. 3.

[63] *News from the USSR* (The Hague—Press Bulletin of the Soviet Embassy), Mar. 29–30, 1982, p. 4.

[64] Ibid., Mar. 31, 1982, pp. 6–7.

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New Head, Old "Problems of Peace and Socialism"

by Wallace Spaulding

The appointment this year of Yuriy A. Sklyarov as Editor-in-Chief of the Prague-based international Communist theoretical monthly *Problems of Peace and Socialism (PPS)* marked continuation of an unbroken streak of four Soviet chief editors in the magazine's quarter-century of publication. Since its inception in 1958, *PPS* has enjoyed continuous growth. At the outset, its staff represented 20 Communist parties; it published 22 national editions in 19 languages; and it was distributed in 80 countries. By late 1981, the respective figures were 63, "nearly 70," 37, and 145. As of late 1981, its circulation totalled over 500,000, nearly half of it in the "non-socialist" world.[1] In addition to ties with more than 60 Communist parties through the *PPS* Editorial Council, the magazine claimed in late 1981 to have had "various forms of durable contact" with another 20 Communist parties plus 30 "revolutionary democratic and national liberation parties."[2] It is clearly a significant channel for contact between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and a broad spectrum of Communist and leftist movements worldwide. It is therefore of interest to examine in some detail the relationship between the CPSU and *PPS*.

The first echelon of Soviet control is through the person of the chief editor. Sklyarov, like his predecessor, Konstantin I. Zarodov (who edited *PPS* from 1968 until his death in early 1982), came to the job directly from the position of first deputy editor-in-chief of *Pravda*, the CPSU's official daily newspaper. Like both Zarodov and Zarodov's predecessor, Georgiy P. Frantsev (who served from 1964 to 1968), Sklyarov is an alternate member of the CPSU Central Committee. The *PPS*'s first chief editor, Aleksey M. Rumyantsev (who served from 1958 to 1964), was a full member of the CPSU Central Committee and had come to *PPS* from the post of chief editor of the CPSU's theoretical magazine, *Kommunist*.

Though the successive *PPS* chief editors all have had links with *Pravda* (Frantsev had once served as a *Pravda* deputy editor, and Rumyantsev went on from *PPS* to become Editor-in-Chief of *Pravda*), it is the International Department (ID) of the CPSU Central Committee that appears to be the Soviet party's institution with the closest overall ties to the magazine. This is logical, since the ID is charged with maintaining the CPSU's relations with non-ruling Communist parties, whose representatives form the bulk of the *PPS* Editorial Council (see below). The de facto chief of the ID, Boris N. Ponomarëv,[3] habitually leads the CPSU delegation to the periodic conferences of Communist parties called to discuss the work of the magazine.[4] At the last such conference, held in November 1981 in Prague, the CPSU delegation also included Vadim V. Zagladin, first deputy chief of the ID (and a former *PPS* staffer[5]), Anatoliy S. Chernyayev and Karen N. Brutents (additional ID

[1] See "How Our Journal Functions," in *World Marxist Review* (London—the British edition of *PPS*—hereafter designated *WMR*), August 1981, p. 128, and "How Our Journal Functions," in ibid., September 1981, p. 8. It should be noted that a North American edition of *PPS*, also bearing the title *World Marxist Review*, is published in Toronto.

[2] *WMR* (London), August 1981, p. 128.

Mr. Spaulding, USAR (ret.), is a Washington-based observer of international Communist affairs.

[3] According to *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Vol. 20, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya entsiklopediya," 1975, p. 349, Ponomarëv has been a CPSU department chief since 1961. Since that time, no one has been announced as having succeeded him in this capacity, and he so obviously appears to be still performing the functions of International Department chief that Western observers generally identify him in that position.

[4] Radio Moscow, Nov. 21, 1969, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC, hereafter *FBIS-EE*), Nov. 21, 1969, p. D/7 and ibid., Jan. 6, 1974, trans. in *FBIS-EE*, Jan. 7, 1974, p. D/2; see also *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 27, 1977.

[5] *WMR* (London), November 1963, p. 72.

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Table 1: Editorial Council of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*

(Data as of autumn 1982)[a]

Party represented[b]	Name of representative[c]	Party position[d]
1. Socialist Vanguard Party (Algeria)	Ali Malki (September 1978)	
2. *Communist Paraty of Argentina*	Leonardo Paso[e]	Alt. CC
3. Communist Party of Austria	Bruno Furch[f]	CC
4. Communist Party of Belgium	Robert Francis (October 1981)	CC
5. Communist Party of Bolivia	Felipe Rodriguez (June 1981)	
6. Brazilian Communist Party	Ari Dos Santos (March 1982)	CC
7. *Bulgarian Communist Party*	Girgin Girginov (September 1982)	CC
8. Communist Party of Canada	Jack Phillips (September 1982)	Alt. PB
9. Communist Party of Chile	Hugo Fazio (July 1981)	CC
10. Communist Party of Colombia	Raul Valbuena (March 1982)	CC
11. People's Vanguard Party (Costa Rica)	Manuel Delgado (July 1981)	
12. Communist Party of Cuba	Raul Valdes Vivo (September 1982)	CC
13. Progressive Party of the Working People (Cyprus)	Agamemnon Stavrou (June 1981)	Alt. CC
14. *Communist Party of Czechoslovakia*	Pavel Auersperg, Executive Secretary (September 1981)	CC
15. Communist Party of Denmark	Ib Jorgen Norlund (September 1981)	S/PB
16. Dominican Communist Party	Arsenio Hernandez Fortuna (T, February 1980)	Alt. CC
17. Egyptian Communist Party	Farid Mujahid (September 1981)	SG (?)
18. Communist Party of El Salvador	Jaime Barrios (March 1982)	CC
19. Communist Party of Finland	Aulis Leppanen (May 1981)	
20. *French Communist Party*	Paul Ernest Courtieu (February 1973)	
21. *Socialist Unity Party* (GDR)	Roland Bauer (September 1982)	CC
22. German Communist Party (FRG)	Georg Kwiatowski (September 1982)	
23. *Communist Party of Great Britain*	Bert Ramelson (October 1981)	
24. Communist Party of Greece	Polychronis Vais (May 1981)	CC
25. Guatemalan Party of Labor	Otto Sanchez (T, February 1980)	PB
26. People's Progressive Party (Guyana)	Clement Rohee (September 1982)	PB
27. Communist Party of Honduras	Milton Paredes (August 1980)	PB
28. *Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party*	Karoly Lipkovics (September 1982)	
29. *Communist Party of India*	Sarada Prasad Mitra (September 1982)	CC
30. Communist Party of Indonesia	Satyadjaya Sudiman (October 1979)	Idr
31. People's Party of Iran (Tudeh)	Ali Khavari (implied, September 1980)	PB
32. *Iraqi Communist Party*	Said Zaki Khayri (February 1981)	PB
33. Communist Party of Ireland	Thomas O'Flaherty (July 1981)	CC
34. Communist Party of Israel	Ibrahim Malik (September 1982)	CC
35. *Italian Communist Party*	Luciano Antonetti (September 1981)	
36. Jamaican Workers' Party	Rupert Lewis (June 1981)	CC
37. Japan Communist Party	Hideo Sakamoto (May 1981)	
38. Communist Party of Jordan	Naim Abbas Ashhab (February 1982)[a]	PB
39. Lebanese Communist Party	Rafiq Samhoun (May 1982)	PB
40. Communist Party of Luxembourg	Rene Urbany (T, February 1973)	CH

deputy chiefs), and Oleg. B. Rakhmanan, first deputy chief of an unidentified department of the CPSU Central Committee.[6]

Not only have the Soviets monopolized *PPS*'s chief editorship, but, at the next level down, they have traditionally occupied one of the magazine's two executive secretaryships. The other has always fallen to a Czech, the present incumbent—Pavel Auersperg—a man described in a Japan Communist Party (JCP) criticism of the magazine as being "more Soviet than the Soviets." This same JCP critique, which furnishes much insight into *PPS* operations from the perspective of an independent Communist party participating in its workings, describes the chief editor and the two executive secretaries as constituting "the core of the Editorial Office."[7]

These three officials, plus one representative from each of 63 other Communist parties form the Editorial Council of *PPS* (see Table 1). The Council's stated duties are to "draw up and discuss long-term plans, discuss the articles earmarked for publication, approve the contents of each issue, organize research and theoretical work, and convene conferences of the participating par-

[6] *Pravda*, Nov. 24, 1981.

[7] *Akahata* (Tokyo), Apr. 30, 1982, trans. by Central Committee, Japan Communist Party in *Information Bulletin for Abroad* (Tokyo), No. 485, May 1982, pp. 21 and 20.

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Table 1: Editorial Council of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (Continued)

(Data as of autumn 1982)[a]

Party represented[b]	Name of representative[c]	Party position[d]
41. Mexican Communist Party[g]	Alejo Mendez Garcia (March 1978)	CC
42. *Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party*	Badamyn Lhamsuren[e]	CC
43. People's Party of Panama	Felix Dixon (March 1982)	CC
44. Paraguayan Communist Party	Severo Romero (March 1982)	CC
45. Peruvian Communist Party	Carlos Nunez Anavitarte (August 1980)	Alt. CC
46. Philippine Communist Party	Jose Lava (September 1981)	PB
47. *Polish United Workers' Party*	Jerzy Waszczuk (October 1982)	
48. Portuguese Communist Party	Domingos Lopes (June 1982)	
49. *Romanian Communist Party*	Barbu Zaharescu (April 1979)	CAC
50. Party of Independence and Labor (Senegal)	Semou Pathe Gueye (June 1982)	CC
51. South African Communist Party	Vusizwe Seme (September 1982)	S/PB
52. Communist Party of Spain	Sebastian Zapirain (T, October 1976)	
53. *Communist Party of the Soviet Union*	Yuriy A. Sklyarov, Editor-in-Chief[h]	Alt. CC
	Sergey V. Tsukasov, Executive Secretary (July 1981)	
54. Communist Party of Sri Lanka	Raja Collure (September 1982)	CC
55. Sudanese Communist Party	Ahmad Salim (September 1982)	
56. Left Party-Communists (Sweden)	Rodny Ohman (June 1981)	
57. Swiss Party of Labor	The replacement of the deceased Otto Schudel (T, September 1979) is unknown.	
58. Syrian Communist Party	Yacub Garro (November 1979)	CC
59. Communist Party of Turkey	Kemal Kervan (June 1982)	
60. *Communist Party, USA*	James West (September 1982)	PB
61. Communist Party of Uruguay	Samuel Behak (June 1981)	
62. Communist Party of Venezuela	Jeronimo Carrera (June 1982)	CC
63. Communist Party of Vietnam	Ho Si Ban (July 1980)	

[a] The June 1982 issue of *World Marxist Review* (London), p. 2, for the first time added the Palestinian Communist Party to the list of parties having representatives on the Editorial Council of *PPS*. It would be logical for Naim Ashhab, listed as the representative of the Jordanian Communist Party on the Council, to have assumed this position, since he has been publicly identified with the new Palestinian party (*Neues Deutschland* [East Berlin], May 28, 1982). Presumably, someone else has assumed or will be appointed to fill the Jordanian position.

The August 1982 issue of *World Marxist Review* (London), p. 128, notes that a representative of the Communist Party of Ecuador had been added to the Editorial Council of *PPS*, bringing to a possible 65 the number of parties represented on the Council.

[b] Names of parties represented on the Editorial Board are underlined.

[c] Dates in parentheses after Council members' names refer to the latest issue of *World Marxist Review*—the London edition of *PPS*—in which Council membership is indicated (where a "T" precedes the date, reference is to the Toronto edition).

[d] Letters following the dates indicate the positions of the Council members in their respective parties; these are keyed as follows: ldr—in the leadership; CH—Chairman; SG—Secretary General; S—member of the Secretariat; PB—member of the Political Bureau, Political Commission, or Central Executive Committee; Alt. PB—alternate member of Political Bureau, etc.; CC—member of Central Committee or National Council; Alt. CC—alternate member of Central Committee, etc.; CAC—member of Central Auditing Commission. Those not labeled presumably hold ranks below that of the Central Auditing Commission member.

[e] Sofia, Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, Dec. 12, 1978.

[f] *Information Bulletin* (Toronto), April 1982, p. 39.

[g] Presumably now the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM).

[h] *Rude Pravo*, (Prague), May 29, 1982.

ties to examine the work of the journal."[8] According to the Czech executive secretary, the Editorial Council is the magazine's basic decision-maker, with each Council member having an equal say in running the magazine, the chief editor being merely "first among equals."[9] However, some appear to be more "equal" than others. Specifically, Council members from only 15 parties concurrently sit as members of the Editorial Board (indicated in Table 1), which "handles current matters, *supervises the work of the editorial staff* and publishing house, and maintains the journal's links with fraternal parties."[10] The Japanese party cited the Editorial Board as instrumental in maintenance of Soviet control over operations of the magazine.[11] It is noteworthy that of the 15 parties represented on the Editorial Board, 10 are strongly pro-Soviet, two more (the French and Hungarian) seem mildly pro-Soviet, and only three (the British, Italian, and Romanian) appear to be "independent."

[8] "How Our Journal Functions," *WMR* (London), September 1981, p. 7.

[9] Letter of Pavel Auersperg in *Zivot Strany* (Prague), trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *East European Report—Political, Social, and Military Affairs* (Washington, DC), No. 2004, JPRS 80679, Apr. 27, 1982, p. 9.

[10] "How Our Journal Functions," *WMR* (London), September 1981, p. 8. Emphasis added.

[11] *Akahata*, Nov. 27 and 28, 1981, trans. in *Information Bulletin for Abroad*, No. 475, December 1981, p. 18.

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Members of the Editorial Council, "in accordance with their interests," sit on some 10 regional or problem-oriented "commissions" of the magazine. The following commissions are identified:

- Problems of Socialist Construction (Communist-ruled countries);
- The Class Struggle in Capitalist Countries (developed, non-Communist countries);
- The National Liberation Struggle in Asian and African Countries;
- The National Liberation Struggle in Latin America and the Caribbean;
- General Problems of Theory;
- Exchanges of Experience of Party Work;
- Problems of Peace and Democratic Movements (international Communist front organizations);
- Problems of Science and Culture;
- Communist Press Criticism and Bibliography;
- Scientific Information and Documents.

The commissions reportedly consider "(1) the agenda of future conferences and meetings on questions concerning theory, (2) long-term plans and projects, and (3) individual articles."[12] There is also mention in the context of *PPS* operations of a variety of "departments," the duties of which have never been specified. These departments by and large mirror the enumerated commissions in areas of interest, although there is an Information Department that appears to have no counterpart commission.[13]

The commissions and departments appear to be essential mechanisms of Soviet control of the magazine. In every case where *PPS* has identified a commission secretary, the individual turns out to have a Russian name; there are even more frequent identifications of department heads, again all with Russian names (see Table 2). One tentative identification of a single person—Aleksandr Didushenko or "Hernandez Dedushenko"—as both Secretary of the Commission on Problems of Peace and Democratic Movements and head of the Department of Problems of Peace and Democratic Movements leads us to surmise that the departments directly parallel the commissions and that the Russian heads of the departments are also the secretaries of the counterpart commissions. It might be postulated further that the departments are where numerous Russian "staffers" of the magazine, otherwise unidentified, fit (see Table 2), since there is no other plausible place for them and since certain of them seem definitely to be active in the respective fields of endeavor.

One might further deduce that the Soviets serving as secretaries of commissions collectively constitute the *PPS*'s Secretariat, a body said to "draw up plans" and to be "responsible for the publication of the journal, submitting drafts and recommendations for approval to the Editorial Council and Editorial Board."[14] Significantly, articles discussing the work of *PPS* published in the August and September 1981 issues of the London edition *(World Marxist Review)* made no mention whatsoever of the composition of the Secretariat or even of the existence of the departments—omissions that would be understandable if these organizations were, indeed, purely Soviet bodies serving as key channels of CPSU control over magazine operations. This hypothesis became more plausible in light of the November 1981 conference, where *PPS* announced establishment of a new *International* Collective Secretariat, comprising the two executive secretaries and the commission *chairmen*—a move described as designed to *democratize* the magazine.[15]

Before leaving the matter of the magazine's personnel and structure, it should be noted that members of the Editorial Council on average appear to hold responsibilities in their respective parties at the level of alternate membership in the Central Committee (see Table 1)—the same level, incidentally, as that occupied by Chief Editor Sklyarov in the CPSU. It is assumed, moreover, that those few persons holding higher positions in their respective parties—e.g., Rene Urbany, Chairman of the Luxembourg Communist Party; Farid Mujahid, apparent Secretary General of the Egyptian Communist Party;[16] and Ib Norlund, member of the Secretariat and Politburo of the Danish Communist Party—do not spend full time at the magazine's Prague headquarters. The generally low level of the party representatives to the magazine makes sense, of course, if that institution is no more than a transmission belt for Soviet policies.

Despite the apparent levers of Soviet control, the magazine attempts to maintain the façade of providing a "common theoretical rostrum of the Communists for exchanges of views, experience, and information" through the articles it carries and the conferences it

[12] "How Our Journal Functions," *WMR* (London), September 1981, p. 8.

[13] Ibid., August 1980, p. 128. It might be noted that the same publisher that publishes *PPS* also publishes an *Information Bulletin,* largely a record of Communist party documents and meetings. It has a director with an obviously Russian name, Andrey P. Sachkov. See Central Committee, Japan Communist Party, *Information Bulletin for Abroad* (not to be confused with the *Information Bulletin* just mentioned), No. 475, December 1981, p. 3. In the absence of information to the contrary, it is likely that the aforementioned Information Department has responsibility for publishing the *Information Bulletin.*

[14] "How Our Journal Functions," *WMR* (London), September 1981, p. 8.

[15] See Letter of Pavel Auersperg, loc. cit., p. 8.

[16] See *New Age* (New Delhi), May 2, 1982.

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sponsors. Moreover, *PPS* claims, "equality, cooperation, mutual respect, and non-interference in the affairs of individual parties" characterize its work.[17] This equality is, as we shall see, illusory.

Moscow's dominance can be inferred from the fact that Yugoslavia—the first Communist nation to go against the Soviet leadership—was pointedly excluded from *Problems of Peace and Socialism* at its founding in 1958, even though the magazine's 1947–56 predecessor, the Cominform journal *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy,* had originally been published in Belgrade. Fearing that the new periodical would be a mere resurrection of the heavy-handed Cominform journal, the Italian Communists and Gomulka's Poland allegedly agreed to participate in *PPS* only after they were assured by the Soviets that it would be "theoretical

[17] "How Our Journal Functions," *WMR* (London), August 1981, p. 127.

Table 2: Additional Soviet Officials on the Staff of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*[a]

Name	Stated position	Implied position
Yevgeniy Panfilov	Secretary, Commission on General Problems of Theory (June 1980)	
Vitaliy Petrusenko	Secretary, Commission on Problems of Peace and Democratic Movements (T, January 1975)	
Aleksandr Didusenko	Secretary, Commission on Problems of Peace and Democratic Movements[b]	Petrusenko's successor
"Hernandez Dedusenko"	Head of Department of Problems of Peace and Democratic Movements[c]	Identical to A. Didusenko (above)
Viktor Gugushkin	Department head (February 1977)	Successor to V. Pokhvalin (below) as head of Department of the National Liberation Struggle in Latin America and the Caribbean
Vladislav Pokhvalin	Department head (T, January 1975)	Head of Department of the National Liberation Struggle in Latin America and the Caribbean
Vsevolod Rybakov	Department head (December 1978)	Head of Department of the National Liberation Struggle in Asian and African Countries
Aleksandr Volkov	Department head (T, October 1974)	Head of Department of Problems of Socialist Construction (December 1974)
Vitaliy Dymarskiy	Staff member (May 1981)	In Department of the Class Struggle in Capitalist Countries
Boris Grishin	Staff member (May 1980)	
Mikhail Kobrin	Staff member (April 1981)	In Department of Problems of Socialist Construction
Vladimir Lober	Staff member (February 1980)	In Department of Problems of Peace and Democratic Movements; also identified on like-named commission's study group
Vitaliy Moyev	Staff member (September 1982)	In Department of Problems of Socialist Construction
Vladimir Mozarov	Staff member (February 1982)	In Department of the National Liberation Struggle in Asian and African Countries (also November 1981)
Mikhail Novikov	Staff member (July 1981)	In Department of Problems of Socialist Construction
Yuriy Oganasian	Staff member[d]	
Marina Pavlova-Silvanskaya	Staff member (December 1981)	In Department of Problems of Socialist Construction
Yuriy Potyomkin	Staff member (October 1980)	In Department of the Class Struggle in Capitalist Countries (also June 1979)
Rustem Sevortyan	Staff member (June 1981)	In Department of the National Liberation Struggle in Asian and African Countries (September 1978)
Aleksandr Sukhostat	Staff member (June 1981)	In Department of the National Liberation Struggle in Latin America and the Caribbean (also August 1981)

[a] A partial listing of figures identified from the pages of the London and Toronto (signified by "T") editions of *PPS* through September 1982. Specific footnotes give other source information. Source for "implied position" is the same as for "stated position" except where indicated.
[b] World Peace Council Special Session, *Bulletin* (East Berlin), No. 3, February 1979, p. 48.
[c] World Parliament of Peoples for Peace, *Preliminary List of Participants,* Sofia, September 1980, p. 6.
[d] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Mar. 12, 1979.

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and informative" rather than "directional."[18]

In 1962, following the onset of the Sino-Soviet dispute, first the pro-Chinese Albanians and then the Chinese dissociated themselves from *PPS*. Moreover, during 1964, the Romanian edition of the magazine was noted as having made the following deletions from the master copy coming out of Prague: 13 articles criticizing China and four advocating strengthening of East European economic integration.[19]

In an apparent rare deviation from Moscow's guidelines, the September 1968 issue of *PPS*—by its selection of documents regarding the Soviet-Czech crisis—appeared to have been leaning toward the Czechs. But circumstantial evidence indicates that the Soviets were quick to reassert control: no October issue appeared (rather, it was combined with that of November), and Zarodov replaced Frantsev as chief editor (there is evidence that Frantsev had been a "moderate").[20] Thereafter, on Czechoslovakia as on China, the magazine has followed the Soviet line.

The 1974 Prague conference on the work of *PPS* appears to have been some sort of high point in *open* Soviet control of the magazine. At this meeting Czech party figure Vasil Bilak and East German party figure Herman Axen called for a new world conference of Communist parties to coordinate ideological work and political action,[21] something the Soviets had been promoting since the previous year.[22] According to a subsequent account, the *PPS* conference itself called for a "struggle against anti-Sovietism," which led Mitsuhiro Keneko, leader of the Japanese delegation to criticize "utilization of the journal as a rostrum where the party and leaders of a certain country are praised."[23] Both Keneko and Santiago Carrillo, leader of the Spanish delegation, also stated their opposition to use of the magazine for making attacks on fraternal parties.[24] Interestingly, Carrillo, in noting the absence of sufficient genuine discussion and debate in the operation of *PPS*, observed that he was reiterating Spanish criticisms made at 1969 and 1971 *PPS* work conferences.[25]

During its 1974–79 "Eurocommunist" phase, the French Communist Party (PCF) apparently found itself out of step with the Moscow line published in *PPS*. The June 1974 French edition of *PPS* omitted an article by Ponomarëv appearing in other editions, which had implied the need for Communists to control the army and police in any Left coalition government in which they might participate (understandable hindsight with respect to the case of Chile but hardly reassuring to French Socialists, with whom the PCF had formed an electoral coalition).[26] Moreover, the French Communists joined with their Italian counterparts in openly protesting Soviet attempts to portray the April 1977 conference on the work of the *PPS* as a landmark on the road to strengthening Communist unity.[27]

The November 1981 *PPS* work conference gave further evidence of the heavy-handed Soviet attempts to dominate the magazine, as well as of considerable resistance by some of the more independent Communist parties. At the conference, Vasil Bilak made a speech extolling the Soviets, urging the magazine "to place emphasis on strengthening the action unity and cohesion of the Communist movement" and ending with a call for a new conference of world Communist parties.[28] By contrast, Tomio Nishizawa, leader of the Japanese delegation, made a detailed critique of Soviet domination of *PPS*.[29] The JCP later claimed that it was supported in this criticism, explicitly by the British, Italian, Belgian, and Spanish delegations, and implicitly by the Romanian, Swiss, and San Marinan ones.[30] In December 1981, the JCP's Standing Presidium explicitly called for the demise of *Problems of Peace and Socialism,* stating that the magazine "has tended to become a propaganda publication justifying the hegemonism of a particular party."[31]

Despite this criticism, the Japanese, Spanish, Romanian, Italian, Belgian, British, and Swiss Communist parties continue to be listed (and presumably still serve) on the *PPS* Editorial Council as of late 1982 (see Table 1). Clearly, *Problems of Peace and Socialism* remains an important—indeed, the only—permanent institutional symbol of unity for the world's pro-Soviet and independent Communist parties.

[18] *The New York Times,* Mar. 16, 1958.

[19] See " 'Problems of Peace and Socialism' Romanian Style," *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), Sept. 23, 1964. The Albanian edition of *PPS* had ceased publication by March 1962, and the Chinese, by the end of 1962.

[20] Christian Duevel, "Yuriy Frantsev Replaced by Konstantin Zarodov as Chief Editor of 'Problems of Peace and Socialism,' " *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), CRD 433/68, Nov. 29, 1968.

[21] See *Rude Pravo* (Prague), Jan. 9, 1974, trans. in *FBIS–EE,* Jan. 16, 1974, p. D/5; and ADN (East Berlin), Jan. 8, 1974, trans. in *FBIS–EE,* Jan. 9, 1974, p. D/6.

[22] Kevin Devlin, "Anniversary Brings (Limited) Chorus of Calls for Conference," *Radio Free Europe Research,* June 6, 1974.

[23] *Akahata,* Apr. 30, 1982, loc. cit., p. 6.

[24] Ibid., p. 7; and Kevin Devlin, "Carrillo's Independent Stand at Prague Conference," *Radio Free Europe Research,* Mar. 13, 1974.

[25] Devlin, "Carrillo's Independent Stand . . . ," loc. cit.

[26] See B. Ponomarëv, "The World Situation and the Revolutionary Process," *World Marxist Review* (London), June 1974, pp. 3–15. Cf. *La Nouvelle Révue Internationale* (Paris—the former title of the French edition of *PPS*), June 1974.

[27] "Soviet Interpretation of Prague Meeting Stirs Controversy," *Radio Liberty Research,* 116/77, May 14, 1977.

[28] *Bratislava Pravda,* Nov. 26, 1981, trans. in *FBIS–EE,* Dec. 3, 1981, p. D/11.

[29] *Akahata,* Nov. 27 and 28, 1981, loc. cit., pp. 8–21.

[30] *Akahata,* Apr. 30, 1982, loc. cit., pp. 9–10.

[31] *Akahata,* Dec. 11, 1981, trans. in *Information Bulletin for Abroad,* No. 475, December 1981, pp. 1, 7.

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Books

Cold War Complexities

by Paul Seabury

HUGH DE SANTIS. *The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933–1947.* Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1980.

THOMAS HAMMOND, Ed. *Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold War.* Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1982.

VOJTECH MASTNY. *Russia's Road to the Cold War.* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1979.

WILLIAM TAUBMAN. *Stalin's American Policy.* New York, NY, W. W. Norton, 1982.

LEON MARTEL. *Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming of the Cold War.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979.

A SAMPLING of several current studies on the origins of the cold war enlarge our understanding of the dense complexities of that important historical period without getting overly involved in the moralistic quarrels over culpability occasioned by such revisionist historians of the cold war as D. F. Fleming, W. A. Williams, Gabriel Kolko, Gar Alperovitz, and others.

Revisionism strikes the historical profession mighty blows from time to time, particularly on issues of war and peace. One recalls the great debates in the 1920's and 1930's about both the origins of World War I and President Woodrow Wilson's reasons for entering it in 1917. To the degree that "traditionalist/revisionist" quarrels preempt the field, they tend to retard ongoing research simply because of the sorts of moral questions upon which they concentrate and the legalistic manner in which evidence is sought and presented. This is particularly so when the issues that historians raise have contemporary policy implications, as in the case of the post–World War II debate regarding the origins of the cold war. If the reviewed works are any indication, that debate may conceivably now be passé.

OF THE VOLUMES under consideration, two—the book by Hugh De Santis and the collection edited by Thomas Hammond—deal with less well-known American actors and participants in the diplomacy of Soviet-American relations between 1941 and 1949. The important works by Vojtech Mastny and by William Taubman concentrate upon East-West relations from the Soviet side. Finally, Leon Martel's study examines American Lend-Lease policy toward the USSR. Clearly, these volumes have many overlapping pieces, for they are all filling in the same jigsaw puzzle. While these works provide few startlingly new insights, they serve collectively to refocus attention on some of the key aspects of Soviet-American relations as they evolved between 1939 and 1949.

I would stress this broader time frame. Much of the existing cold war literature—revisionist and nonrevisionist—begins with the high points of Soviet-American collaboration (at Tehran in 1943 and Yalta in 1945) and attempts to trace the downhill slide thereafter. However, it is essential to understand the continuity of events from the prewar period to the early cold war period. George Kennan, in his contribution to Hammond's *Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold War,* focuses on this problem:

To this day I have never been able to understand why, when people choose to use the term Cold War to describe our relations with the Soviet Union, they begin with the end of World War II, as though there were some sharp difference between what went on after that time and what had gone on before it. Indeed, one gains the impression that many people are only imperfectly aware that the Soviet Union existed prior to the Second World War. (Hammond, p. 28)

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Kennan's comment is, of course, hyperbole—but useful hyperbole. The question is not one of whether or not Americans knew the Soviet Union existed, but of the number of Americans who had any deep appreciation of the interior nature of the beast itself. Knowing only the exterior of the beast, Americans (including American policymakers at the very highest levels) were prone to sharp swings of moods and attitudes regarding the USSR, with profound illusions giving way to profound revulsions, and even vice versa.[1]

As De Santis demonstrates, of the American diplomats who had dealings with the Russians during the 1939–49 period, the most realistic and judgmentally consistent were those of the so-called "Riga group" (plus Averell Harriman). These professional diplomats were alumni of the American listening post in Latvia before the United States established relations with the Soviet Union in 1933. They went on to Moscow or back to Washington to become the first real Soviet experts of the American government. By 1945, they were the veterans of a long campaign, having watched the Kremlin through several of its convulsions. They, at least, had few illusions, one way or the other, regarding the nature of the beast; nor did they have exaggerated apocalyptic visions of the Soviet threat. George Kennan and Charles Bohlen are the best-known of the group, but others, like Arthur Bliss Lane and Loy Henderson, shared their experiences.

De Santis' book is flawed by his excessive probing of the sociological origins of these diplomats and the putative effect of their Ivy League, generally genteel backgrounds on their diplomatic perceptions and behavior. This is an overworked theme. It is possible that the desire to be *salonfähig* and to appear in the best company of sophisticated Europeans may have made some of them snooty, "reactionary," and appalled by assignments to dismal, backward posts like Moscow. But it is not proven that such snobbishness colored what they actually came to think of the Russians and of Soviet behavior. This preoccupation of De Santis tends to downplay the important effect of objective experience and events on their judgments.

The De Santis account reveals that members of the "Riga group"—like other Americans of the time—were capable of altering their assessments of Soviet intentions, capabilities, and social changes, i.e., that they were not mere doctrinaire hard-liners, as some have suggested. Thus Lane, in the Riga outpost before the Stalin purges began, toyed in his dispatches with the idea that the Soviet system *might* undergo evolutionary transformations for the better (De Santis, p. 58). Later, during the war, many of the Riga-ites themselves became committed to Roosevelt's faith of the time that, treated with trust and enticements, the Soviets might also trust and commit themselves to high liberal principles in the postwar era (ibid., pp. 81–105).

Hammond's *Witnesses to the Cold War* reinforces the cumulative impression one gains from the De Santis volume that it was not the predispositions and biases of American diplomats on the spot which led them to adopt strong, anti-Soviet stands, but rather their immediate experiences. Like De Santis, the Hammond collection deals with the reactions of American diplomats to Soviet-American relations, although chiefly in a later period, 1944–48, after the tide of battle on the Eastern front had turned decisively in favor of the Red Army and the balance of power had shifted in favor of the Soviet Union in Eastern and Central Europe. The book is a collection of reminiscences by US diplomats and other officials stationed in Moscow, Belgrade, Sofia, Prague, Berlin, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe when the war ended and the gradual process of Soviet digestion and subjugation of the region commenced.

The contribution of Karl Mautner, US Liaison Officer to the Berlin City

[1] William Bullitt, Roosevelt's first Ambassador to Moscow, exemplified the first kind of switch; Roosevelt, himself, the second. During the Nazi-Soviet Pact period, Roosevelt in a 1940 White House address to the American Youth Congress, gave a bitter and extemporaneous tongue-lashing to the Soviet Union and its American fellow-travelers. The Soviet Union, he said, was run by a dictatorship as absolute as any in the world and was allied with another dictatorship. Quoted in Wm. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolationism*, New York, NY, Harper and Bros. 1952, p. 388. Scarcely two years later, he was into his "Uncle Joe" mood, which was more than mere Rooseveltian soft-mouthing—he seems to have believed it.

Reviewers in This Issue

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MARC D. ZLOTNIK—Soviet Affairs Analyst, US Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Washington, DC), specializes in Soviet leadership, political theory and ideology, and economic policy.

RICHARD KRAUS—Professor of Political Science, Dickinson College (Carlisle, PA); author of *Class Conflict in Chinese Socialism*, 1981; currently writing on the politics of the Chinese Ministry of Culture.

JOHN GARRARD—Professor of Russian Literature and Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Virginia (Charlottesville); widely published on Russian and Soviet literature; editor of and contributor to *The Russian Novel from Pushkin to Pasternak*, forthcoming.

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Government from 1947 to 1958, is particularly illustrative. As a US Army major, Mautner crossed the Elbe River in April 1945 with his division to meet a stream of westward-moving refugees—Germans, liberated Dutchmen, Frenchmen, Ukrainians, and Belgians—who were "full of horror stories" about their experiences with the Russians. These stories, Mautner recalls, "we mostly discounted as Goebbels propaganda designed to drive a wedge between us Allies." Yet, why was it that "no one wanted to go east, even if they came from there?" Only after these Americans met the Russians, did they begin to grasp the reason. The "most fearful . . . were the liberated Soviet P.O.W.'s who were in terror of being liberated by their compatriots" (in Hammond, p. 232). The spectacle of Nazi concentration camps served as temporary antidote to these new, perceptible feelings for the Stalinist terror.

The Hammond collection shows the cumulative effect that the Soviet conquest of Central and Eastern Europe had on these Americans "treated" to a front-row seat. Never before, at least since the early days of the Bolshevik revolution, had Americans had the opportunity at first hand to observe the Soviet system in operation. Even the "Riga group" of Russia-watchers—in Latvia and later in Moscow—had been circumscribed in their movements and their contacts. But the Americans in Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1948 were impotent and horrified witnesses to a gigantic catastrophe, as the Soviets systematically commenced to transform their conquered territories. Episodic though they may be, the reminiscences of these observers, when viewed together, foreshadow the profound shock which was later also to be registered in American public reactions to these developments. Mautner's essay on Berlin is unique among these reminiscences, since only in Berlin (where Western Allied forces were present to countervail the Soviets) was the process of *Gleichschaltung* checked.[2]

American bewilderment at the swift deterioration of relations with the Soviets after Yalta and the temperamental US reactions to events in postwar Eastern and Central Europe become more understandable when set against the record of wartime exhortations, declarations, and principled statements. In reading accounts in Martel's *Lend Lease, Loans, and the Coming of The Cold War* and Taubman's *Stalin's American Policy,* one is particularly struck by the abstract fashion in which wartime Western statesmen dealt with postwar issues in meetings with their Soviet counterparts. Even Winston Churchill's realistic concerns about the postwar balance in Europe (not to mention the liberal views of Cordell Hull and Roosevelt) were matters pertaining to future possibilities, not to visible realities. In the high world of global statesmanship, such intangible abstractions made it possible to deal more impersonally with such matters as spheres of influence, the Atlantic Charter, and frontiers, since the probable consequences of decisions could not be understood in the light of personal experiences. The two Western liberals, Churchill and Roosevelt, were, in their respective ways, products of their slightly different Anglo-American cultures, and while by far the more worldly-wise of the two, Churchill was oddly enough probably as insensitive as his American counterpart to the likelihood of postwar Western resentment about the real-life consequences of wartime Realpolitik dealings with the Soviets. The idea of "spheres of influence," considered in the abstract, was innocuous enough; but when actually implemented with firing squads, mass deportations and exterminations, purges, and concentration camps, it was quite another thing.[3]

CONTINUITY of Soviet policy from the late 1930's through the early postwar period is an important theme in the reviewed works by Mastny and Taubman. Moreover, their treatment of the 1939–45 period itself as one of triangular conflict among the liberal democracies, the Nazis and the Soviets—with a wide range of possible shifts and permutations—is enlightening, if not altogether original.[4] The contingencies inherent in this unstable "correlation of forces" at any given time between 1939 and 1944 included (1) perpetuation of the Nazi-Soviet alliance, at least until a decisive Nazi victory in the West against Britain and even the US; (2) an actual war between the Soviet Union (in alliance with Nazi Germany) and the Western powers—a distinct, if brief, possibility in 1939–40; (3) a common front of the liberal democracies and the USSR to defeat or contain Hitler; (4) a war between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany with the United States standing by; and (5) the possibility, after June 22, 1941, of a separate peace—either on the Western or Eastern fronts. It is

[2] Michael Petrovich's story from Belgrade, where he was stationed during and after the war, differs only in that the political *Gleichschaltung* was carried out by Tito's forces. The Yugoslav Communist partisans' record was simply an autonomous, bloody miniature of Soviet behavior during the same period. See Petrovich, "The View from Yugoslavia," in Hammond, pp. 34–59.

[3] It should be pointed out in the case of the subjugation of Eastern Europe, American diplomatic and military personnel, and to a certain extent even journalists, were able to witness the terrible events first hand. This was not the case in China after 1949 or in South Vietnam after 1975, when similar or even more horrifying processes of "purification" took place largely without outside observers.

[4] Perhaps the most intelligent exposition of this view came some years ago, from the Spanish historian, Salvador DeMadariaga, in his book, *The Blowing Up of the Parthenon,* New York, NY, Praeger, 1960.

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against the backdrop of all these possibilities that one should examine the wartime policies of the respective belligerents, rather than merely against the backdrop of "what really happened."

One gets two powerful impressions from reading Mastny and Taubman: first, that both before the outbreak of war in 1939 and afterwards, it was the Western powers that courted the Soviets, never vice versa; and, second, that Stalin's mode of dealing with Nazi Germany during his courtship of Hitler was profoundly different from his later treatment of the Western Allies—both during and after the war. (The latter point has a corollary: that Stalin's wartime perspective regarding Soviet interests in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East was fundamentally derived from patterns and policies displayed during the time of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Thoughts entertained by Western diplomats before that agreement and after the Russo-German war began that the Soviet Union would respect the inner integrity of states in its own sphere were at best illusory hopes.)

The contrast between Stalin's dealings with Hitler during the period of the Pact and with the Western powers in the period from the Nazi invasion through the immediate postwar period is worthy of some contemplation. From the very outset of the Russo-German war, the Allies were the supplicants in Moscow: they initiated the idea of the "Grand Alliance"; they lent material assistance to the Soviet war effort through Lend-Lease and hazardous shipments; they were the initiators and pleaders for the wartime conferences at Tehran and Yalta; it was their leaders, Hull, Churchill, and Roosevelt, who traveled thousands of dangerous miles to meet with Soviet leaders in cities easily accessible from Moscow (through the entire European war, only one major Soviet leader, Vyacheslav Molotov ventured out to a Western capital—in 1942 to Washington). This diplomatic asymmetry of visits was particularly poignant when one recalls how an ailing Roosevelt traveled, at great risk to his health, to the Crimea to participate in a summit conference that otherwise would not have occurred.

The Western leaders' "confidence-building measures"—praise for Soviet strides towards democracy and a downplaying of suspicions of Soviet behavior—were not, to put it mildly, warmly reciprocated.[5] Cold realism was the order of the day in Moscow, and Mastny in his book goes so far as to suggest that even Roosevelt's condescending "Uncle Joe" treatment of Stalin may have served only to heighten suspicions of American duplicity in the latter's mind. During the war, Soviet outbursts of anti-Western polemics, while lacking the usual Marxist-Leninist claptrap (which was revived only when the war had ended), had the consequence of redoubling of efforts by London and Washington to reassure the Soviets of Western loyalty to the Alliance.

A good example of this Western policy of wooing the Soviets during the war was the special status accorded the Soviet Union by Roosevelt in the American Lend-Lease program after the Nazi attack on the USSR. The Russians unlike all other aid recipients, including Britain, were neither held accountable for what they intended to do with what they received, nor were they required to present hard evidence in advance why they needed it. Furthermore, from the beginning, the Lend-Lease program for the USSR was specially watch-dogged by the White House to ensure maximum cooperation from US government agencies and to expedite deliveries (Martel, p. 59 and passim).

How different were Stalin's relations with Hitler during the Soviet-German alliance! Then, far from being the grudging, ungrateful, sullen recipients of aid, the Soviets had been the fulsome bestowers of lend-lease to the Nazis, in the form of desperately needed raw materials, including oil. As Hitler's relations with the Russians began to cool in 1940, Stalin went out of his way to assure his ally of Soviet fidelity, to avoid any public signs of protest or anger—a posture of truckling compliance which became more bizarre as the threat of a German attack grew.[6]

Neither Mastny nor Taubman resolve the questions which this contrasting behavior raises. Was it that prudence and fear were more in order in dealing with a totalitarian power? Was it that Stalin believed that toughness and threats would work with the Anglo-Saxons, where it would certainly not work with Hitler? Did Stalin—before, during, and even after the brief Nazi-Soviet pact—really have a respect for Hitler, which he did not have for Roosevelt?[7]

For their part, Western statesmen from the outset of the Russo-

[5] Such were Soviet suspicions that when the pro-Soviet American Ambassador to Moscow, Joseph Davies, invited members of the Soviet Politburo to view a movie version of his *Mission to Moscow*, Stalin refused to attend. Mastny, p. 102.

[6] Mastny at one point (p. 28) even conjectures an ironic theory: that the Soviet massacre of thousands of Polish officers at Katyn may have been intended as a signal to the Nazis of the Soviets' *Bündnistreue*, i.e., as proof that they were not holding these officers in reserve for some possible future use against Germany!

[7] Stalin's attitude of grudging respect for Churchill, which he did not feel for Roosevelt, may also shed light on the Soviet leader's attitude toward Hitler. When Churchill visited Moscow in 1942, he referred in a conversation with Stalin to his own anti-Communist past. Stalin replied, that "we like a downright enemy better than a pretending friend." As Stalin, with some respect, told Yugoslav Communist Milovan Djilas, "Churchill is the kind who, if you don't watch him, will slip a kopeck out of your pocket. . . . Roosevelt is not like that. He dips in his hand only for bigger coins. . . . ." Mastny, p. 48.

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German war were faced with the specter of either a Russian collapse, or a Nazi-Soviet separate peace. This accounts for their constant attempts to reassure Stalin of their fullest support—even when, as in the matter of an early Second Front in 1942, such reassurances were neither plausible nor credible. According to Mastny, Stalin himself probably did not rule out the possibility of a separate peace in the East until mid-1943. This would explain, in part, the ambiguous Soviet statements about Germany before that date—the distinctions Stalin drew between the German people and their leaders, and between even the German state and the Nazis. It would also explain Stalin's reluctance to subscribe to Roosevelt's formula of "unconditional surrender." Ironically, Stalin's shift to the maximalist goal of totally defeating Germany (in mid-1943 according to Mastny) came when Washington and London were most concerned about the possibility of the USSR's signing a separate peace.[8]

IN HINDSIGHT, we now know that the structure of postwar Europe—its division between the Soviet empire and the West—was fixed geographically by the disposition of military forces after VE (Victory in Europe) Day, 1945. "Yalta" became the symbol of betrayal for those who felt it might have been otherwise. Yet, what these books—particularly Mastny's and Taubman's—definitively show is that in their dealings with Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt had pretty much given up Eastern Europe long before. The fine pronouncements they strove for at Yalta were largely cosmetic. Did these Western statesmen really hold the destiny of freedom in Europe in their hands in the brief period from 1943 through 1945? Could more have been expected of them? Was either of them more responsible than the other for the debacle?

Mastny demonstrates that by late 1943 at Tehran, Roosevelt clearly dominated his British partner and in many ways—some of them contemptible—went out of his way to make this clear to Stalin.[9] Thus, one might argue that Roosevelt should bear the chief responsibility for the concessions at Tehran and Yalta. But, even before Churchill became the junior partner in the summit talks, he had pretty much thrown in the Western Allies' towel concerning a large swath of European territory. Hull, Roosevelt's Secretary of State, may have come back from the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference in October 1943 (a meeting at which the British voice was still the dominant one on the Western side) with glad tidings that spheres of influence and the balance of power were things of the past. But at that same conference, Anthony Eden had presented a British line of policy which clearly gave up far more than even Stalin himself was asking for. The Churchill directive which Eden took to Moscow, a fatuous combination of high principle and low realism, was very clear on this point:

We affirm the principles of the Atlantic Charter, noting that Russia's accession thereto is based upon the frontiers of the 22nd June 1941. We also take note of the historic frontiers of Russia before the two wars of aggression waged by Germany in 1914 and 1939. (Mastny, p. 109)

Small wonder, then, that this Moscow conference, and its orgiastic festivities, was the high point of "Allied" cooperation.[10]

As Mastny notes (p. 109), from that point on, the Western powers, "though genuinely opposed to spheres of influence, showed a growing disposition to sanction in advance Soviet supremacy in large, but as yet undefined, portions of Europe." But that was only the half of it. "Russia's exclusive role in Eastern Europe would be taken for granted while the rest of the continent could be regarded as open for competition. This was the new meaning the formula [spheres of influence] had acquired by 1943."[11]

That the two Western leaders were resigned, long before Yalta, to Soviet domination of East-Central Europe is clear. But what is equally clear, and somewhat different from these dispositions, is that the ultimate determinant of where Europe would be divided would lie not in these various conferences, but on the battlefield. Conferences would ultimately only register—give or take a few kilometers—what the armies would conquer. It seems that the British and Americans merely hoped that Stalin would behave himself with what he took; it was not their turf

[8] The change apparently occurred after the battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943. In October 1943, Harry Hopkins wrote in *American Magazine* of his worries concerning Russia: "If we lose her, I do not believe for a moment that we will lose the war, but I would change my prediction about the time of victory." See Mastny, p. 84.

[9] Wendell Wilkie, visiting Moscow in 1943, outdid Roosevelt in bad-mouthing the British in conversations with Soviet leaders. At dinner with Andrey Vyshinskiy, he went so far as to say that the US was in favor of a second front but that Britain was not. Taubman notes that this was even too much for the Russians: Vyshinskiy "gaped in astonishment" and then "rose to remark that winning the war would require the united efforts of all three great allies." Taubman, pp. 58–59.

[10] Stalin's Lucullan banquet for his Western guests almost defies description. One American diplomat described it as resembling the "wild and irresponsible extravagance of prerevolutionary Moscow." No one outdid the British Ambassador for histrionic effect. "Draped in medals, a great red and blue sash and a stiff shirt . . . he proceeded to fall in the middle of a toast—not gracelessly, all things considered—on a table filled with bottles and glasses, incurring only minor abrasions and, given the horizontal attitudes of many of his crapulous colleagues, no great loss of dignity." De Santis, p. 103.

[11] Roosevelt had by 1943, like Churchill, written off Eastern Europe, indeed even more. Roosevelt reportedly told Cardinal Spellman in September 1943 that the "*European* people will simply have to endure the Russian domination in the hope that—in ten or twenty years—the European influence would bring the Russians to become less barbarian." Mastny, p. 108.

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anyway. The only line which Roosevelt repeatedly took with Stalin about possible Soviet depredations was that Polish and Baltic Americans might become angry and vote wrong—a debating point which, to Stalin, must have been incomprehensible, or at least "suspect."

CLAUSEWITZ coined the aphorism that war is a continuation of politics by an admixture of other means. Yet, Clausewitz was too astute a student of warfare to neglect some important realities which make the implementation of the axiom very difficult in practice. Aside from their uncertainties, battles contain their own imperatives and give birth to new ones. In the waging of war, the obvious need and impulse to win, or at least not to lose, compels even the shrewdest statesman to lay aside thoughts of long-term goals during the heat of battle. Consciousness of this dilemma inherent in war can illuminate our understanding of the origins of the cold war.

Revisionist historians of the cold war have made much of the issue of the "Second Front," as one of several early causes of Stalin's "justified" suspicions regarding his Western allies. The Russians were doubtless unhappy when they later found out that Roosevelt's ingratiating assurances to Molotov in 1942 regarding the early opening of a second front were not to be realized (Mastny, pp. 46–47). But there is more to the story than duplicity on the part of the American president.

Of course, between 1941 and 1943—before the tide of battle turned in the East—an Allied landing in the West seemed to the Russians an indispensable battlefield necessity; they ceaselessly clamored for it. The expression "Second Front" itself, as a Soviet invention, could have been read as a heavy insult, particularly to the British, whose own first front had been all too grave a reality since the Battle of France, when Stalin had been on the other side helping Hitler as best he could. But such bootless arguments are essentially irrelevant to military necessity. Stalin had his own necessity; the Allies, theirs. Stalin's imperative was that the invasion come quickly, to divert German divisions from victory in the east. The strategic imperative for the Allies was that their invasion be sufficiently well endowed logistically so as not to fail, and that took time. The two necessities were very different, and the leaders of the West could not satisfy both Stalin and their own generals.

However, as Mastny points out, Stalin was not alone in praying for a very early "Second Front." Another Allied commander, the Polish general Wladyslaw Sikorski also prayed for it (Mastny, p. 60) but for reasons very different from Stalin's. An early and successful Allied invasion penetrating into the heart of the continent would have meant that less territory would fall to the Red Army; it might even have meant Polish freedom. Sikorski surely was not alone in this dream. Had the Normandy invasion been delayed longer than it was, or had Hitler beaten it back, far more of Europe would have fallen under Soviet sway—possibly all of Germany, or much more.

There are other, smaller ironies of military necessity to be observed in the European war. At one point, for instance, a beleaguered Stalin urged his Western allies to pressure Turkey into the war, by way of a diversionary Balkan invasion (Mastny, p. 113). Surely he knew that such an adventure, if successful, would have had far-reaching political consequences for that region. Also for battlefield reasons, the British and Americans at Cairo opted to support the partisans under Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslavia rather than those of Draza Mihajlovic (deeming the former more effective fighters), whereas Stalin, for his own prudent reasons, distanced himself from Tito and maintained correct relations with King Peter's government-in-exile (Mastny, pp. 67–68). And then there was Churchill's "soft-underbelly" invasion strategy (successfully opposed by Dwight Eisenhower—Mastny, p. 113): had it been undertaken, the door to Northern and Western Europe surely would have been open to the Red Army.

But there is a critical aspect of this Clausewitzian problem to which none of these authors much attend, perhaps because it is so obvious. For the Americans, in any event, it was decisive. US strategic planning, backed by the immense "arsenal of democracy," was exclusively devoted to defeat of the enemy and to no other cause, certainly not to a triangular war game. Particularly, it was dedicated from the outset to winning the European war before the Pacific one (a good thing, all things considered). Finally, it was committed to a central Clausewitzian principle: the strategy of direct engagement with the enemy's main force, which meant going to the heart of enemy territory. The supreme irony is that at Tehran, at a time when the tide of battle had conclusively turned against Hitler, it was Stalin, and not Churchill, who supported this strategy, which was to bring American and British forces into the heart of Europe. The strategy of direct engagement triumped over Churchill's far more cautious alternative of indirect strategy, which might well have prolonged the war in the West, while permitting the Soviets to advance further into the heart of Europe.

Although the reasons for this simple, clear American strategy are many, behind it there lay an astute judgment of a very high order, which had to do with an understanding of American democracy and the

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American character. There is a story, not repeated in any of these books, that illustrates the point. In 1943, a young American Army colonel, Dean Rusk, accompanied General George Marshall on a train trip from Washington to New York. Querying the General as to the (to him) dubious merits of Eisenhower's direct strategy, with its promise of very heavy casualties, Rusk got a simple answer from Roosevelt's master logistician: the American people, Marshall replied, would not tolerate a long war; they were impatient.[12] That impatience, which Roosevelt also sensed, extended to an American aversion to engage in a dangerous confrontation with Stalin just at the moment when victory had been achieved.

Maxim Litvinov turns up as a haunted, Cassandra-like figure in several of these books. More aware perhaps than Roosevelt of the inevitable American backlash against Stalin's relentless westward expansion, Litvinov despaired of the future. When Harriman ran into him at a Moscow theater one evening in November 1945, he asked Litvinov what "the US could do" to satisfy Stalin. Litvinov replied, "Nothing." Harriman then asked what the Soviet government could do to improve affairs. Litvinov answered, "I believe I know what should be done but I am powerless" (Mastny, p. 305).

THOSE HISTORIANS who are concerned with explaining why things happened the way they did are naturally cautious as to the great *what ifs* in history. Much of the cold war literature, both traditional and revisionist, has focused upon the paths, roads, streams, and rivulets leading to the particular cold war we have known. But the books reviewed here, taken together, remind the reader of other contingencies which swirled in the tides of World War II. One clear possibility in those years was an East-West confrontation strategically far more disadvantageous to the West than the one which came about. The stakes, in essence, involved control over all of Europe. The dice of Mars, not diplomacy, witlessly saved what remains of a free Europe.

Could things have been better? The reputations of Churchill and Roosevelt do not shine in these pages. It is Mastny's judgment, which the other works at least do not contradict, that these two Anglo-Saxon statesmen, as diplomats, failed to "prepare themselves and their peoples for the disheartening likelihood of a breakdown of the wartime alliance" (Mastny, p. 309).

But their failure went beyond this. In the glow of victory—the war won, the job done—they did not warn Stalin of the repercussions that his reckless overextension would have. But then, Stalin never was one to understand public opinion or the democracies. Litvinov, the Bolshevik dove, one might say, was in desperate need of premature hawks in London and Washington to mitigate or stave off the impending crisis.

[12] Personal communication of Mr. Rusk to the author.

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Chernenko's Platform

by Marc D. Zlotnik

K. U. CHERNENKO. *Voprosy raboty partiynogo i gosudarstvennogo apparata* (Questions of the Work of the Party and State Apparatus), 2nd ed., rev. and expanded. Moscow, Politizdat, 1982.

K. U. CHERNENKO. *Nekotoryye voprosy tvorcheskogo razvitiya stilya partiynoy i gosudarstvennoy raboty* (Some Questions on the Creative Development of the Style of Party and State Work). Moscow, Politizdat, 1978.

K. U. CHERNENKO. *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Articles). Moscow, Politizdat, 1981.

KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO. *Human Rights in Soviet Society.* New York, NY, International Publishers, 1982.

KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO. *Selected Speeches and Writings.* New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1982.

KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO was actively campaigning for one of the top leadership posts in the Soviet Union at the time of Leonid Brezhnev's death. While his chief rivals had maneuvered quietly behind the scenes, Chernenko had made a concerted effort to keep himself in the limelight and had sought the support of progressive, reform-minded elements within the party, including key regional leaders. His campaign platform called for greater democracy within the party; increased public participation in decision-making; economic and ideological innovation, and decentralization.

Chernenko's strategy suggests that he believes there is a strong constituency within the party that is anxious for reform. Indeed, there are many signs of pressure for change from members of the political elite. Leading party theoreticians, for example, have suggested a need for basic political reforms that would place restraints on the authority of the top party leadership and result in a decentralization of political power.[1] Other well-placed specialists have questioned current economic priorities and called for a new stress on consumer production—presumably at the expense of heavy industry and defense spending.[2] Reform economists in the Soviet Union have proposed a limited revival of private enterprise along the lines of the New Economic Policy of the 1920's and have begun to look to the private economy in Eastern Europe as a model for the Soviet Union itself.[3]

Chernenko appears to have actively courted these interests. This aggressive strategy could work to Chernenko's disadvantage by alienating the more conservative party members and making him the principal target of the other candidates for Brezhnev's succession. At the same time, by placing himself in this position, Chernenko has sought to distance himself from Brezhnev, with whom he was more closely identified than were any of his rivals. Although the close association with Brezhnev was Chernenko's greatest asset in his climb to power, it could be one of his greatest liabilities after Brezhnev's death. Given the mount-

[1] In a recent allegorical article ostensibly on China, but with unmistakable implications for the current situation in the Soviet Union, Fedor Burlatskiy, a department head at the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Social Sciences, suggested a broad range of political and economic reforms for the post-Brezhnev era ("Interregnum, or a Chronicle of the Times of Deng Xiaopong," *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), No. 4, 1982, pp. 205–228. In a 1981 assessment of "political power" in socialist societies, Anatoliy Butenko, a sector chief at the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, indicated that basic political reforms were needed in the Soviet Union in order to forestall a Polish-style crisis. Butenko's book is entitled *Politicheskaya organizatsiya obshchestva pri sotsializme* (The Political Organization of Society Under Socialism), Moscow, Mysl, 1981.

[2] V. Pechenev, a consultant to the CPSU Central Committee, stated that further progress toward communism would be impossible without an increased emphasis on consumer production ("On the Firm Soil of Socioeconomic Policy: On Certain Aspects of the Shaping of the New Man Under Conditions of Developed Socialism," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 11, 1982, pp. 32–43). Yu. Novopashin, a sector head of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, recently wrote that the Soviet Union could not hope to serve as a model for the development of the Third World unless it could do a better job supplying its own people with food and consumer goods ("The Influence of Real Socialism on the World Revolutionary Process: Methodological Aspects," *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 8, 1982, pp. 3–16.

[3] See Anatoliy Butenko, "Socialism: Forms and Deformations," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 6, 1982, pp. 5–7. Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, at the same institute as Butenko, has been the leading advocate for expanding private enterprise. See "On the Private Economy," *Sovetskaya Rossiya,* April 12, 1981, and "Economics and Politics: Lenin's Approach," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 10, 1980, pp. 18–20, and No. 11, pp. 18–20.

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ing problems facing the country, Brezhnev's successor cannot afford to be seen merely as a continuer of the status quo. Thus, Chernenko must clearly demonstrate that he is not just a Brezhnev clone.

Chernenko's association with Brezhnev can be traced back to 1950, when Brezhnev became the first secretary of Moldavia, where Chernenko was head of Agitprop. Soon after Brezhnev became a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in 1956, Chernenko was brought to Moscow to serve as a sector head in the CPSU Agitprop. In 1960, when Brezhnev became chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, he selected Chernenko to head its secretariat. Soon after Brezhnev replaced Nikita Khrushchev as leader of the CPSU, Chernenko was selected to head the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee, the top staff position serving the Politburo and Secretariat. In the mid-1970's, Chernenko began to move rapidly through the ranks of the top party leadership, becoming a Central Committee Secretary in March 1976, a candidate member of the Politburo in October 1977, and a full member in November 1978. In recent years, the Soviet press and television have shown Brezhnev and Chernenko together with increasing frequency, highlighting their close relationship.

While Chernenko's status and authority grew steadily after his promotion to the Politburo, his fortunes took a sudden leap following the death of Mikhail Suslov in January 1982. Chernenko immediately jumped ahead of Andrey Kirilenko in the leadership rankings and took over Suslov's position as unofficial second secretary of the party. He soon began to assume new responsibilities in the leadership, becoming more actively involved in the key areas of foreign policy and management of cadres.

Chernenko's status did not appear to have been diminished by the promotion of Yuriy Andropov to the Secretariat in May. On the contrary, judging by his public activities, the range of Chernenko's responsibilities and activities increased after the May 1982 plenum, while Andropov kept a remarkably low profile. In recent months, for example, Chernenko has become actively involved in economic matters for the first time, while also assuming many of Suslov's former responsibilities in the areas of foreign policy, ideology, and culture. Andropov's activities, by contrast, seemed to have been largely restricted to the latter three areas. It thus appeared that Chernenko had assumed responsibility for broad oversight over all aspects of party work, while Andropov was entrusted only with the day-to-day management of certain Central Committee departments formerly under Suslov.

CHERNENKO is by far the most prolific author among the succession candidates. In the past five years, he has written three major books, seen a collection of his speeches and articles published, and authored numerous additional articles.[4] This impressive outpouring has contributed to Chernenko's image as an authority on a broad range of subjects, perhaps helping to compensate for the fact that he has never headed a major party or state organization. Chernenko's works contain many important new ideas. A careful reading of these materials also provides a remarkably clear picture of what might be some significant new policy initiatives under a Chernenko regime.

Chernenko's newest book (*Questions of the Work of the Party and State Apparatus*), published in May 1982, appears to have been timed to coincide with succession maneuverings. Issuance of this expanded and revised edition of a book that first appeared in 1980 was—according to the introduction—in response to the great enthusiasm of readers and critics to the original. The first half of the book—on party history—is virtually unchanged in the 1982 version, whereas the second—on current problems of party work—has been almost completely revised and considerably expanded. These revisions appear to have been designed to help promote Chernenko's image as a well-rounded leader, familiar with all key aspects of domestic policy. The new edition contains new or expanded sections on the economy, cadres, collective leadership, and ideology. Reissuance of the book has been accompanied by a new wave of publicity for Chernenko. Compared to the treatment of books by other Politburo members, the Chernenko volume has been reviewed by an unusually large number of papers and journals throughout the country, and many of these reviews have been particularly flattering to Chernenko.[5]

An important theme in many of Chernenko's writings, and a major one in this book, is the need to strengthen democratic practices within the party. Throughout the book Chernenko stresses the need for greater openness in party decision-making. He suggests, for example, that there should be freer debate in party meetings, which, he complains, are often dominated by "professional orators" who deliver "dull, stereotyped speeches." He also calls for less secrecy in party work, stating that it is "hardly justified" to keep the results of party control investigations confidential.

[4] On Oct. 15, 1982, *Pravda* announced the publication of an expanded edition of Chernenko's book on human rights.

[5] See, for example, *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Moscow), No. 8, 1982; *Pravda*, July 22, 1982, and *Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, (Baku), Aug. 4, 1982.

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Chernenko praises innovations by the Communist party of the Georgian republic that help promote the "free and frank exchange of views" and suggests that other party organizations might adopt some of the Georgian practices, such as: both announcing the agenda for plenums and providing participants with copies of reports in advance; conducting open party meetings; and encouraging frequent contacts between party leaders and various groups in society.

Chernenko's commitment to expanding intraparty democracy is underscored by his comments on Stalin. The symbol of Stalin is a touchstone of political orientation in the Soviet Union, and Chernenko is the only party leader who has directly addressed this sensitive subject in recent years. His comments provide the clearest indication that he is trying to cultivate a reputation as a reformer. As in the first edition of the book, Chernenko states that the "mistakes and distortions connected with the Stalin personality cult harmed socialist democratization and party and state building" (p. 119). He goes on to praise the work of the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 in examining the question of Stalin's methods of leadership, and the June 1956 Central Committee decree on Stalin for helping to overcome the consequences of the personality cult (pp. 119, 139). Thus, Chernenko publicly rejects a return to more repressive methods of party control.

A SECOND major theme of Chernenko's writings is that party leaders must become more attuned and responsive to the views of the populace and foster a sense of public participation in managing society. In this latest book, Chernenko repeatedly stresses that leaders must take the views of all groups into account when making decisions. Calling for better communication between the leadership and the masses, he is particularly enthusiastic about sociological research and public opinion polling and suggests that party leaders make greater use of this type of information (pp. 216, 266). Chernenko also devotes considerable attention in the book to the importance of letters that the party receives from workers (pp. 349–64). In fact, the importance of this channel of communication has long been one of Chernenko's favorite themes. In the later 1970's, for example, he began a broad campaign for local party organizations to pay more attention to the problems discussed in letters, and many local parties have responded enthusiastically.

The theme of improving the links between the leadership and the populace was also emphasized in Chernenko's 1978 book (*Some Questions on the Creative Developments of the Style of Party and State Work*). There Chernenko claimed that Lenin was strongly committed to maintaining close ties between party leaders and the people and that Lenin believed that these ties were necessary for the party to stay in power. Chernenko quoted Lenin as saying that "one of the greatest and most terrible dangers" for the party is becoming separated from the people. Chernenko stated that a central theme of all of Lenin's works is that socialism is "not created by orders from above" (pp. 122–24).

The need to increase the public's sense of participation by expanding the role of broad-based, non-party organizations in the management of society figures strongly in Chernenko's 1978 book as well as in many of his other writings. Although the populist ideas in Khrushchev's 1961 party program have been largely ignored in the Brezhnev era, Chernenko's book quotes several of that program's provisions to support his idea that soviets, trade unions, and other mass organizations should "actively participate in managing state affairs, and deciding economic and cultural questions" (p. 116). Chernenko maintains that soviets have a key role to play in expanding democracy in the Soviet Union and that the 1977 Constitution significantly strengthened their authority. The 1978 work contains an in-depth discussion of the constitution that includes interesting new details on the work of the committee which drafted it. Chernenko also discusses trade unions at length. His call for more active involvement of the trade unions in the management of production is a theme that has gained new popularity in the Soviet Union since the start of the Polish crisis.

The articles Chernenko has written since the crisis in Poland have stressed with new urgency the importance of ascertaining and considering public opinion. They suggest that unless the views of the masses are carefully considered, the Soviet Union itself, as well as other East European countries, risk a Polish-style crisis. In a recent issue of *Kommunist,* for example, Chernenko suggested that the Polish leadership's lack of understanding of the public mood was a major factor leading to the disturbances.[6] He stated that the experience of other socialist countries demonstrates that "truly firm ties with the masses" cannot be established "once and for all," but that Communist leaders must constantly stay in close touch with the "vital interests" of the people and pursue policies that yield "tangible results." He also cautioned that unless the interests of all elements of society are carefully

[6] "The Leninist Strategy of Leadership: On Certain Questions of the Party's Activity Under the Conditions of Developed Socialism," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 13, 1981, pp. 6–22.

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considered and reflected in policy decisions, there is a "danger of social tension and of political and socioeconomic crisis." In a more recent article, he stated that events in Poland demonstrate the "fundamental significance" of heeding the views of the masses, and that the "harsh lessons" of recent years show that if problems go unchecked they can turn into political crises.[7]

THE 1981 VOLUME of Chernenko's collected speeches and articles clearly demonstrates that these concerns for expanding intraparty democracy and improving links between leaders and the masses have been long-standing themes in his writings, predating his rise to the top ranks of the party leadership. These issues dominate the articles on domestic affairs in the book, which contains Chernenko's published writings for the period 1971 to 1980 as well as a number of previously unpublished speeches. A good subject index enhances the usefulness of this collection for studying Chernenko.

The need to improve intraparty democracy is, in fact, the principal subject of the earliest article in this collection, a reprint from the September 1971 *Voprosy istorii KPSS*. In this article, Chernenko called for making information more available within the party, expanding the activities of lower party organs, and making more extensive use of workers' letters in party work. Similar themes were expressed with particular zeal in a May 1979 article from *Problemy mira i sotsializma*. Chernenko argued in this article that, as the population becomes more sophisticated and better educated, there is a more pressing need for the leadership to hear and take into account public opinion in the decision-making process. He revealed for the first time that the CPSU Central Committee has set up a special group for studying public opinion and conducting sociological research (p. 442).

THE NEED for more innovative solutions to the problems facing the country is a third major theme that emerges from Chernenko's writings. In his 1982 book on the party and state apparatus, Chernenko places particular stress on the need for innovative solutions to economic problems. His discussion, however, appears to have been left intentionally vague, since Chernenko fails to commit himself to any specific types of economic reform. Rather, he limits himself to generalities, calling for more innovative approaches to economic management and greater experimentation in industry. He also stresses the importance of implementing new ideas and technological innovations on a broad scale, while calling for a resolute struggle to eliminate obstacles to progress that are now a "brake" on development (p. 261). Chernenko's comments on trade unions suggest that he favors giving workers a greater role in management.

Chernenko goes further in urging a more innovative approach to ideological questions. His 1982 book stresses the "creative" development of Marxist-Leninist theory and calls for a resolute struggle against "dogmatism, ossification of thought, and the irrational imitation of existing models" (p. 247). In a recent article,[8] Chernenko not only stresses the need for ideological flexibility, but appears to call into question the ideological legacy of Suslov. He urges a reassessment of "seeming indisputable theses" in the light of changing conditions. Chernenko acknowledges that this is a controversial idea and states that the problems he discusses in the article were bound to prompt "heated disputes" within the party. These fundamental questions are the very ones that must now be considered by party leaders as they undertake a revision of the 1961 party program.[9] Chernenko has been particularly active in pushing the revision, and he may be trying to use this as an occasion to press for basic changes in party policy.

IN ADDITION to presenting a broad program for change, Chernenko makes a particular effort to appeal to key interest groups in his writings. For example, in his 1982 book on the party and state apparatus, Chernenko goes out of his way to reassure the party elite that their job security will not be threatened by the innovations a Chernenko regime might bring. He stresses the importance of experienced cadres and condemns Khrushchev's policy of mandatory replacement of a fixed portion of the party leadership at each election. He says that such requirements arbitrarily eliminated many qualified leaders, and praises the decision of the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966 to repeal the provisions in the party statutes that mandated replacement of cadres (p. 221).

Chernenko also uses this newest book to help woo the support of regional party organizations by promoting greater decentralization. He suggests that local areas should be given greater authority and be freed from excessive dependence on Moscow in decision-making. He

[7] "A Question of Importance for the Entire Party," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 2, 1982, pp. 3–19.

[8] "The Vanguard Role of the Communist Party, Important Conditions for its Growth: On the Quality of Ideological and Organizational Work," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 6, 1982, pp. 25–43.

[9] The 26th CPSU Congress adopted a decision to complete a draft revision of the party program for consideration by the next party congress.

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states, for example, that "strengthening of democracy begins with increasing the possibilities for the development of local initiative, freeing central organs from minor details." This idea is supported by quoting Lenin to the effect that local areas should be allowed the "maximum initiative and should show maximum independence and boldness" (p. 407).

Chernenko praises at length reforms made by two regional party organizations whose support could help his succession chances: those in Georgia (for efforts to improve intraparty democracy) and in Azerbaydzhan (for effective management of the economy). Georgian CP First Secretary Eduard Shevardnadze, and Azerbaydzhan CP First Secretary Geydar Aliyev, two of the Soviet Union's most effective and innovative leaders, reciprocated by clearly allying themselves with Chernenko in the succession contest.[10] Both men are candidate members of the Politburo. What is perhaps more significant, however, is the fact that such well-placed leaders were betting on Chernenko.

Chernenko's discussion of nationality policy also appears designed to help win support in the republics. In his 1982 book on human rights, for example, Chernenko stresses the flourishing of individual national cultures, as do other leaders, but goes further by strongly condemning Russian nationalism. He states that "great power chauvinism," reflecting the past privileged status of the Russian nationality, was a particular problem in the Soviet Union and that the struggle against it was one of the chief tasks of the party (p. 49).

THE BOOK on human rights, however, is aimed primarily at a foreign audience. The volume is designed to establish a strong record for the Soviet Union on human rights issues, as the Soviets themselves define them. It outlines the various social services provided by the Soviet state and defends the Soviet record on cultural issues. The English translation of this book appears to be faithful to the 1981 Russian original, although the book's contents have been reordered.

The non-Russian reader will find the last reviewed item, an English-language collection of Chernenko's writings assembled by Pergamon Press, a more representative introduction to his views than the book on human rights. Unfortunately, the primary criterion for the choice of the selections appears to have been to avoid having to make new translations of Chernenko's writings. The book relies heavily on articles that had already appeared in English and which were intended primarily for a foreign audience. It includes a disproportionate number of articles from *International Affairs*, as well as a lengthy introductory pamphlet on the CPSU. The handling of this pamphlet is puzzling. The pamphlet (first published in 1978) was reprinted without change in the 1981 Russian edition of Chernenko's writings. However, in this English-language collection, the editors have added numerous references to events occurring after 1978, without explaining why they have done so.

This English-language volume helps to promote Chernenko's image as an authority on foreign policy. The most interesting item in this regard is Chernenko's speech at the April 1981 celebration of Lenin's birthday, in which he speaks out in unusually strong terms about the dangers of nuclear war. He explicitly rejects nuclear war as a "legitimate" or "rational" option for policymakers, and adds that any responsible leader must recognize that the use of nuclear weapons would place the "future of mankind's existence in jeopardy" (p. 11). Chernenko has shown more concern over this problem than any of the other succession candidates.

Other comments by Chernenko also suggest that he is anxious to negotiate an arms agreement with the West and that he would like to shift resources spent on defense to the consumer sector. For example, in his 1979 election speech for the Supreme Soviet, republished only in the Russian edition of Chernenko's works, Chernenko was more enthusiastic than other leaders at the time in looking ahead to a SALT III agreement, expressing the hope that it would allow more money to be spent on consumer production. He stated that if any agreement could be reached "a considerable part of the resources currently swallowed up by the arms race could be used for creative needs." Chernenko's writings on domestic affairs also place a strong emphasis on consumer production and suggest that he would be inclined to seek ways to limit defense expenditures.

WHILE THIS REVIEW has focused on Chernenko's more innovative ideas, his views on other subjects appear to be quite traditional. Nevertheless, taken together Chernenko's writings tell us a great deal about the man and his ideas. Chernenko emerges as a leader committed to pragmatism and change, who would be willing to undertake new policy initiatives. His writings suggest that if Chernenko were to come to power some of his policy directions might include: a heightened interest in arms control with the

[10] Shevardnadze frequently mentions Chernenko in his speeches and singled him out for special praise in a speech published in *Zarya Vostoka*, (Tbilisi), May 4, 1982; their close ties were evident during Chernenko's October 1982 visit to Georgia. It is worth noting that on major public holidays (May 1, November 7), Chernenko's portrait has been displayed for several years in Armenia in a position that accords him a higher ranking than his actual status in Moscow would have merited.

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West, some efforts to slow defense spending, an increased emphasis on consumer production, economic reform, and an expansion of democratic practices both within the party and in the country as a whole.

Gulag Literature

by John Garrard

VARLAM SHALAMOV. *Graphite.* Trans. by John Glad. New York, NY, Norton, 1981.

ANATOLY MARCHENKO. *From Tarusa to Siberia.* Edited and with an Introduction by Joshua Rubinstein. Royal Oak, MI, Strathcona Publishing Co., 1980.

AVRAHAM SHIFRIN. *The First Guidebook to Prisons and Concentration Camps of the Soviet Union.* Trans. from the Russian. Switzerland, Stephanus, 1980.

EUGENIA GINZBURG. *Within the Whirlwind.* Trans. by Ian Boland. Introduction by Heinrich Böll. New York, NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979.

EUGENIA SEMYONOVNA GINZBURG. *Journey into the Whirlwind.* Trans. by Paul Stevenson and Max Hayward. New York, NY, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967.

VARLAM SHALAMOV. *Kolyma Tales.* Trans. by John Glad. New York, NY, Norton, 1980.

THE TRADITIONAL response of Russian intellectuals to sociopolitical problems and abuses in their country has been to write a book, more often than not a novel, a play, or perhaps a collection of stories or poems. Russians continue to be denied those options for normal political action that people living in participatory democracies take for granted. Hence Russian literature has assumed a unique social and ethical significance, which in turn has brought upon the heads of writers special demands not only from an expectant reading public hungry for the truth, but also from the ever-vigilant authorities determined to prevent the appearance of seditious material that might interfere with the smooth running of the state and the security of their own positions in power. So it often happens that political debates revolve around novels, plays, and even poetry, in ways that are quite unfamiliar to us in the West.

The situation today remains much the same as it was two centuries ago under the Empress Catherine II. Horrified by the abuses of serfdom, Alexander Radishchev in 1790 managed to publish (on a private printing press!) an account of his fictionalized journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow. Catherine rewarded Radishchev for his temerity with immediate arrest. Radischev was sentenced to death, but Catherine graciously commuted his sentence to exile for ten years in Siberia. In 1849, a similar thing happened to Fyodor Dostoevsky: for participating in a discussion group he was sentenced to be shot. However, Nicholas I reduced his sentence to ten years in Siberia, four of them in prison. On his return, Dostoevsky published a remarkable account of his experiences. His *Notes from the House of the Dead* (*Zapiski iz mërtvogo doma*) was the first in a long line of such memoirs, but it is in the Soviet period that this unique literary genre—camp or prison literature—has come into its own.

While much has changed since Dostoevsky's time, it is all for the worse. Almost immediately after they seized power in 1917, the Bolsheviks established "concentration camps": first for political opponents; then for those who might possibly become unsympathetic to their methods and aims; then for political allies; then for members of the CPSU and the military elite; then for anybody and everybody, quite indiscriminately. As Solzhenitsyn argues in *The Gulag Archipelago,* the camps were introduced on Lenin's specific instructions, and the notion of "socially redeeming" forced labor was fully established by the early 1920's. It was Stalin, however, who transformed the

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camps into an integral part of the state's political and economic system.[1] Varlam Shalamov, who was first arrested in 1929, states in an important tale, "Mister Popp's Visit," that the authorities conducted experiments with the use of convict labor in two chemical plants in 1930–31:

It was here that the question of the camps' very existence was decided. Only after the Vishera experiment was judged profitable by the higher-ups did the camps spread all over the Soviet Union. No region was without a camp, no construction site was without convicts. It was only after Vishera that the number of prisoners in the country reached 12 million (*Graphite,* p. 143).

After Stalin's death in 1953, many criminals were amnestied: the official Soviet view remains that criminals are less dangerous than "politicals." Soon afterward millions of political prisoners were released, giving rise to an important theme in Russian literature and film, that of the returning political prisoner. (An honest, thoughtful treatment of the theme can be found in Victor Nekrasov's *Kira Georgiyevna,* a novel published in 1961. The appearance of these novels and films, permitted because of Khrushchev's anti-Stalin campaign, culminated in late 1962 with the publication in *Novyy mir* of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's novella *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* (*Odin den' Ivana Denisovicha*), the first (and only) truthful portrayal of life in the camps published in the Soviet Union; official hacks have, of course, produced several grotesquely rosy pictures of the camps.

Significantly, given the Russian tradition referred to above, the vehicle chosen for this revelation of camp life was not a work of expository prose, but one of fiction. To avoid having to explain the phenomenon of the camps or to get into the dangerous area of generalization, Solzhenitsyn carefully narrowed his focus in both time and place. Furthermore, he narrated the story from the point of view of a simple peasant carpenter, a man who would not seek to rationalize his experiences.

The appearance of this startling work resulted from a rare overlap between the policies of the Soviet Communist Party leadership and the desires of the liberal intelligentsia.[2] In permitting the publication of *One Day* and other works, such as Yevgeniy Yevtushenko's poem "The Heirs of Stalin" ("*Nasledniki Stalina*") which actually appeared in *Pravda,* Khrushchev's obvious intention was to separate himself from the abuses of the past, which were all blamed on the "cult of personality." (Stalin's body had been removed from the mausoleum on Red Square in late 1961.) The suggestion was that times had now changed, that the Gulag was a thing of the past.

IT IS generally agreed in the West that the mass terror employed by Stalin as a weapon of political control has been abandoned. Some have suggested that the camp system he created has been largely dismantled. Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case. Mass terror has been replaced by selective terror, designed to "encourage the others." Certainly, there can no longer be 12 million prisoners in the Gulag, but just how many remain is impossible to say. Most Western estimates put the figure at two to three million, of whom a little over 10,000 are political prisoners.[3] Compare this figure with the 400,000 inmates now being held in American prisons.

Anatoly Marchenko's *My Testimony* (*Moi pokazaniya*) offers the first extensive description of the camps since the death of Stalin. Marchenko states at the outset that the only thing that kept him alive was the determination to get out and tell what he had seen and endured: "The main purpose of my notes is to tell the truth about the camps and prisons for politicals that exist today. . . ."[4] Marchenko expresses the fear that all the writing about Stalin's camps circulating in *samizdat* would lull readers into a false sense of security, that they would not realize that the camps continued to exist after Stalin.

Marchenko is unusual in being a worker who was politicized into becoming a member of the dissident intelligentsia. In *From Tarusa to Siberia* he tells of his most recent arrest, his hunger strike, and the brutal treatment he endured in the late 1970's. Marchenko is a victim of "selective terror." Originally arrested as a scapegoat after a brawl in a workers' hostel, he has been

[1] The similarities between the Soviet camps and the later Nazi German camps are striking. In 1937, Volume 34 of the *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia) appeared with a description of the Nazi camps *that in fact describes accurately and in detail the* Soviet labor camps. Quoted in Mikhail Geller, *Kontsentratsionnyy mir i sovetskaya literatura* (The World of Concentration Camps and Soviet Literature), London, Overseas Publications Interchange, 1974, pp. 5–6. The similarities were an obvious embarrassment to the Soviet authorities. Shalamov tells of a man who was accused, quite falsely of course, of declaring that Kolyma was "Auschwitz without the ovens" (*Graphite,* p. 130); the fabricated charge is revealing. Some prisoners had experience of both Nazi and Soviet camps. Among the women Eugenia Ginzburg met in prison were several members of the Comintern. One displayed some "hideous scars" on her buttocks and calves and said, " 'This is Gestapo.' Then she quickly sat up again and, stretching out both her hands, added: 'This is NKVD.' The nails of both her hands were deformed, the fingers blue and swollen."

[2] See my "Anti-Stalinism and the Liberal Trend in Soviet Literature," *The Dalhousie Review,* (Halifax), Summer 1962, pp. 179–89.

[3] See "Estimates of the Prison Population of the USSR," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (Munich), RL 351/82, Aug. 31, 1982.

[4] Anatoly Marchenko, *Moi pokazaniya,* Paris, La Presse Libre, 1969, p. 6.

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systematically brutalized and has had his health placed in serious jeopardy because of his desire to leave the Soviet Union.

The evidence included in Avraham Shifrin's extraordinary *Guidebook* confirms on a countrywide scale Marchenko's personal experience that the Gulag continues to exist and even to flourish. Furthermore, Shifrin argues that the prisoners, whether politicals or common criminals, men or women, continue to play an important economic and military role by working in plants, on industrial sites (such as the Baykal-Amur Railway—BAM), and in Soviet arms (including nuclear) production. Shifrin, a Zionist who spent ten years in the camps and emigrated to Israel in 1972, has drawn less from his own experiences than from those of countless other former prisoners and their families to produce detailed information on the location, type, capacity, and, on occasion, the names of the commandants of some 2,000 prisons, camps, and "psychiatric hospitals" in the Soviet Union. A map of the country at the end of the book is completely black with dots marking the sites of such establishments.

What makes Shifrin's book especially shocking is the deliberate incongruity between the tourist format (republic by republic, region by region) and his often ironically cheerful guidebook prose style on the one hand, and on the other, the frightening "sights" and human suffering that are being described. Here is just one example of this technique (pp. 86–88):

Odessa was given the title of "heroic city" for its role in the war. This is the first thing an Intourist guide will tell you. . . . The guide, however, will not tell how to find the concentration camps, prisons, and psychiatric prisons of the city. . . . We can most easily begin our tour by first visiting the penal complex on Chernomorskaya Road, consisting of a women's camp, a children's camp, and a camp for adolescents (14 to 18 years of age).

Shifrin's book contains not only maps, but also some photographs taken in the camps and somehow smuggled out of the country. One shows a camp in Orël with a group of boys walking past a sign that reads "Honest work: the road home to the family"; another shows women sawing and chopping trees deep in the Siberian forests near the Yenisey River (both photos taken in 1976).

WHY IS IT that the shocking facts presented in Shifrin's book have not had very much impact in the West? The first reason is that you cannot suffer for statistics; the suffering reaches a level where it no longer registers with the reader, certainly not the reader in the West. As Eugenia Ginzburg herself remarks: "The most fearful thing is that evil becomes ordinary, part of a normal daily routine extending over decades" (*Within the Whirlwind,* p. 290). You can only suffer with one person at a time; that is why *The Diary of Anne Frank* had such an enormous impact. Second, the bare facts lose their power over our senses and emotions if they are not presented in a coherent and *artistic* manner. In his remarkable book *The Uses of Enchantment,* Bruno Bettelheim has drawn our attention to the essential role played by fiction in the psychic and emotional growth of human beings. This is an important point understood by Solzhenitsyn and other well-known writers on the camps; that is why they have taken such trouble to treat real events with attention to pace, characterization, theme, and detail—all tools from the novelist's tool box. In this respect, Soviet camp literature inhabits the same genre as American "faction," initiated by Truman Capote's *In Cold Blood*. Another point to remember is that the terrible suffering described must be interpreted; the reader is looking for some way to incorporate the suffering into his own experience, to increase his understanding of life and human nature, as well as of the truth of what happened and is happening in the Gulag.

Ginzburg and Shalamov shared similar fates. Both were arrested without just cause in 1937 (in Shalamov's case, re-arrested) and spent most of their sentences in Kolyma, the far northeastern part of Siberia, notorious for the appalling conditions in the gold mines and logging camps. Both were allowed to return to European Russia (or what they call "the mainland") in 1954–55. Their descriptions of life and death in the camps agree on many points: the criminals were far worse than the guards (Shalamov comments wryly that if Dostoevsky had known real criminals he would never have expressed sympathy for them (*Graphite,* p. 194); women were on average better able to endure than men, and even worked harder than men; the real killer in the camps was not the cold, or brutality, or starvation rations, but the hard labor; the only people who could save you were the medical personnel (becoming medical assistants ultimately helped both Ginzburg and Shalamov to survive). But essentially one was either lucky or unlucky. As Ginzburg at one point says in despair: "What's the point of looking ahead when you're playing chess with an orangutan?" (*Within the Whirlwind,* p. 161).

Shalamov tells the story of a prisoner (probably himself), whom he calls Krist (translated as "Chris"). The prisoner is summoned by a camp investigator because of his neat handwriting and ordered to

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recopy prisoners' files and long lists of last names. Krist continues to do this one evening a week for several months during the winter of 1937–38 without exchanging a word with the investigator. One evening the investigator picks up a file and asks Krist his full name, then tears up the file. Krist learns only years later that the file was his and the investigator had saved his life. The investigator himself was shot, together with the prisoners whose names Krist had been copying out so neatly ("Handwriting," in *Graphite*).

COMPARISONS at this level of suffering are invidious, but it is clear that Shalamov endured the depths of hell for longer than Ginzburg and witnessed horrors that she was spared. (Ginzburg quotes the Eastern proverb: "May I never experience all that it is possible to get used to" [*Journey into the Whirlwind,* p. 160]). Shalamov's experiences left him permanently scarred; his stories are more bitter and pessimistic than is Ginzburg's narrative. Grigory Svirski, who once saw Shalamov at the Union of Writers in Moscow after his release, describes him as "dried up and curiously dark and frozen like a blackened tree," a tree that "will never again become green."[5]

Ginzburg can wonder: "What would have become of us all if it had not been for the illusory light of that tenacious hope?" (*Journey,* p. 100). Later in the camps she comes to realize that "where there is hope there is fear" (*Within,* p. 69), but Shalamov's narrator is typically more harsh: "A man who hopes for something alters his conduct and is more frequently dishonest than a man who has ceased to hope" (*Graphite,* p. 135). Elsewhere Shalamov declares that it is not hope that makes man want to survive: "He is saved by a drive for self-preservation, a tenacious clinging to life, a physical tenacity to which his entire consciousness is subordinated" (*Kolyma Tales,* p. 123).

Ginzburg continued to believe that man does not live by bread alone; Shalamov became convinced of the opposite. Ginzburg may speak of "a mind purified by suffering" (*Journey,* p. 206), but Shalamov considers the possibility that the mind and soul might be frozen over just as easily as the body (*Kolyma Tales,* p. 48). For him the physical dominates the mental and emotional sides of man: "All human emotions—love, friendship, envy, concern for one's fellow man, compassion, longing for fame, honesty—had left us with the flesh that had melted from our bodies during their long fasts" (*Kolyma Tales,* p. 56). In another story, "Sententious" (*Kolyma Tales*), the narrator begins to revive after being near death: first he becomes semi-conscious, then feels aches and pains. It is only after flesh grows on his bones that he can feel emotions, and the last emotion he feels is pity, first for animals, then for people. Love did not return.

Ginzburg, on the other hand, believes in love and friendship, even under the worst conditions. Admittedly early in her narrative, before she experiences the horrors of the camps, Ginzburg says: "There are no more fervent friendships than those made in prison" (*Journey,* p. 99). Shalamov declares in contrast: "Literary fairy tales tell of 'difficult' conditions which are an essential element in forming any friendship, but such conditions are simply not difficult enough. If tragedy and need brought people together and gave birth to their friendship, then the need was not extreme and the tragedy not great. Tragedy is not deep and sharp if it can be shared with friends" (*Kolyma Tales,* p. 66).

For Shalamov the camps represent not only a descent into the lowest reaches of hell itself, but also a retreat to the beginnings of life on this planet. Here Ginzburg agrees; she describes her arrival at Kolyma as a journey not only into the whirlwind, but to the ends of the earth in the neolithic age, to an "icy, prehistoric land" (*Journey,* p. 397). Shalamov speaks of prisoners kneeling "before the stove's open door as if it were the god of fire, one of man's first gods" (*Kolyma Tales,* p. 50). He frequently compares the prisoners' struggle to survive with that of primitive man, who managed to triumph over the other animals because he was stronger, more determined, and more ruthless: "The beast hidden in the soul of man and released from its chain lusts to satisfy its age-old natural instinct—to beat, to murder" (*Graphite,* p. 119).

By no means does Ginzburg turn a blind eye to man's bestiality. She admits: "We were not yet affected by the corrosive jungle law of the camps, which in later years—it is no use trying to hide the fact—degraded more than one of us" (*Journey,* p. 264). And yet, through all that she endures and witnesses, Ginzburg continues to have faith in human nature. This faith is in fact rewarded on several occasions when acts of kindness save her life. Ginzburg still believes in "that Supreme Good which, in spite of everything, rules the world . . ." (*Journey,* p. 411). Even when, still exiled in Magadan, she is assigned in the fall of 1953 to teach Russian language and literature to 40 security police officers (!), she does not refuse. She replies to friends who criticize her by saying that she will not remain bitter; she refuses to prolong the "ritual of hate" (*Within,* pp. 381–2).[6]

[5] Grigory Svirski, *A History of Post-War Soviet Writing: The Literature of Moral Opposition,* Trans. and ed. by Robert Dessaix and Michael Ulman, Ann Arbor, MI, Ardis, 1981, pp. 195–96. This is an abridged translation of *Na lobnom meste* (At the Place of Execution), originally published in London in 1979.

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Ginzburg and Shalamov choose different forms, different structures to serve as vehicles for their opposing visions of human nature. Ginzburg is far more "literary" than Shalamov in every sense of the word. She reflects often on "the power which literature exerts on us . . ." (*Journey,* p. 228). Ginzburg had an extraordinary memory and was able to recite by heart reams of poetry; in this respect she recalls Nadezhda Mandelshtam. She also composed and memorized many poems of her own which she says helped her to remember people and events when writing her reminiscences; she only began writing down the version we have in 1959. The quotations and references scattered on almost every page testify to Ginzburg's wide reading, but they also constitute a unique possession that could not be stolen from her, even in the camps. She uses literature (chiefly, but not exclusively Russian) to give shape and coherence to what she sees and experiences; it helps her defend her sense of values against the assault being mounted upon them. Ginzburg was an idealist; at first her idealism found an outlet in Marxism (she had been a loyal member of the party and the wife of a successful apparatchik in Kazan'). Although this faith was destroyed, her enthusiasm for literature endured and was reinforced by Christian faith acquired from her second husband, a Volga German homeopathic physician and devout Catholic, whom she met in the camps.

At the end of *Within the Whirlwind,* Ginzburg speaks of completing "this cruel jouney of the soul." Indeed, she has written a sort of spiritual autobiography, an *apologia pro vita sua.* She is completely honest about her earlier political naïveté and openly admits her own share of guilt in ignoring the atmosphere of political fanaticism that led to the Stalinist dictatorship. Given her attitude toward human nature and her desire to bear witness to her own spiritual growth, Ginzburg chose an appropriate literary form to present the truth as she saw it.

The same may be said of Shalamov. We have seen that he did not share Ginzburg's optimism and idealism; nor did he appear to feel any need to trace his own spiritual growth—indeed his whole approach is to deny the cognitive role of suffering. For Shalamov the mindless cruelty and bestiality of camp life could not be incorporated into the traditional form of autobiographical narrative, with its reliance on chronological sequence and the logic of cause and effect. In Shalamov's world there is no logic.

Readers who approach Shalamov's works with the generic expectations usually associated with short stories and tales will be disappointed. That is why I think that comparisons with such writers as Anton Chekhov and Isaac Babel are misleading. With rare exceptions, e.g., in "Major Pugachov's Last Battle" (*Kolyma Tales*), Shalamov does not tell the traditional story. Rather he writes a modern version of the "physiological sketch" that was popular in the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century, first in France and then in Russian. This type of sketch (*ocherk*) has an honorable tradition in Russian literature. The writer adopts an almost documentary or sociological approach, paying little attention to plot, character, and motivation. On occasion Shalamov tries to compensate for this lack of narrative interest by giving his sketches an unexpected final twist or revelation, recalling a technique widely used by O. Henry and Guy de Maupassant, among others.

A second feature of Shalamov's "tales" that serves to distinguish them from more traditional examples of the genre is his use of parataxis. Shalamov chooses to present only separate and discrete slabs of experience, unrelated one to the other.[7] This paratactical method of narration was also employed by a few writers during and after the Russian Civil War as a means of expressing in the very form of their works the haphazard nature of the events being described; a world in which man seemed incapable of controlling his fate. So we stumble after Shalamov as he guides us through the circles of hell, illuminating one terrible scene after another. Unlike the punishments meted out in Dante's *Inferno,* those in the hell described by Shalamov have no rhyme or reason.

TAKEN TOGETHER these six books, particularly those by Ginzburg and Shalamov, constitute an entrée for the Western reader into the unfamiliar genre of camp literature. The sad irony, however, is that with the exception of Shifrin's *Guidebook,* we are not the prime audience to whom these works are addressed. Ginzburg, Marchenko, Shalamov, and other victims of the camps have sought to bear witness to their compatriots in the Soviet Union. Yet this intended audience can only read the accounts in *samizdat,* at great personal risk. The Soviet authorities have apparently been very successful in keeping information about the real conditions in the camps from reaching the general public. In *My Testimony,* Mar-

[6] Shalamov's narrator-participants are not vengeful even when, having been released from the camps, they meet fellow prisoners who have been *chekists* and informers. See, e.g., "The Secondhand Bookseller" and "Esperanto."

[7] Mikhail Geller claims that Shalamov viewed his separate tales as "chapters of a single large work" (*Kontsentratsionnyy mir,* p. 282). We must assume that the juxtapositions Shalamov intended to introduce by a special ordering of the tales have now been lost. Shalamov died in January 1982.

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chenko mentions the case of a camp nurse, who while on vacation, tells of incidents from her work—desperate prisoners who have swallowed glass and other objects. The other vacationers regard her as "abnormal" and avoid her company.

How, then, can these accounts have an impact on Soviet society as a whole? When will the cycle of suffering and witnessing come to an end? To witness suffering is merely a first step; knowledge without action remains frivolous. The writing of these six books constitutes an act of great faith and courage, and yet we cannot avoid the tough questions raised by the long, sad Russian experience. Robbed of any effective means of bringing about change in their society, Russian writers and readers have little choice but to estheticize their experience of suffering and cruelty.

Andrei Sinyavsky, who has written forcefully on these issues, says that the Russian writer's predicament is "To spend all his life drowning and trying to make himself understood in groans and curses. . . ."[8] Sinyavsky correctly points out the special Russian belief in "the power of words." He speaks of "our age-old, purely Russian habit of treating words as real. . . ." However, this in itself exacerbates the harsh dilemma facing the Russian writer. Could it be that both writers and readers have been tempted to substitute words for reality? How do they reconcile their belief in the power of words both with the evidence of Russian history and with their own personal experience which denies the efficacy of literature to bring about social and political change? I began with the example of Radishchev two hundred years ago. The poignant question remains: What hope is there that two centuries from now things will be different?

And what about the reader in the West? The reader feels as though he were attending the funeral of someone he does not know very well. He tries to commiserate with the bereaved, but feelings of sadness mingle with those of embarrassment and suppressed relief that he himself has been spared. The Gulag is immeasurably distant from our own experience. As HRH Prince Charles remarked in a recent interview, while commenting on the works of Solzhenitsyn and Mihajlo Mihajlov: "How do we in the West ever become aware of the depth of our own spirit, and the fortitude which we can extract from that without being made to suffer . . .?"[9] Camp literature confronts the reader in the West with his own dilemma.

[8] Andrei Sinyavsky, "The Literary Process in Russia," *Kontinent*, New York, NY, Anchor, 1976, pp. 85 ff. Sinyavsky, who used the pseudonym Abram Tertz, has written a remarkable account of his own experiences in the camps, *Golos iz khora*, which is available in English: *A Voice from the Chorus*, trans. by Kyril Fitzlyon and Max Hayward, New York, NY, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976.

[9] *The Washington Post*, Aug. 29, 1982, p. C-3.

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Intellectuals and the State in China

by Richard C. Kraus

JEROME B. GRIEDER. *Intellectuals and the State in Modern China: A Narrative History.* New York, NY, Free Press, 1981.

JONATHAN D. SPENCE. *The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and Their Revolution, 1895–1980.* New York, NY, Viking Press, 1981.

R. DAVID ARKUSH. *Fei Xiaotong and Sociology in Revolutionary China.* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1981.

JAMES P. McGOUGH. *Fei Hsiao-t'ung: The Dilemma of a Chinese Intellectual.* White Plains, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1979.

MERLE GOLDMAN. *China's Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent.* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1981.

EVER SINCE the Enlightenment, China's intellectual elite has retained an allure for Westerners. Thus it is not surprising that these new works by Grieder, Spence, Arkush and Goldman, each demonstrating the most sophisticated scholarship on Chinese affairs, share an obvious affection for the intellectuals whose careers they examine. Indeed, almost universal admiration and sympathy is shown for the dozens of intellectuals portrayed in these pages, with the exception of some harshness reserved by Goldman for the intellectual supporters of the Cultural Revolution (and even here an effort is made to understand the forces at work in generating their radicalism). The modern Chinese intellectual emerges in these works as an heroic figure, while the role of villain is assigned not to intellectual adversaries in this past century of mental contention, but rather to the Chinese state and indirectly, to the politicians who have controlled it.

While it is certainly not unusual for intellectuals to be disaffected from their nation's rulers, the story told in these studies of modern China is both more complex and compelling. Historically, state and intellectuals in China have shared a mutual dependence. In exchange for serving and legitimizing the state, intellectuals have been assured a certain social position. In the Qing dynasty, for example, even when old-style mandarins were unhappy with their Manchu rulers, they remained nonetheless generally well-integrated into society through a web of official posts and local leadership responsibilities. This relationship between the political system and the intellectuals began to unravel toward the end of the Qing era, as both internal corruption and external imperialist assault weakened the dynastic state. Seeking to strengthen their state and to protect their social order, mandarin intellectuals became increasingly critical of the dynasty's policies. In its response to criticism, the Qing court revealed what Grieder calls the "dual nature" of Chinese ruling power: "patronage of scholarship and extirpation of dissent went always hand in hand" (p. 49). Conservative modernizers of the state punished those who strayed too far from apparently "traditional" values, leaving intellectuals and state leaders increasingly at odds.

Modern Chinese intellectuals thus have been caught between their desire to participate in a group whose boundaries and nature historically have been shaped through involvement with the state, and their individual vulnerability to disciplinary action as they have sought to reform that state in new ways. Especially in the early 20th century, following the end of the ancient examination system, the collapse of the dynasty, and economic changes in which the gentry families of the intellectuals became less firmly tied to the rural community, intellectuals were cast adrift, increasingly critical and frustrated. In their effort to reestablish central authority, the new Guomindang rulers proved to be no more tolerant of political deviance than had been the Manchus, leading to unprecedented alienation by modern and increasingly Western-oriented intellectuals through the 1930's and 1940's.

When finally the Chinese Communist Party began to reinvigorate and reform the state after 1949, it faced a corps of intellectuals accustomed less to supporting state power than to criticizing it. Drawing upon its experience at "rectifying" sympathetic

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intellectuals in Yan'an, the party turned to a traditional Chinese combination of, on the one hand, coopting intellectuals by appointing them to state posts, and on the other, coercing them through campaigns against heterodoxy. While intellectuals had in the past organized themselves into factions which aimed at reforming or overthrowing political authorities, in the People's Republic similar factions sought the support of powerful state leaders in order to advance or protect the interests of their members.

Some of the authors here under review might take exception to specific aspects of the shape into which I have compressed their story, but the thrust of the legend of the modern Chinese intellectual is clear enough. A centralizing and often despotic state sometimes beguiles and frequently betrays the intellectuals who seek in various ways to serve their nation. Indeed, those who have sought to have the greatest political impact have often suffered the most pain, and even those who have made an accommodation with political power have done so only at the cost of their integrity.

My use of the word "legend" is not to suggest that these authors have concocted a myth with little correspondence to reality. Unfortunately, the emotional anguish and personal suffering of many modern Chinese intellectuals have been all too real. However, the story of these intellectuals may assume slightly less heroic dimensions if one allows that these authors have made two important extrapolations. First, although they are primarily concerned with a tiny handful of celebrated stars among a much larger group of Chinese writers, teachers, and artists, the authors tend easily to offer generalizations about the broader category. Second, the significance of conflict between the individual and the state is often, and sometimes misleadingly, treated in terms of the classic dilemma of Western liberalism, at the expense of treating seriously a profoundly statist orientation common among Chinese intellectuals. I will return to these points after looking more closely at the new books by Grieder, Spence, Arkush, and Goldman.

THE TWO most ambitious efforts to capture the political frustrations of the Chinese intellectuals are Jerome Grieder's *Intellectuals and the State in Modern China* (the fourth volume in an excellent series on the "Transformation of Modern China," edited by James Sheridan) and Jonathan Spence's *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*. Both writers skillfully array the careers of dozens of individually distinctive figures into a rich and complex pageant of intellectuals passionately engaged in the sometimes exhilarating but more often depressing world of modern Chinese politics. Grieder's account begins earlier (with the fall of the Ming dynasty) and ends earlier (in 1949) than Spence's, which starts with the ferment for reform in the 1890's and continues through 1980. Many figures, such as Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Lu Xun, are treated extensively in both books.

Spence's and Grieder's excellent books complement each other surprisingly well, even though they are of rather different character. Grieder's is the more academic work. It places more demands upon its reader, both in supplying one's own background information and in disentangling occasionally convoluted sentences. Grieder treats more thinkers, and sometimes in greater detail than does Spence, whose book is written less for reference by the specialist than as an elegant account for the sophisticated lay reader. Spence provides many good photographs and poems, and his resumes of individuals' ideas, while briefer than Grieder's, are also pithier, making room for more narration of political history. If Spence's language is sometimes more romantic, his intellectuals seem actively involved in the political world around them, whereas Grieder's thinkers often seem to produce relatively disembodied thoughts, and are less immediately tied to the turmoil of their society. Sometimes whole issues are lost. For instance, one reads Grieder without learning that feminism has been a major concern for modern Chinese intellectuals, while Spence makes the struggle for women's rights a primary theme of his book. But neither can Spence include all within the space of one volume; he has little to say about such ultra-Westernized intellectuals as Hu Shi, who plays a prominent role in Grieder's (who is Hu's biographer) account.

Although Grieder adds a tiny epilogue on the People's Republic, his decision to end his story of "modern" China in 1949 contributes to a feeling that intellectual life somehow ended with Communist victory. Indeed, he prefaces his accounts of Communist intellectuals of the Republican period with a discussion of "ideological" thought, as if to show that this is sharply differentiated from (and inferior to) less obviously committed thinking. Here Spence's treatment is more compelling, for he effectively relates the experiences and feelings of intellectuals in the People's Republic to their earlier adventures. The events of 1949 represent neither the dropping of a curtain nor a glorious new beginning, but rather a political change which modified the situation of China's intellectuals without resolving their dilemma of how to cope with political power.

This notion of a continuing dilemma emerges clearly in the case

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of Fei Xiaotong, who was China's most eminent social scientist in the 1940's, and is so once more in the 1980's. That Fei's social science began not with Marx but with Malinowski's functionalist anthropology makes this continuity all the more remarkable. David Arkush's *Fei Xiaotong and Sociology in Revolutionary China* provides a finely detailed and excellently written biography by which the significance of this career can be assessed. Although from a gentry family, Fei sought education in fields very foreign to China's mandarin tradition. While Fei's desire to harness knowledge to social betterment recalls that tradition, his disdain for historical research and his pioneering village field-work represent sharp breaks with the accepted concerns of Chinese intellectuals.

In addition to producing scholarly research and journalistic writings which were increasingly critical of the Guomindang government, Fei became a successful academic entrepreneur, drawing frequently upon important foreign connections (the London School of Economics, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Institute of Pacific Relations) for the kind of financial and intellectual support that was difficult to obtain at home. Indeed, Fei's book most famous in the West, *Peasant Life in China,* was never published in Chinese, although the Japanese quickly translated it when they occupied the Jiangsu area it describes. In the absence of Chinese patronage, Fei relied upon foreign support to aid his career. Fei's grants and foreign lecture invitations served him just as the outside world in other manifestations served Sun Yatsen, Kang Youwei, and Liang Qichao (the physical security of the treaty ports or Hong Kong, foreign education, the bases of exile politicians in Japan). Frequently uprooted from their own society, and with tenuous (or hostile) ties to their own state, Chinese intellectuals have repeatedly sought purchase in the external world from which they might maximize their leverage on their state.

Fei chose to remain in post-1949 China, where his career initially flourished as he replaced Western ties with the patronage of the new state. The need to hustle constantly after money during the great Guomindang inflation (which provided an impetus for much of his political writing in the Chinese press) was obviated by a comfortable house and a series of appointments to official posts. But Fei did not settle easily into the role of new mandarin for the Communist government. His continuing entrepreneurial instincts on behalf of sociology showed themselves distinctly during the Hundred Flowers period, and he was bitterly criticized during the ensuing anti-rightist campaign. Several of these attacks, along with some of Fei's writings since the late 1940's, have usefully been assembled in James P. McGough's *Fei Hsiao-t'ung: The Dilemma of a Chinese Intellectual.* It is to Arkush's credit that he does not dismiss this episode as mere hatchet-work by a perfidious state, but instead discusses seriously the political issues represented by Westernized intellectuals such as Fei.

One result of the criticism was that Fei ceased publication. However, the treatment he received was otherwise mild—neither jail nor re-education through labor, but an administrative drop in bureaucratic rank. And he kept the house. Fei's political agility was evident again during the Cultural Revolution, when in 1972 he because one of the first old-style intellectuals to be rehabilitated. By the end of the decade he was again organizing the discipline of sociology, meeting countless foreign guests, travelling abroad, and even serving as a judge in the trial of Jiang Qing. It seems that the Western connections and prestige abroad which had harmed him in 1957 are again a source of leverage in dealing with a state that now seeks to cultivate certain foreign ties.

THE REINTEGRATION of intellectuals and the state has not been a smooth process, and Fei's relatively gentle personal treatment is by no means typical. Much of the bitterness and suffering of the past three decades has been intensified by internal divisions among the intellectuals themselves, who are apparently as faction-prone when close to the seat of power as when exchanging polemics in exile. An extremely helpful guide to these struggles since 1960 is Merle Goldman's *China's Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent,* in many ways a sequel to her *Literary Dissent in Communist China.* Goldman carefully traces opposing factions among politicized intellectuals, providing much valuable information about their institutional bases, their programs, and their patrons.

The fundamental line of division traced by Goldman separates intellectuals who seek enthusiastically to grasp and use state power, whom she calls radicals, and those who desire a more limited role for the new state, whom she identifies as liberals. Her division coincides with support or opposition to the Cultural Revolution and goes a long way toward explaining intellectual politics in contemporary China. There are, however, a few problems with this tidily appealing dichotomy of radicals and liberals. For instance, one must stretch the categories a bit to count Zhou Yang, that most faithful of spokesmen for shifting party policies, as a liberal reformer. Another of Goldman's liberals is Wu Lengxi, former editor of *People's Daily,* who did indeed

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belong to an anti-Maoist faction prior to the Cultural Revolution. But Wu somehow managed to sign up with the radicals in the early 1970's, only to be purged again (this time for leftism) after Mao's death. He has recently surfaced a third time, demonstrating that Mr. Wu is fleet of foot in Beijing's political marathon, and also suggesting that ideological proclivities are an insufficient basis for explaining the operation of intellectual factions. To be fair, Goldman is concerned with the importance of personal ties, shared work experiences, and so forth, in building factional loyalties. Cases such as Wu's, which are by no means exceptional, merely show how difficult it is to understand from outside China the workings of these very personal networks of mutual obligation.

Another difficulty is Goldman's eager representation of the anti-radical intellectuals as "liberals." While she correctly interprets their opposition to the Cultural Revolution as resistance to political influence over their work, she too quickly concludes from this that they subscribe to fundamentally anti-statist values. Rather than look for closet Jeffersonians tucked away in the Academy of Social Sciences, one might as easily view the resistance to the Cultural Revolution in less philosophical terms: the anti-radical intellectuals were unhappy because their influence over the state was insufficient to bring about social policies of their preference. It is not that there was *too much* state, but rather that it was in the wrong hands. Most of these "liberal" intellectuals are now in good standing and close to the center of power. There have been changes in the relationship of intellectuals to the state since Mao's death, but it would be very misleading to characterize recent reforms as liberalism, if that slippery word refers to institutional or intellectual efforts to establish a separate sphere for individual, as opposed to state, interests.

What the post-Mao reforms have brought are improved material conditions for intellectuals: better pay, better housing, better vacations, more distinctive titles, and less direct political supervision of their work. Such a program is not liberal, unless one believes that whatever is good for intellectuals is liberal. Rather it is a very traditionally statist program of political cultivation of the educated elite. Even at the height of Western influence on China during the May 4th period, liberal thought could not find a firm social basis in Chinese society, assuring that even those intellectuals most critical of the Guomindang government remained fundamentally statist in their orientation toward power. The trouble with the Guomindang was that it harmed the interests of intellectuals when it assassinated poets and let professors' salaries fall ruinously behind inflation. Similarly, the trouble with the Cultural Revolution for most intellectuals was that it sent them to the countryside, split up their families, restricted their publications, and bestowed greater status on workers and peasants. These are deeply felt concerns with which it is easy to have enormous sympathy, but we should be cautious not to allow our compassion for beleaguered intellectuals to lead us into seeing liberals where they in fact do not exist.

THE APPARENT centrality of the conflict between individual intellectuals and the state might be diminished somewhat if we knew more than we yet do about the politics and lives of intellectuals less celebrated than those discussed in these works. Stars are often prima donnas and may well behave differently, perhaps more defiantly, than ordinary working intellectuals. Certainly many leading intellectuals have perceived a gap between their aspirations and those of some of their not so famous contemporaries. Spence quotes Lu Xun's criticism of "Master Baldy," a fictional scholar whose "forebears had never laid down their lives to preserve a government, nor had they lost their lives by joining rebel causes" (p. 87). I do not mean to imply an inherent cravenness among ordinary writers, performers, and teachers, but merely to suggest that their daily concerns may often be distant from the heroic struggles set forth in these four books. This may be especially true of China's growing ranks of technical intelligentsia, and of new intellectuals of worker and peasant backgrounds, who do not have to worry so constantly about the questions of foreign influence or of tainted class origin.

As a vehicle for facilitating the reconciliation of intellectuals to the state in China, official Marxism has some intriguing attributes. Although students of other socialist societies have frequently observed that Marxism has been utilized by intellectuals to consolidate their social positions, this line of analysis has not been pursued in these works on China. This lack is surprising, given the demonstrated importance of culture to Chinese politics. Grieder quotes the Sung dynasty poet and bureaucrat Su Dongpo to show this Confucian impulse: "What a ruler has to rely upon is only the hearts of men" (p. 26). A Marxist state also requires intellectuals to mediate between the ruler and those hearts, and in the long term there is every reason to believe that China's modern intellectuals will be able to use that position of mediation to their own advantage.

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Notes & Views

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 400 C Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547.*

SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN TRADE SUBSIDIES

TO THE EDITORS: In his article "East European Economic Slowdown" (*Problems of Communism,* July-August 1982), Jan Vanous has made a number of assertions regarding East European terms of trade with the USSR which, in my opinion, present a rather distorted picture of the true state of affairs in the Soviet Union's trade with its satellite clients.

In connection with the question of preferential trade treatment accorded to Eastern Europe by Moscow in the 1970's, Mr. Vanous claims that "the USSR exported relatively underpriced energy and nonfood raw materials to Eastern Europe in exchange for imports of relatively overpriced machinery and industrial consumer goods," the degree of overpricing being even enhanced by the low technological sophistication of East European products (p. 6). Finally, he asserts that as much as 92 percent of total Soviet transfers of resources to Eastern Europe took the form of hidden trade subsidies (p. 7). I believe that any argument exaggerating the extent of Soviet "assistance" in this manner rests on rather fragile ground. The premises on which it draws seem to underestimate a number of significant factors involved in the overall development of the terms of trade between the USSR and Eastern Europe during the 1970's. Let me address two such factors that I consider to be of particular importance to the present argument.

First, there is the question of "hidden costs" incurred by East European countries in their exports of machinery and other technological products to the USSR. It can be reasonably argued that after the period of outright economic exploitation of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union in the early postwar years, terms of trade in the intra-CMEA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] trade were put on a more balanced footing in 1956–67, with the Soviet terms of trade admittedly set on a deteriorating trend. In order to redress this unfavorable development, the Soviet Union decided to "improve" the quality of industrial imports from Eastern Europe by gradually making her client states base their Soviet-oriented production on imported Western technology and know-how. Such Soviet tactics started with pressures on Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic beginning about 1972 (see Paul Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe," in S. J. Rosen and J. R. Kurth, Eds., *Theories of Economic Imperialism,* Toronto and London, Lexington Books, 1974). The subsequent "investment boom" in Poland was a case par excellence—with the bulk of Western loans pumped into industrial sectors geared for the production of Soviet-bound exports. According to a rare recent report on the subject, the "hidden costs" thus incurred by Poland in sustaining her trading exchanges with the USSR, especially since 1976, amounted to losses almost proportionate to Poland's growth in indebtedness, estimated at about US$6 billion per annum (see Marian Rajski's speech at a May 16, 1981, local party conference in Gdynia in *Kultura* [Paris], No. 11, 1981, and a brief reference to the speech in *Foreign Report* [London], Dec. 3, 1981).

The second factor, no less important, is the Soviet imposition since 1976 of the transferable ruble as a binding unit of account for intra-CMEA trade, which enables Moscow to manipulate exchange rates almost at will. In the case of Poland, for instance, in 1981, the ruble was valued at 44.44 zloty for exports of Poland's machinery to the USSR, but was valued much higher for Polish energy imports from the USSR. According to Polish charges, "the TR [transferable ruble] has become an instrument for changing every 62 kopecks for one US dollar, the Soviet profit on each dollar being a Polish loss" (ibid.).

I neither deny the (indisputable) existence of subsidies in Soviet energy exports to Eastern Europe, nor propose a counter-argument suggesting extensive Soviet "profits" from its intra-CMEA trade. I merely hope to have shown that any attempt to weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages in intra-CMEA terms of trade must be approached with utmost care, because of the lack of sufficient empirically reliable data.

Finally, I think it is rather naive for anyone to expect that the Soviet Union would be willing to forgo long-term economic benefits from its intra-CMEA trade "to pay for continued political and military allegiance" of its East European client states. The USSR may, admittedly, be forced into temporary economic concessions as a short-term tactic to avert a major catastrophe—as in the case of Poland now. However, I believe that Albert Hirschman's concept of "exclusive complementarity" (formulated as long ago as 1945 in his *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, University of California Press) is still very much in evidence as a dominant factor in Soviet long-term attitudes toward its East European satellites.

JANUSZ MONDRY
London

MR. VANOUS RESPONDS: The letter by Mr. Mondry typifies the attitude of those who have little understanding of the concept of opportunity cost in Soviet-East European trade and even less knowledge of the actual terms of this trade but who nevertheless boldly pronounce the Marrese-Vanous study of implicit subsidies as presenting "a rather dis-

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torted picture of the *true* state of affairs in the Soviet Union's trade with its satellite clients" (emphasis added).

To explain the concept of opportunity cost in Soviet-East European trade, I shall use a simple example. Assume that the Soviet Union is interested in transforming crude oil into knitted sweaters produced out of synthetic fibers. The USSR has an option of producing the synthetic fibers and sweaters domestically, importing them from an East European country (say Poland), or importing them from a West European country (say Italy). Let us also assume that within the Soviet Union, the trade-off between oil and sweaters—measured in terms of production resources required—is 5 sweaters for 1 ton of oil. Further assume that by exporting oil to Poland in exchange for sweaters, the Soviet Union is able to obtain 10 sweaters for 1 ton of oil, and thus trade appears profitable. However, assume that Italy is even more efficient in production of sweaters, and that the Soviets may be able to obtain 20 sweaters for 1 ton of oil exported there. According to the concept of opportunity cost, the Soviet Union by trading with Poland—a partner offering inferior terms of trade—would incur an opportunity cost of 10 sweaters per ton of oil sold (the difference between what could be obtained from Italy and what is actually obtained from Poland). In relative terms, we can say that the Soviet Union is either paying twice as high a price for sweaters to Poland as it would have to pay to Italy or is receiving only half the price for its oil exported to Poland that it could obtain in Italy. Thus, the Soviet Union is implicitly subsidizing the Polish economy.

Just as the Soviet Union should not worry where Italy obtained its technology for transforming crude oil into synthetic fibers and into knitted goods, it should not be a Soviet concern where Poland obtains its technology. The concept of "hidden (hard-currency) costs" of East European exports to the Soviet Union is totally irrelevant here. The Soviet Union is not forcing Eastern Europe to export more machinery so that the region can import more energy—rather, the pressure is in the opposite direction: Eastern Europe needs to export more manufactures to the Soviet Union in order to pay its growing energy import bill. By importing Western technology and improving the quality of its manufactures exported to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe has been able to induce the Soviets to increase their purchases of its manufactured goods. The fact that in the course of this self-chosen strategy Eastern Europe ended up with a substantial hard-currency debt in the West is not a direct fault of the Soviet Union. Rather, it is an illustration of what is wrong with the present form of the centrally planned economic system, which was originally imposed on Eastern Europe by the Soviets. Thus, the Soviet responsibility is at most indirect. The case of Poland is not an example of direct Soviet exploitation but an example of large-scale mismanagement of Poland's economy by that country's rulers.

Mr. Mondry's assertion that in 1976, the Soviet Union imposed the transferable ruble as a binding unit of account for intra-CMEA trade is absolute nonsense. The transferable ruble was created in 1963 to facilitate multilateral financial settlements within CMEA instead of bilateral balancing of trade accounts. The official transferable ruble/dollar exchange was then arbitrarily set at 0.9 rubles per dollar, but this rate has little real economic meaning. Since intra-CMEA trade prices are based on lagged world-market dollar prices, for the purposes of exchange *any* rate would do. If the ruble is overpriced, as has been the case, this merely implies that the Soviet Union overcharges Eastern Europe for its exports as it is in turn overcharged by Eastern Europe exactly to the same degree for its imports.

The difference between the valuation of the ruble in terms of zloty for Polish machinery exports and energy imports reflects the relationship between the distorted domestic price structure and the value of traded goods in rubles at special intra-CMEA prices (which happen also to be distorted by world-market standards). Surely, Mr. Mondry would not argue that Poland grossly exploited the West through its energy exports when in 1980 the domestic cost of earning 1 dollar was 18 zloty for exports of energy and 42–46 zloty for exports of most manufactures. The sectoral zloty/dollar and similar zloty/ruble rates merely reflect the relationship between internal zloty price levels and external dollar and ruble price levels in different sectors.

The Polish charge that "the transferable ruble has become an instrument for changing every 62 kopecks for one US dollar, the Soviet profit on each dollar being a Polish loss," was made by someone with no knowledge of the meaning of the transferable ruble, its use in Polish-Soviet trade relations, or the actual terms of trade between Poland and the Soviet Union. The availability of detailed official Polish statistics on Polish-Soviet trade, judged reliable by most specialists on Eastern-bloc trade, permitted a detailed study of Polish-Soviet trade relations by Elizabeth Goldstein of the University of Pennsylvania. The results of her study, appearing in the upcoming publication US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects,* show that in 1980, Soviet hidden trade subsidies to Poland amounted to US$2.4–3.0 billion, hardly a paltry sum. The Marrese-Vanous study arrived at a very similar conclusion based on Soviet trade data.

Finally, it is rather naive for anyone to expect that an excellent book by Albert Hirschman published 37 years ago could have captured all cases of economic and political relationship between a center and a peripheral country. There are other cases where the economic costs of maintaining an empire exceeded the economic benefits—the economic relationship between Great Britain and its colonies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries being a good example.

JAN VANOUS
Washington, DC

A MATTER OF "TRUTH"

TO THE EDITORS: Alexander Kazhdan's critique of Elizabeth Pond's *From the Yaroslavsky Station* (*POC,* July-August 1982) is everything a good review should be. Written out of an intimate familiarity with the subject, it sharpens and multiplies the reader's senses, whetting his appetite for the book.

It is surprising to find in such an informed essay a statement that can be flatly contradicted. I refer to Mr. Kazhdan's dismissal of author Pond's distinction between the Russian words *"pravda"* and *"istina."* Perhaps in the historical and literary development of the pre-Soviet Russian language there was, as Kazhdan claims, no such distinction. But when the voice of state power spoke from the pages of Lenin's *Pravda,* the meaning of words changed radically.

Joseph Berger, in his memoir *Shipwreck of a Generation* (Glasgow, Collins and Son, 1971, pp. 52–53) writes: "The discussion of *pravda* and *istina* went on endlessly in the camps and prisons. . . ." Admitting confusion, he offers the explanation given him by a philologically trained fellow prisoner. With characteristic prison-camp irony he states: *"Istina* denotes the correspondence between the notion and objective reality. *Pravda* is a unique and specifically Russian concept. It means a higher concept of truth, a truth elevated to the rank of an idea. . . . In the rooms of the NKVD and at Party meetings, *istina* was nothing—it was relative and could easily be changed. Only *pravda* was absolute."

The late Alexander Galich also hinted at this difference in his song *"Vinovniki naideny"* (The

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Guilty Are Discovered) in which he writes: "Ask anyone and everyone/Neither poet nor citizen/will know a rhyme for *ISTINA.*"

Language, it would seem, is, after all, superstructure, and is in constant flux, seeking new forms of expression for the complex and often contradictory changes in the base of Soviet society recorded so well by Elizabeth Pond, and commented on so knowingly by Alexander Kazhdan. It is this quest for essence in a changing society that makes Soviet studies a challenge.

THEODORE H. FRIEDGUT
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

MR. KAZHDAN REPLIES: Theodore Friedgut has seen fit to flatly contradict my rejection of Elizabeth Pond's distinction between two Russian words—*"pravda"* and *"istina"*—both of which designate "truth." In order to refute my statement he should have done two things.

First, he should have demonstrated that the example drawn in my review is wrong. This he did not do. On the contrary, he concedes that "perhaps in the historical and literary development of the pre-Soviet Russian language there was . . . no such distinction" (the "perhaps" serving to preserve a shade of doubt).

Second, he should have cited a couple of sentences in which the word *"pravda"* would have a unique and specific sense and could not be replaced by *"istina."* This he also did not do. Instead, he refers to Joseph Berger, who in turn had referred to a "philologically trained" camp prisoner who categorically asserted that such a distinction does exist. In logic this is called *argumentum ad hominem.* Normally, such a tack does not work, but in this particular case it unexpectedly does—not to prove Mr. Friedgut's case but to confirm my own comments. Let us reread Berger's passage. The word *"pravda,"* according to Berger, "means a higher concept of truth, a truth elevated to the rank of an idea." Now back to Mrs. Pond, who affirms the contrary (on p. 214), that "truth was *istina,* pure, unadulterated, uncompromising, painful truth, as opposed to *pravda,* the directed, adulterated, and often betrayed 'truth' shaped and moulded to some further socialist end." Any objective reader will see that in their attempt to draw a distinction between *"pravda"* and "istina," Mrs. Pond ascribed the "loftiest" meaning to *"istina,"* whereas Mr. Friedgut or Joseph Berger or his philologically trained informer ascribed this exalted meaning to *"pravda."* What better proof that the distinction between the two words is artificial and purely subjective?

As for the quotation from Aleksander Galich, it has nothing to do with our dispute since it does not deal with the alleged opposition between *"pravda"* and *"istina."*

ALEXANDER KAZHDAN
Washington, DC

CENSUS CENSORED

FROM RECENT personal conversations and the contents of the publishing plan for the *Izdatel'stvo "Finansy i statistika"* for the year 1983, it appears that the Soviet government will not publish a series of volumes on the results of the 1979 population census.

In the usual meaning of the term in the two postwar Soviet censuses, a census volume contains the details for one or several major characteristics (such as age and sex) by administrative-territorial unit, or alternatively, for one administrative-territorial unit (such as Tadzhikistan) with data on all characteristics selected for publication. It now appears that publication will be limited to reproduction of the tables and brief introductory text materials already published, or soon to be published, in various issues of *Vestnik statistiki* (Moscow), the monthly house organ of the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. This is very little information in comparison to the three thousand pages of information published in 7 volumes for the 1970 census.

So far, no age data have been published in the "Statistical Materials" section of *Vestnik statistiki* or elsewhere. Continued reluctance by the USSR authorities to permit publication of age data (as I noted in this journal's January-February 1982 issue) strongly suggests the presence of major demographic distortions which the Soviet authorities will not make known to their own people and the world. If my analysis is wrong, the Soviet authorities can easily show it by publishing the data. I would rather be wrong and have the data.

MURRAY FESHBACH
Washington, DC

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